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Zusammenfassung 
 
Anfechtbares Denken (defeasible reasoning) beschreibt die Fähigkeit von Menschen, zuvor 
gezogene Schlüsse im Lichte neuer Information zu revidieren. Es ist besonders in der 
Rechtsprechung wichtig, weil dort strafausschließende Umstände dazu führen können, dass 
Richter schlussfolgern, dass eine strafbare Handlung nicht bestraft werden soll. Das Ziel 
dieser Arbeit ist es daher zu untersuchen, wie Menschen Schlussfolgerungen von rechtlichen 
Regeln revidieren. In einer Reihe von Experimenten wurden rechtliche Regeln als 
Konditionale präsentiert (z.B. „Wenn eine Person einen Menschen tötet, dann soll die Person 
wegen Totschlags bestraft werden“) und in Inferenzaufgaben zusammen mit potenziell 
strafausschließenden Umständen (z.B. Notwehr) eingebettet. Strafausschließende Umstände 
wurden entweder explizit als eine dritte Prämisse präsentiert (Experimente 1, 2, 4, 5) oder 
durch Vorstudien implizit erfasst (Experimente 6-8). Die Versuchsteilnehmer sollten 
entscheiden, ob der in der Inferenzaufgabe beschriebene Täter bestraft werden soll 
(Experimente 1, 2, 4-8) oder bestraft wird (Experimente 6-7). In Experiment 3 wurden die 
Versuchsteilnehmer aufgefordert strafausschließende Umstände selbst zu generieren. In allen 
Experimenten hatten die Versuchsteilnehmer kein rechtliches Vorwissen (d.h. Laien), aber in 
den Experimenten 1-3 wurden auch Juristen (d.h. fortgeschrittene Jura-Studierende oder Jura-
Absolventen) getestet. Während Juristen beim Schließen den Regeln des Strafgesetzbuches 
folgten, hatte das Gerechtigkeitsempfinden von Laien einen Einfluss auf ihre 
Schlussfolgerungen. Wenn Laien gefragt wurden, ob ein Täter bestraft werden soll und die 
Straftat moralisch empörend war, ignorierten sie oft potentielle strafausschließende 
Umstände. In solchen Fällen hatten Laien sogar Schwierigkeiten selbst strafausschließende 
Umstände zu generieren. Nur wenn Laien danach gefragt wurden, ob ein Straftäter bestraft 
wird, konnten sie Ausnahmen für moralisch besonders verwerfliche Straftaten 
berücksichtigen. Des Weiteren konnte gezeigt werden, dass abhängig von den Einstellungen 
und Präferenzen der Teilnehmer manchmal rechtlich strafbare Taten nicht bestraft wurden. 
Zwei weitere Experimente (Experimente 9-10) zeigen, dass Menschen auch in 
Alltagssituationen oft Ausnahmen für emotional geladene Ereignisse ignorieren. Die Befunde 
sind für die kognitive Psychologie relevant, weil sie die Wichtigkeit von Vorwissen, 
Einstellungen und Präferenzen beim Denken zeigen. Außerdem sind sie für die 
Rechtswissenschaften, Sozialpsychologie und unserer Gesellschaft bedeutsam: die Ergebnisse 
zeigen, dass Paradigmen der kognitiven Psychologie verwendet werden können, um sozial 
relevante Konstrukte aus der Rechtstheorie und Sozialpsychologie zu testen.  
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Abstract 
 
Defeasible reasoning is people’s ability to withdraw previously drawn conclusions in light of 
new evidence. Defeasible reasoning is therefore especially important in law, where 
exculpatory evidence can bring judges to conclude that an offence should not be punished 
after all. The aim of this thesis was thus to investigate how people withdraw conclusions from 
legal rules. In a series of experiments, legal rules were presented as legal conditionals (e.g., 
“If a person kills another human, than the person should be punished for manslaughter”) and 
embedded in inference tasks together with potentially exculpatory circumstances (e.g., self-
defense). Exculpatory circumstances were presented either explicitly as a third premise 
(Experiments 1, 2, 4, 5), or captured implicitly via preliminary studies (Experiments 6-8). 
Participants had to decide whether the offender described in the inference task should 
(Experiments 1, 2, 4-8) or will be punished (Experiments 6-7). In Experiment 3 participants 
were asked to generate exculpatory evidence. Participants in all experiments were people 
without legal education (i.e., laypeople), but in Experiments 1-3 lawyers (i.e., advanced law 
students and graduated lawyers) were also tested. Whereas lawyers’ defeasible reasoning 
adhered to the rules of penal code, the results showed that laypeople’s defeasible reasoning 
depended on their own sense of justice. When asked whether an offender should be punished, 
laypeople ignored potential exculpatory evidence when the offence was highly morally 
outraging. In these cases, laypeople even had difficulties in retrieving exculpatory evidence 
from memory. Only when laypeople were asked whether an offender will be punished, were 
they more willing to also consider exceptions for highly morally outraging offences. 
Moreover, depending on people’s attitudes about offences and offenders, sometimes legally 
punishable actions were not punished. Two additional experiments (Experiments 9-10) 
suggested that people are also prone to ignore exceptions for emotionally-charged events in 
everyday scenarios. The findings are relevant for cognitive psychology because they show the 
importance of considering domain knowledge and the reasoners personal attitudes and 
preferences when predicting inferences. Moreover, the results also have implications for law, 
social psychology, and society: they show how cognitive paradigms can be applied to test 
socially relevant constructs from legal theory and social psychology. 
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Introduction 
 
Imagine you are a judge presiding over a dispute about bodily injury. The case is very clear: a 
man A, 25 years old, beat his neighbor B, 30 years old, during a dispute that originated 
because B destroyed A’s flower bed. You know that the penal code includes a rule stating that 
if a person beats another human, then the person should be punished for bodily injury. How 
will you decide? 
This is a simple case. The facts coincide perfectly with the legal requirements of the 
rule, so we can apply this rule and conclude that A should be punished for bodily injury. Such 
reasoning from if-then rules is known as conditional reasoning, and conditionals describing 
legal rules can be called legal conditionals.  
Conditional reasoning is not unique to the legal domain. We actually reason from 
conditionals constantly in our day to day lives, often without even noticing it. For instance, 
when we see that it is sunny, we might consider using sunscreen because we know that if the 
sun shines, then one can get sunburn. Or, when we try arriving on time to work, it might be 
because our boss once told us that if we come late, then he will fire us. Conditional reasoning 
is so central to our daily lives that – not surprisingly – many theories have been developed to 
understand how human beings reason with conditionals (e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 1991; 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Oaksford & Chater, 2007). Many of these theories measure 
human reasoning performance against the assumptions of classical logic. Classical logic 
prescribes that whenever we have a conditional rule of the form “if p then q”, and a fact 
stating p, q, ¬p or ¬q, we can infer logically what follows. All three examples presented in 
this chapter followed this structure: we had a conditional “if p, then q” and the fact p. As in 
classical logic, we assumed that p is sufficient for q to happen and thus concluded that if p is 
the case, q follows. In classical logic such a conclusion can only be true or false, nothing in 
between. Further, no additional information can make such a conclusion false, because as 
long as the premises (i.e., the rule and the fact) are true, the conclusion is necessarily true. 
This is the property of monotonicity of classical logic. But do we reason monotonically in our 
daily lives?  
Imagine again you are a judge. Once more you are confronted with a case of bodily 
injury. At first glance the case is very similar to the one you solved before. A man C, 25 years 
old, beat this neighbor D, 30 years old, in an dispute that originated after D destroyed C’s 
flower bed. As in the previous case, you might consider applying the rule against bodily 
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injury and conclude that C should be punished. However, unexpectedly C’s lawyer comes up 
with exculpatory evidence showing that C was actually defending himself. In the dispute 
about the flower bed, D had actually attacked C first so that C had no alternative but to attack 
back. How would you decide? 
In law, exculpatory evidence can make judges change their conclusions. Judges may, 
in light of exculpatory evidence, refrain from punishing offenders, even though a punishable 
act was committed. Also in our daily lives we draw conclusions which we then withdraw in 
light of new information. For example, even though the sun is shining, we might refrain from 
concluding that we should use sunscreen if we know that we will be at home the whole day. 
Or, even though our boss told us to arrive on time for work; we know that our boss will not 
fire us if we have a written permission to arrive late once. This flexibility of human reasoning 
cannot be captured by monotonic classical logic. This is why in recent years psychologists’ 
attention has turned to the investigation of defeasible reasoning – a kind of reasoning where 
conclusions can be defeated by subsequent information (e.g. Oaksford & Chater, 1995a; 2013; 
Pfeifer & Douven, 2014; Pollock, 1987; Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2005). 
Defeasible reasoning has a long tradition at the interface between philosophy, logic 
and artificial intelligence (e.g., Brewka, 1991; Delgrande, 1987; McCarthy & Hayes, 1969; 
Pelletier & Elio, 1997). In those fields researchers have long proposed non-monotonic logics 
to capture human defeasibility (e.g., System P by Kraus, Lehmann & Magidor, 1990; or close-
world reasoning by Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2008). In psychology, the term “defeasible 
reasoning” is not encountered often. Still, there are many psychological studies showing that 
people defeat initially drawn conclusions in light of new information, dating back to the late 
eighties (e.g., Byrne, 1989; Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & Rist, 1991; De Neys, Schaeken, & 
d’Ydewalle, 2003a; Oaksford & Chater, 1991; 1995a). Psychologists’ main focus of research 
in this area has been to find out which factors affect the withdrawal of conclusions. For this, 
the majority of studies employed conditionals describing everyday situations, such as the 
sunburn example above. But what about conditionals describing legal cases, such as in the 
bodily injury example? How human beings defeat conclusions from conditionals describing 
legal rules has hardly been investigated. 
The aim of the current thesis is to combine the fields of legal reasoning and 
conditional reasoning to investigate defeasibility in law experimentally. Understanding how 
human beings reason with legal conditionals is important from a psychological, but also from 
a legal point of view. Most societies have a penal code and other legal stipulates that prescribe 
which actions deserve punishment and which do not. However, the particulars of this 
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knowledge are mostly in the hands of legally educated people. Laypeople usually do not know 
all regulations of the penal code. We therefore cannot know how people without legal 
education reason with legal rules. It may be that their defeasible reasoning is similar to that of 
lawyers and judges. However, it could also be that laypeople have problems with accepting 
exculpatory evidence. Often people complain about courts’ and judges’ decisions, for 
example when a suspect is believed to be guilty but is released because of lack of evidence – 
as in the lawsuit against Jörg Kachelmann in Germany (see Jüttner, 2011; “Geteiltes Echo 
auf,” 2011). Complaints also arise when offenders commit morally reprehensible acts but 
exculpatory evidence – such as psychological disorders – exonerates them or reduces their 
sentences (e.g., Bloechl, Vitacco, Neumann, & Erickson, 2007; Hans, 1986; cf. Tyler & 
Boeckmann, 1997). These reactions from laypeople to offenders suggest that laypeople’s own 
sense of justice may influence their legal reasoning. But how? Does laypeople’s reluctance to 
forgive offenders also lead to less consideration of exculpatory evidence? This thesis aims to 
shed light on this open question by investigating whether and how people’s own sense of 
justice affects their defeasible reasoning with legal rules, and how this defeasibility can be 
modulated. 
 
This thesis starts with an introduction on conditional reasoning. It is explained how 
conditional reasoning is usually investigated in psychology and under which circumstances 
people’s reasoning is defeasible. The cognitive mechanisms behind defeasible reasoning are 
further described by presenting the most important theories on human reasoning. Afterwards, 
the literature on legal reasoning is presented; first from the perspective of legal theory. It is 
explained how penal codes implement defeasibility and how conditionals can be used to 
describe legal reasoning. Then, legal reasoning is explained from the perspective of social 
psychology by presenting studies on people’s sense of justice. Next, empirical findings on 
how humans reason with conditionals describing punishable or undesired acts are presented. 
After having provided the theoretical overview on conditional and legal reasoning, the two 
domains are brought together to draw the main hypotheses of this thesis. It is proposed that 
contrary to lawyers, people without legal education use their own sense of justice to reason 
with legal conditionals. Laypeople’s withdrawal of conclusions drawn from legal rules will 
therefore depend on how morally wrong they perceive an offence to be. These hypotheses are 
tested in three experimental blocks. The first block consists of three experiments and 
investigates differences between laypeople’s and lawyers’ legal reasoning. For this, legal rules 
describing offences were phrased as conditionals and presented together with exculpatory 
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evidence. It is investigated whether the moral wrongfulness of offences predicts laypeople’s 
acceptance of exculpatory evidence and the withdrawal of conclusions. The second block 
investigates how behavioral rules affect laypeople’s sense of justice, and in turn, their 
defeasible reasoning. The effect of behavioral rules is investigated by testing the role of 
religiosity and cultural background on legal reasoning. The third block consists of three 
experiments, which explore how linguistic factors, such as the way in which legal rules are 
phrased, influence legal reasoning and the withdrawal of conclusions. Finally, two last 
experiments are presented. In these two experiments the domain of legal reasoning is 
abandoned to test whether the findings from the previous experiments on the defeasibility of 
legal conditionals have equivalents in everyday scenarios. The thesis ends with a General 
Discussion, where the main findings are recapitulated and their theoretical and practical 
implications for cognitive psychology, social psychology, law, and society are discussed.  
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Background 
 
1.1. Conditional Reasoning 
 
The experimental investigation of defeasible reasoning in law requires the combination of two 
fields: cognitive psychology and legal theory. Therefore, I start with reviewing the 
psychological literature on human reasoning in general. Introducing current reasoning theories 
and the concepts of deduction and defeasibility enables the reader to understand how 
defeasibility can be investigated experimentally and applied to legal theory.  
The study of reasoning in psychology originates from classical logic, which is taken to 
provide standards for how deductive inferences should be drawn (Evans, 2002). In deduction 
people reason from the general to the particular; such as judges do if they have to decide 
whether the general rule of bodily injury applies to a specific case. Deduction differs therefore 
from inductive reasoning, where people reason from the particular to the general (e.g., 
inferring that all thieves wear masks after having observed some thieves wearing masks). 
Besides syllogistic (i.e., reasoning with quantifiers) and relational reasoning (i.e., reasoning 
about relations), conditional reasoning has been one of the most investigated forms of 
deductive reasoning in psychology. In conditional reasoning, reasoners draw inferences from 
a conditional rule of the form “if p, then q”. The if-part of a conditional is called the 
antecedent (p) and the then-part the consequent (q), both are atomic propositions. Each atomic 
proposition can have the truth value true or false. Depending on these truth values, the 
sentence “if p, then q” is either true or false. Propositional classical logic captures this 
dependence by the following truth table for the connective “if” (also called material 
implication): 
 
Table 1 
Truth table for material implication. 
p q If p then q 
true true true 
true false false 
false true true 
false false true 
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In the first row of Table 1, p and q are true, and therefore the statement “if p, then q” is 
also true. In the second row, p is true, but q is false, so that the statement “if p, then q” is 
false. However, if p is false, irrespective of the truth value of q, the compound “if p, then q” is 
true. It is worth noting that in propositional logic, the connective if has a different meaning 
than in everyday language. “If p, then q” does not mean that q is only true if p is true. Instead, 
material implication states the truth value of “if p, then q” depending on whether the atomic 
propositions are either true or false.  
Psychologists have employed different paradigms to investigate conditional reasoning; 
the most widely used being the truth table task, the selection task, and the conditional 
inference task. Because of its relevance for legal reasoning (see Section 1.2.1) the 
experiments in this thesis dealt with the conditional inference task. In the conditional 
inference task participants usually are confronted with three statements, for instance:  
 
If the sun is shining (p), then Jack puts sunscreen on his face (q). 
The sun is shining (p). 
Does Jack put sunscreen on his face (q)? 
 
The two statements above the line are called premises, the first of them being a conditional, 
and the second a fact (also called categorical statement) stating either p, q, ¬p (not p), or ¬q 
(not q). The participant’s task is usually to decide whether the statement below the line, the 
conclusion, follows necessarily from the previous premises. The conclusion can either be 
phrased as a question (as in the above example) or as a concrete statement (i.e., Jack puts 
sunscreen on his face). According to classical logic a conclusion is always true if the premises 
are true and the reasoning is correct. Additional information can never alter a valid 
conclusion. This property is referred to as monotonicity (cf. Stenning & van Lambalgen, 
2008) and results in the four possible inferences depicted in Table 2.  
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Table 2 
The four inferences in classic propositional logic. Table based on Knauff (2006). 
Inference Validity Example 
Modus Ponens 
(MP)  
If p, then q 
p 
q 
 
 
valid 
 
 
If the sun is shining, then Jack puts sunscreen on his face 
The sun is shining 
Jack puts sunscreen on his face 
Modus Tollens 
(MT) 
If p, then q 
¬q 
¬p 
 
 
valid 
 
 
If the sun is shining, then Jack puts sunscreen on his face 
Jack does not put sunscreen on his face 
The sun is not shining 
Affirmation of the 
Consequent (AC) 
If p, then q 
q 
p 
 
 
invalid 
 
 
If the sun is shining, then Jack puts sunscreen on his face 
Jack puts sunscreen on his face 
The sun is shining 
Denial of the 
Antecedent (DA) 
If p, then q 
¬p 
¬q 
 
 
invalid 
 
 
If the sun is shining, then Jack puts sunscreen on his face 
The sun is not shining 
Jack does not put sunscreen on his face 
 
 
According to material implication, Modus Ponens (MP) and Modus Tollens (MT) are 
valid inferences, but Affirmation of the Consequent (AC) and Denial of the Antecedent (DA) 
are not (Table 2). In classical logic, the validity of inferences depends only on the structure of 
the inference. The actual content of the conditional is irrelevant. Nonetheless, I will illustrate 
why some inferences are valid and others not with the conditional from the initial example.  
Given the conditional “If the sun is shining, then Jack puts sunscreen on his face” we 
can conclude that every time the sun is shining Jack will put sunscreen on his face (MP) and 
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that if he is not putting sunscreen on his face, it is because the sun is not shining (MT). The 
validity of MP and MT inferences can be actually read off from the truth table of material 
implication, assuming that the conditional “If p, then q” is true. In MP inferences p is given as 
true. Accordingly, in the first row of Table 1 we see that when p is true, q is also true. 
Similarly, in MT inferences ¬q is given. Accordingly, in the second row of Table 1 we can 
see that if q is false, p is also false. However, it is wrong to conclude that if Jack puts 
sunscreen on his face, it is because the sun is shining (AC), and similarly that if the sun is not 
shining, Jack does not put sunscreen on his face (DA). AC and DA are fallacies according to 
material implication because there are alternative reasons why Jack might put sunscreen on 
his face although the sun is not shining (e.g., testing how tolerant his skin is for a new 
sunscreen, or putting sunscreen as a preventative measure). Also the truth table shows why 
AC and DA are fallacies. In AC inferences q is given, and reasoners are asked whether p 
follows. However, Table 1 shows that if q is true, p can be true (first row) or false (third row); 
there is thus no certain conclusion that can be drawn. The same applies for DA. In DA 
inferences p is negated (i.e., ¬p is true). But Table 1 shows that if p is false, then q can be 
either true or false (see the last two rows). So again, we can infer nothing from ¬p. Because of 
this relationship between p and q, some researchers argue that p is sufficient but not necessary 
for the consequent q, and the consequent q necessary for its antecedent p (e.g., Hilton, Jaspars, 
& Clarke, 1990; Thompson, 1994; 1995).  
In the past 60 years many studies have been conducted to investigate human 
conditional reasoning (Evans, 2002), some studies even date back to the beginnings of the 20
th
 
century (see Störring, 1908). In most of them, participants were asked to assume the premises 
as true and to infer what necessarily follows from them. Sometimes abstract material (e.g., 
Evans, Clibbens, & Rood, 1995; Marcus & Rips, 1979), but also content rich conditionals 
such as the conditional about Jack and the sunscreen (e.g., Byrne, 1989; Markovits, 1986; 
Stevenson & Over, 1995) were used. Based on which conclusions reasoners drew, researchers 
aimed to discover something about human rationality. But, contrary to their expectations, 
researchers found that the inferences people draw – especially the ones with content rich 
material – do not always comply with classical logic. As can be seen in Table 3, people have 
difficulties in recognizing the validity of some inferences. For instance, AC and DA 
inferences are often erroneously classified as valid, in some studies in over 50% of the cases. 
Also, MT inferences are difficult. While in some experiments reasoners manage to draw 
correct MT inferences, in others they reject MT inferences in almost half of the cases. Though 
less frequently than with MT inferences, in some experiments people also have difficulties 
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with MP, i.e., concluding that q follows from p (see Table 3, up to 14% errors in some 
studies). Researchers have tried to find explanations to these deviations from classical logic.  
Some researchers see these deviations from classical logic as errors in a strict sense, 
i.e., cases of wrong reasoning. Wrong reasoning can happen because people understood the 
task wrongly, because of limitations of working memory, or because reasoners are biased by 
the content of the conditional. For instance, errors in accepting AC and DA inferences are 
often explained by assuming that people interpret conditionals not as material implication, but 
as biconditionals (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993). In a biconditional interpretation the 
conditional is understood as “If and only if p, then q”, implying that q only happens if p is the 
case. Therefore, if reasoners hear that p is false they assume wrongly that also q is false; or 
when they hear that q is false they assume that also p is false. Such erroneous interpretations 
are often the result of conversational processes (Grice, 1975). For instance, humans usually 
assume that speakers only communicate what the hearer needs to know. So, when confronted 
with the conditional “If the sun is shining, then Jack puts sunscreen on his face”, reasoners 
assume that all other instances where Jack might use sunscreen are not relevant for the 
speaker and are consequently not mentioned. Another explanation for errors in conditional 
reasoning are problems in processing negations. Negations are often thought to be the primary 
reason for problems with MT inferences (De Neys et al., 2003a). However, errors in MT 
inferences can be also explained by the amount of mental steps necessary to arrive at the 
conclusion (see Section 1.1.2.2) or the amount of mental rules that have to be applied to infer 
that ¬p follows from ¬q (see Section 1.1.2.1).  
Other researchers, however, argue that deviations from classical logic are not actually 
errors. Instead, they argue that people’s conclusions do not always follow the rules of 
classical logic because classical logic is likely not the correct norm for describing human 
reasoning (Bonnefon & Vautier, 2010; Evans, 2002; 2012; Oaksford & Chater, 2009). In 
classical logic, premises can be only true or false, nothing in between. But in our daily lives 
things are rarely that certain. The information we get is only true to a certain degree. If 
somebody tells us that if the sun shines, Jack uses sunscreen, we know that this is not an 
absolute truth. Instead, we know this rule only describes something which is usually the case, 
with some degree of uncertainty. Consequently, the conclusions we draw from such uncertain 
premises are also only more or less probable, and not definitely true or false as in classical 
logic (e.g., Evans, 2012; Oaksford & Chater, 2013; Pfeifer, 2013). Particularly the 
monotonicity of classical logic does not apply to many situations in our daily lives. Many 
conclusions we draw can be defeated by subsequent information. For instance, although we 
CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 10 
might have concluded initially that Jack will put sunscreen on his face, we might withdraw 
this conclusion when we hear that Jack will be at home the whole day. Everyday reasoning is 
therefore non-monotonic and defeasible: additional information can make people reject 
previous valid conclusions (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 1995a; 2013; Pfeifer & Douven, 2014; 
Politzer, 2007; Pollock, 1987; Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2005). 
 
Table 3 
Frequency (%) of acceptance of MP, MT, AC, and DA inferences in the literature up to 1990. 
Table adapted and extended from Evans, Newstead, and Byrne (1993). 
Study n MP MT AC DA 
Taplin (1971) 56 92 63 57 52 
Evans (1977) 16 100 75 75 69 
Marcus and Rips (1979) 
   Experiment 1 (2 choice) 
   Experiment 2 
 
36 
24 
 
99 
98 
 
62 
52 
 
29 
33 
 
31 
21 
Rumain, Connell, and Braine (1983)
 
 
   Experiment 1
 a
 
   Experiment 2
 a
 
 
24 
24 
 
98 
100 
 
81 
63 
 
27 
28 
 
28 
17 
Markovits (1988) 
   Trial 1 (average between both conditions) 
 
76 
 
100 
 
59 
 
42 
 
52 
Byrne (1989) 
   Experiment 1 (simple arguments) 
 
24 
 
96 
 
92 
 
71 
 
46 
Markovits and Vachon (1990) 
   Experiment 2 (concrete material)
ab
 
   Experiment 2 (abstract material)
ab
 
 
150 
150 
 
86 
90 
 
70 
70 
 
15 
28 
 
8 
34 
a
 Children were also tested in this experiment, but only data from the adult control group is 
reported here 
b
 Averaged across the two presentation orders  
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1.1.1.  Defeasible Reasoning  
 
In defeasible reasoning previously drawn conclusions can be withdrawn (i.e., defeated) in 
light of new information. Defeasible reasoning is very important in argumentation (e.g., 
Pollock, 1987), but also in law, e.g., where exculpatory evidence can bring judges to conclude 
that an offence should not be punished (e.g., Prakken & Sartor, 2004). In fact, focusing on the 
defeasibility of human reasoning has a long tradition in philosophy and artificial intelligence 
(e.g., Brewka, 1991; Delgrande, 1987; McCarthy & Hayes, 1969; Pelletier & Elio, 1997). In 
psychology, however, researchers have only recently started to investigate defeasible 
reasoning experimentally – even though the term “defeasible reasoning” is not used often.  
One of the first psychological papers showing that people defeat previously drawn 
conclusions was written by Byrne (1989). In a seminal paper Byrne (1989) confronted 
participants with two different kinds of inference tasks. Half of her problems had the structure 
of typical conditional inference tasks, describing a conditional “If p, then q”: 
 
If Ann has an essay to write (p), then she will study late in the library (q). 
Ann has an essay to write (p). 
Ann will study late in the library (q). 
 
She found that in around 96% of the cases participants correctly made the MP inference. 
However, the other half of the problems contained an additional premise “If r, then q”, 
describing an additional requirement r for q: 
 
If Ann has an essay to write (p), then she will study late in the library (q). 
If the library stays open (r), then Ann will study late in the library (q). 
Ann has an essay to write (p). 
Ann will study late in the library (q). 
 
Now, participants made the MP inference in only 38% of the cases. Byrne initially interpreted 
her findings as evidence showing that people do not apply mental rules during reasoning (see 
Section 1.1.2.1). However, Byrne’s findings are understood nowadays as evidence for 
people’s ability to defeat initially drawn conclusions by additional information (Da Silva 
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Neves, Bonnefon, & Raufaste, 2002; Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2005).
1
 Since Byrne’s 
study, many other experiments have been carried out to measure human defeasibility. Some 
researchers even argue that the central paradigm of cognitive psychology has changed (Evans, 
2012). Instead of testing people’s deductive reasoning abilities against the rational norms of 
classical logic, nowadays – in the so called new psychology of reasoning – researchers are 
more concerned with people’s everyday reasoning: how background knowledge, preferences, 
and experiences affect the conclusions people draw – and withdraw. In the following passages 
I describe how the content (Section 1.1.1.1) and the context of conditionals (Section 1.1.1.2) 
affect the degree to which people engage in defeasible reasoning. 
 
1.1.1.1. The Content of Conditionals 
 
One of the main reasons why reasoning is defeasible stems from people’s background 
knowledge about the content of conditionals (e.g. De Neys, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2003a, 
2003b; Dieussaert, De Neys, & Schaeken, 2005; Evans & Over, 2004; Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 2002; Oaksford & Chater, 1995a; 2003a; 2009). Consider again the sunscreen 
example:  
 
If the sun is shining (p), then Jack puts sunscreen on his face (q). 
The sun is shining (p). 
Does Jack put sunscreen on his face (q)? 
 
At first sight, the MP conclusion that Jack puts sunscreen on his face given the sun is shining 
seems plausible. However, people may refuse to draw MP inferences if they think there are 
reasons why people would not put sunscreen on their faces although the sun is shining, for 
example if somebody had already a deep tan, if somebody did not care about skin cancer, if 
someone wanted to get tanned faster, if someone knew he would be inside all day, if they had 
run out of sunscreen, if someone developed an allergy against sunscreen components, etc. … 
                                                 
1
 One could argue that Byrnes’ (1989) findings can be still explained within the monotonicity framework if all 
possible instances that break the link between p and q are inserted as part of the antecedent (If p and not r, s, t…, 
then q). However, this explanation is psychologically and computationally implausible because it is impossible 
to enumerate exhaustively all possible defeaters that may exist (cf. Dennett, 1987; Fodor, 1987; see Chapter 
1.2.1 for how this problem applies to legal reasoning). 
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When people consider conditions that prevent q even though p is given, they will reject or 
have problems with accepting MP conclusions (e.g., Byrne, 1989; Cummins et al., 1991; De 
Neys et al., 2003a, 2003b; Dieussaert et al., 2005; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Markovits 
& Potvin, 2001; Oaksford & Chater, 2001). These disabling conditions, or more general, 
defeaters, do not only influence MP, but also MT inferences. For example: 
 
If the sun is shining (p), then Jack puts sunscreen on his face (q). 
Jack does not put sunscreen on his face (¬q). 
Is the sun shining (p)? 
 
As in the MP example, defeaters such as the fact that the sunscreen has run out, or that 
Jack is already tanned, or an unexpected allergy etc. can lead people to reject the valid MT 
conclusion and instead conclude that the sun is actually shining. And note that contrary to 
Byrne’s (1989) experiment, it is not necessary to explicitly present possible defeaters as part 
of the conditional inference task. Even if defeaters are not explicitly presented in inference 
tasks, people can still consider them because they have background knowledge about the 
content of the conditional (cf. Cummins, 1995; Cummins et al., 1991; De Neys, Schaeken, & 
d’Ydewalle, 2002; De Neys et al., 2003a; Thompson, 1994).  
Defeaters are also relevant for the fallacies AC and DA. In this case, the literature 
refers to them as alternatives (e.g., Cummins et al., 1991; Markovits & Quinn, 2002). 
Consider the following examples:  
 
If the sun is shining (p), then Jack puts sunscreen on his face (q). 
Jack puts sunscreen on his face (¬q).  
Is the sun shining (p)? 
 
If the sun is shining (p), then Jack puts sunscreen on his face (q). 
The sun is not shining (¬p). 
Does Jack put sunscreen on his face (p)? 
 
Here, background knowledge can also help people to generate conditions that would make 
Jack put sunscreen on his face even though the sun is not shining, such as to test how a 
sunscreen feels on the skin, or if it is the only lotion available to moisturize the skin, or 
applying it preventively, etc. However, note that the consideration of alternatives does not 
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lead people to reject logically valid conclusions. On the contrary, considering such 
alternatives makes people aware that AC and DA are fallacies.  
The likelihood that defeaters are considered depends on how many disabling and 
alternative conditions actually exist for a given conditional. For instance, the conditional 
about Jack and the sunscreen has many disabling conditions, but other conditionals like for 
example “If Jack cuts his finger, then he will bleed.” do not. One of the first researchers 
studying the effect of the amount of defeaters on reasoning was Cummins (1995; Cummins et 
al., 1991). In a preliminary study, she created conditionals whose amount of disabling 
conditions and alternatives was varied orthogonally. She therefore created conditionals for 
which people can generate many disabling and many alternative conditions, conditionals for 
which people can generate many disabling conditions but few alternatives, conditionals for 
which people can generate few disabling conditions but many alternatives, and conditionals 
for which participants can generate few disabling conditions and few alternatives. She 
embedded these conditionals in MP, MT, AC and DA inferences and asked participants to 
evaluate the conclusion. Although defeaters were actually never presented as part of the 
inference task, Cummins found that participants considered them anyway. MP and MT 
inferences from conditionals with many disabling conditions were accepted less frequently 
than inferences from conditionals with few disabling conditions. Analogically, AC and DA 
inferences from conditionals with many alternatives were accepted less frequently than 
inferences from conditionals with few alternatives. Cummins’ findings have been replicated 
several times (e.g., Byrne, Espino, & Santamaria, 1999; Cummins, 1995; De Neys et al., 
2002; 2003a; 2003b; Dieusseart et al., 2005; Thompson, 1994, 1995).  
Many psychologists assume that defeaters affect inferences because people usually 
activate their semantic knowledge about the content of conditionals during reasoning tasks 
(De Neys et al., 2003a; 2003b; Janveau-Brennman & Markovits, 1999; Markovits, 2000; 
Vadeboncoeur & Markovits, 1999; see also Markovits, Fleury, Quinn, & Venet, 1998). In this 
way, the more disabling conditions or alternatives people have stored in their memory for a 
given conditional, the more probable it is that at least one of them will be retrieved and 
therefore considered during reasoning. Initially this was thought to be an “all-or-nothing 
phenomenon” (De Neys et al., 2003a, p. 582): as soon as a person retrieves one disabling 
condition or one alternative he or she rejects the corresponding conclusion; if they do not find 
one, they accept the conclusion (see Markovits, 2000; Vadeboncoeur & Markovits, 1999). 
However, in a series of experiments De Neys and colleagues (2003a) showed that the 
consideration of defeaters is gradual, and that every additional disabling condition or 
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alternative has an impact on the degree to which people accept a conclusion. In their 
experiments, De Neys and colleagues embedded conditionals with many disabling conditions 
and many alternatives in conditional inference tasks, and, additionally to the usual premises, 
presented either one, two, three, or four defeaters. They found that people’s acceptance of the 
conclusion was related in a linear fashion to the amount of disabling conditions or alternatives 
additionally presented. 
A potential mechanism by which the amount of defeaters affects conclusions is via the 
influence they exert on the perceived sufficiency and necessity relation between p and q. In 
classical logic p is sufficient, but not necessary for q to happen (e.g., Hilton et al., 1990; 
Thompson, 1994; 1995). However, the existence of disabling conditions questions this 
sufficiency of p. If there are conditions which prevent q from happening even though p is the 
case (such as when the sunscreen bottle is empty), then p is not sufficient for q anymore. In 
other words, the more disabling conditions exist, the less sufficient one perceives p to be for 
q. The same applies for alternative causes. The more alternatives one can generate, the less p 
is perceived as necessary for q, and the fewer AC or DA fallacies reasoners will make (see 
Thompson, 1994; 1995).  
Additionally to their amount, also the associative strength or relative salience of 
defeaters influences inferences (De Neys, et al., 2002; De Neys et al., 2003b; Chan & Chua, 
1994; see also Markovits & Potvin, 2001). If we go back to our initial example of Jack and 
the sunscreen, one can generate different kinds of disabling conditions. For instance, one 
disabling condition could be that the bottle of sunscreen is empty, and another one can be that 
Jack developed an allergy against some component of the sunscreen preventing him from 
using it. Now imagine you are confronted with this conditional in a reasoning task and have to 
solve a MP inference. Which of both disabling conditions will pop up more readily in to your 
mind? Although both are valid disabling conditions, the former may occur to people more 
easily than the latter. According to De Neys and colleagues (2003b) this happens because 
some disabling conditions are more strongly associated with one’s semantic knowledge of 
how to prevent q from happening (see also Markovits et al., 1998; Quinn & Markovits, 1998). 
Analogously some alternative causes are more strongly associated to one’s semantic 
knowledge of how to cause q. Strongly associated defeaters are considered more readily than 
those which are not. As a consequence, one strongly associated disabling condition can have a 
higher impact on withdrawing from MP or MT inferences than many weakly associated 
disabling conditions; and one strongly associated alternative cause can have a higher impact 
on rejecting AC and DA inferences than many weakly associated alternatives (see Quinn & 
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Markovits, 1998). A similar account was proposed by Chan and Chua (1994), but only for 
disabling conditions. They propose that disabling conditions differ in their relative salience, 
i.e., how important they are perceived to be based on the prior knowledge of the reasoner. 
Depending on this salience, potential disabling conditions are accepted more or less strongly. 
Also Manktelow and Fairley (2000) proposed that not all defeaters are the same. They say 
that disabling conditions and alternatives differ in their relevance in respect to superordinate 
principles, such as in our example “ways in preventing sunburns” (cf. Manktelow & Fairley, 
2000). 
One direct consequence of considering defeaters is that they lower the believability of 
the conditional. For instance, the conditional “If Anna eats lots of candies, then she will get 
cavities” is probably not believed very much, because it lays at hand that by brushing the teeth 
and regular visits to the dentist one can still eat candies but not get cavities. Experiments on 
the believability of conditionals on defeasible reasoning have mainly focused on the role of 
believability on the rejection of MP and MT inferences. George (1997), for instance, 
conducted experiments where conditional statements where either presented traditionally as 
“if p, then q” (e.g., If Pierre is in the kitchen, then Marie is in the garden), or with an 
additional “very probably” or “not very probable” in front of the conditional (e.g., It is very 
probable that if Pierre is in the kitchen then Marie is in the garden). He found that the 
uncertainty of the conditional statement influenced participant’s belief in the conclusion. 
However, in another experiment George (1995) found that the believability of conditionals 
only affects some people. In his experiments he found that while for half of the participants 
the believability of the conditional correlated with the believability of the conclusion, for 
other reasoners this was not the case. Instead, the believability of the conditional did not affect 
conclusions. Also Stevenson and Over (1995) found similar effects. They created conditionals 
such as “If John goes fishing, he will have a fish supper” and presented these together with 
additional information such as “If John catches a fish, he will have fish supper”. The 
interesting manipulation was, however, that they varied the believability of defeaters by 
telling, for example, that John always is lucky or never is lucky when he goes fishing. 
Stevenson and Over found that when defeaters were presented as uncertain, their defeasible 
power was reduced.  
Studies on the amount and strength of defeaters have all the underlying assumption 
that people take into account each possible defeater during reasoning. The more strong 
defeaters people can think of, the more likely a conclusion is withdrawn. However, an 
alternative explanation for the consideration of defeaters is that not the amount of possible 
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defeaters matters, but the general frequency of p and ¬q cases (i.e., the frequency of 
exceptions) or the frequency of ¬p and q cases (i.e., the frequency of alternatives) – 
irrespective of how many different disabling or alternative conditions are behind these 
frequencies. Usually, the amount of defeaters and the frequency of exceptions or alternatives 
are correlated. For instance, in the sunscreen example there are many disabling conditions and 
also the frequency of p¬q instances is high (i.e., it happens often that the sun is shining and 
people do not use sunscreen). But what about this conditional: “If the traffic lights are red, 
then the car will stop”? If someone is asked to generate disabling conditions for this 
conditional, it is possible to say that the driver had an emergency, that the car is an 
ambulance, that the driver did not care, or did not see the street light, etc. But, although there 
are many disabling conditions, the overall amount of p¬q cases is still low because, in 
general, there are not so many instances where the traffic lights are red and the car does not 
stop. Along the same lines it is possible to generate many alternative causes for the 
conditional “If the brake is depressed, then the car slows down” (e.g., out of gas, collision, 
driving uphill, etc., see De Neys et al., 2002). But the perceived frequency of cases where a 
car slows down without the brake being pressed is probably low. An important study on the 
relationship between the amount of defeaters and frequencies was done by Geiger and 
Oberauer (2007). They conducted four experiments on the relationship between disabling 
conditions and frequency of exceptions (i.e., p¬q cases). In the first three experiments they 
created conditionals with fictional content (e.g., If an animal belongs to the family of grocks, 
then it has six legs) and provided reasoners with information about frequencies and possible 
disabling conditions. In the fourth experiment they used everyday conditionals (e.g., If you 
open the fridge, then the light inside goes on), which differed orthogonally in their amount of 
disabling conditions and their overall frequency of exceptions (measured within a preliminary 
study). They found that it was not the amount, but the frequency of exceptions that best 
predicted MP and MT inferences.  
The relationship between frequency of exceptions and the associative strength of 
defeaters is not clear. It is thinkable that what makes a defeater strong or salient in memory is 
related to how often it actually occurs. One attempt in combining both factors can be found in 
Fernbach and Erb (2013). Fernbach and Erb say that all disabling conditions have some base 
rate and also some disabling strength. When both factors are considered together, one has a 
measure of the disabling probability of one disabling condition. Accordingly, when the 
disabling probabilities of all possible disabling conditions are combined, one has a measure 
for the overall probability that the antecedent will not cause the consequent. It is possible to 
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imagine that this overall disabling probability is related to the perceived frequency of 
exceptions (i.e., instances of p but ¬q).  
 
1.1.1.2. The Context of Conditionals 
 
The amount, strength and frequency of defeaters affect defeasible reasoning through the 
content of conditionals. Context factors, instead, affect defeasible reasoning through the way 
in which conditionals are presented or framed. For instance, in a series of experiments, 
Stevenson and Over (2001) embedded conditionals describing health issues (e.g., If Bill has 
typhoid he will make a good recovery) in conversational contexts and varied the level of 
expertise of the speakers (first-year student vs. professor of medicine). They found that when 
the conditional is uttered by an expert in the field, people believed much more in the MP 
conclusion than when it was uttered by a novice. Similarly, when additional information 
denying the minor premise was added to the task (i.e., “Bill has typhoid”, “No, Bill has 
cholera”), this additional information was considered more when it was uttered by an expert 
compared to a novice (see also Dieussaert, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2002; Evans & 
Twyman-Musgrove, 1998; Wolf, Rieger, & Knauff, 2012). Although denying the minor 
premise of inference tasks is not exactly the same as presenting defeaters, we can relate 
Stevenson and Over’s findings to the acceptance of defeaters. If the conditional “If the sun is 
shining, then Jack puts sunscreen on his face” is uttered by a person who knows Jack very 
well, then people will presumably think less about defeaters than when the conditional is 
uttered by someone who does not know Jack. 
In addition to the trustworthiness of the source, defeasible reasoning is also affected by 
other context factors. For instance, experimental manipulations such as instructions, response 
modality, and the phrasing of conditionals can also affect the degree to which people consider 
defeaters. These context factors are described in more detail in the following two sections.  
 
1.1.1.2.1. Instructions and response modality 
 
Instructions can influence the degree to which people reason strictly deductively or defeasible. 
For instance, Vadeboncoeur and Markovits (1999) found that the acceptance of MP and MT is 
quite low when participants are simply instructed to suppose the premises to be true, without 
further clarifications. However, when the instructions highlight the logical nature of the task, 
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telling participants that the statements have to be considered as true even though this may not 
be the case in everyday life, endorsements of MP and MT inferences increase. Similar effects 
were found by Singmann and Klauer (2011): when instructed to base conclusions on the 
logical form of the problem assuming the rule to be true, participants made much more MP 
inferences than when instructed to simply judge the probability of the conclusion given the 
rule and the fact (see also Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2010). 
Also the response modality has an effect on reasoning. In the last section I presented a 
study of Geiger and Oberauer (2007) who claimed that not the amount, but the overall 
frequency of exceptions predicts inferences. However, Markovits, Forgues, and Brunet (2010) 
showed that Geiger and Oberauer’s claims are only true when the response modality is scaled. 
When the response modality is categorical (i.e., dichotomous) the mere presence of defeaters 
was enough to withdraw from valid inferences, without any linear relationship to the 
frequency of exceptions. In fact, Markovits et al. noticed that some inconsistent findings 
between studies can be solved by looking at the response modality used. 
 
1.1.1.2.2. Phrasing of the conditional 
 
Most of the literature on defeasible reasoning has investigated the effect of defeaters by 
varying the content of conditionals, for example by presenting conditionals with either many 
or few defeaters. Little attention, however, has been given to how the conditionals are 
phrased. For instance, researchers only seldom give attention to whether their conditionals 
describe general rules (e.g., “If the sun is shining, then human beings use sunscreen”) or 
specific rules (e.g., “If the sun is shining, then Jack uses sunscreen”). Little attention is also 
given to the tense in the premises. For instance, the categorical statement of an inference task 
can be presented in the present (e.g., the sun is shining) or in the past (e.g., the sun was 
shining).  
Of particular importance for defeasible reasoning is the modal which is used to phrase 
conditionals. Let’s go back to our initial example of Jack and the sunscreen. The relationship 
between the sun shining and Jack putting sunscreen on his face can be described in different 
ways. It can be described as an indicative conditional, describing what is factually the case “If 
the sun is shining, then Jack will put sunscreen on his face”. On the other hand, the 
conditional can be phrased such that it suggests uncertainty, such as “If the sun is shining, 
then Jack might put sunscreen on his face”. Further, conditionals can also be phrased as 
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describing a deontic relationship such as “If the sun is shining, then Jack should put sunscreen 
on his face” (e.g., Beller, 2010; Perham & Oaksford, 2005). It becomes clear that defeaters are 
weighted differently depending on how the conditional is phrased. If the sun is shining and 
one has to infer whether Jack will put sunscreen on his face (i.e., a factual conditional), then 
calculating the amount of defeaters – or the frequencies of exceptions – makes perfect sense. 
However, when one has to infer whether Jack should put sunscreen on his face (i.e., a deontic 
conditional), then counting defeaters or estimating “p and not q” instances is not very fruitful. 
Instead, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of a conclusion given the premises is 
more useful (e.g., Given that the sun is shining, is it really necessary for Jack to put sunscreen 
on his face?). These assumptions are strengthened by a study of Over, Manktelow and 
Hadjichristidis (2004). They found that when conditionals are not factual, but deontic, the 
acceptance of conditional rules does not depend on the perceived probability of q given p (see 
Section 1.1.2.3), but instead on the preference of the different outcomes such a rule can have. 
The more a reasoner prefers the outcome ‘p and q’ (in our case: the sun shining and putting 
sunscreen on his face) over ‘p and ¬q’ (in our case: the sun shining and Jack not putting 
sunscreen on his face), the more a deontic rule will be accepted (see also Oaksford & Chater, 
2007; 2009). 
 
 
1.1.2. Theories on Conditional Reasoning 
 
So far I have described defeasible reasoning and explained how the content and context of 
conditionals influence people’s willingness to defeat conclusions. Before moving on to the 
importance of defeasibility in law, it is necessary to give an overview on how the existing 
reasoning theories describe defeasible reasoning. Such a theoretical overview allows for a 
better understanding of the before mentioned effects and therefore provides a theoretical 
ground to base this thesis’ hypotheses on. Most of the theories presented in this chapter were 
initially proposed as descriptions for monotonic deductive reasoning. Consequently, it is 
unavoidable to first describe their general assumptions, to then specify how each theory was 
adapted to account for defeasible reasoning.  
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1.1.2.1. Mental Rules Theories 
 
Mental rules theories propose that human beings have some kind of abstract general reasoning 
rules that they apply to draw inferences. Inferences are thought to be made by first uncovering 
the logical form of the premises, then applying abstract reasoning rules to arrive at a 
conclusion, and finally, translating this abstract conclusion to the content of the premises 
(Evans et al., 1993; see also Braine, 1978; Braine & O’Brien, 1991). Mental rules theories are 
therefore syntactic theories, which only depend on the form of the arguments and not on their 
meaning (Knauff, 2006). The best known theories based on mental rules are those from Rips 
(1994) and Braine (Braine, 1978; Braine & O’Brien, 1991; 1998; Braine, Reiser, & Rumain, 
1984). Braine explains deductive reasoning in terms of three components. The first 
component contains the inference schemas. The second is a reasoning program in charge of 
deciding which inference schemas should be applied. The third component is the 
comprehension component, which is based on pragmatic principles that are needed to obtain a 
semantic representation of the premises on which to apply the inferences schemas later on. 
The inference schemas are thought to be 13 (though in some papers 16 are reported; Knauff, 
2006), e.g., MP, double negation, and-elimination, and and-introduction. Not all inference 
schemas are also found in logical formal systems. Rather, they are thought to represent some 
kind of natural logic, which also takes into account linguistic constraints (Knauff, 2006). In 
the case of conditional reasoning, the relevant inference schemas are MP and the Schema for 
Conditional Proof (CP), both contained in the lexical entry of the logical operator “if” in 
semantic memory. The MP schema states: “Given if p then q and p, one can infer q” and can 
be used to immediately reach conclusions from premises containing p and if-statements. CP 
states: “To derive or evaluate If p then …, first suppose p; for any proposition q that follows 
from the supposition of p taken together with other information assumed, one may assert if p 
then q”, and can be thus used to derive if-statements. Conclusions are reached according to 
Braine and O’Brien (1991) by successively matching inference schemas against the premises. 
Each conclusion reached by the application of one inference schema is added to the premise 
set. A conclusion is considered true if there is a match between the conclusion provided in the 
inference task and the conclusion reached by the application of inference schemas. If there is 
no match, the conclusion was false. Along these lines, people’s high endorsement of MP 
inferences is explained by the existence of the MP inference schema: MP inferences follow 
thus directly from the lexical entry “if” (Braine & O’Brien, 1991). MT inferences are more 
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difficult because more rules, e.g. reduction ad absurdum, have to be applied to reach a 
conclusion. AC and DA fallacies are explained by assuming that reasoners are invited by 
conversational implicatures to interpret the conditional as a biconditional (see Politzer, 2007; 
Evans et al., 1993). According to Braine’s mental rules theory errors can therefore happen due 
to (1) comprehension errors (i.e., wrong interpretation of the premises), (2) strategy errors 
(i.e., difficulties in accessing some inference schemas), or (3) process errors (i.e., working 
memory constraints do not allow a correct application of the inference schemata; see Evans et 
al., 1993; Knauff, 2006). Similar to Braine’s account, Rips (1994) also proposed that people 
apply mental rules during reasoning. Rips assumes that conclusions are drawn by the 
application of rules, each of them necessary to reach subgoals towards the final conclusions. 
However, Rips’ inference schemas are more attached to the rules of formal logic than 
Braine’s rules (Knauff, 2006). Another difference is that instead of assuming only MP and CP 
(here: if-introduction) as inference schemas for conditionals, he also proposes a MP 
backwards rule which is needed to reach subgoals.  
Mental rule theories have received criticism. The main problem is that they do not 
specify how the structure of natural language propositions is transformed into semantic 
representations (Politzer, 2007). Consequently, mental rules theories cannot fully explain how 
the content of natural language conditionals affects reasoning (Evans et al., 1993). One might 
also criticize the fact that mental rules theories cannot account for defeasible reasoning 
because the rules are underlain by classical logic. However, there have been some attempts to 
adapt mental rules theories to defeasible reasoning. For instance, Politzer proposed that the 
MP and CP inference schemas can explain how uncertain conclusions can be reached by 
uncertain premises (Politzer & Bourmaud, 2002). He argues that conditionals are usually 
understood as “If {N}& p, then q”, where N indicates implicit complementary necessary 
conditions (CNC) which are conditions that are necessary for p leading to q. When reasoners 
are confronted with defeaters, they are not sure anymore whether the CNC are actually 
fulfilled. This uncertainty is then transmitted to the conclusion by interplay between the MP 
and the CP inference schemas (Politzer & Bourmaud, 2002). However, Politzer’s approach is 
not described in much detail and he declared years later that this approach has not been tested 
yet (Politzer, 2007). Stenning and van Lambalgen’s (2004; 2005; 2008) non-monotonic 
approach to conditional reasoning can be also interpreted as an attempt to explain defeasible 
reasoning by the application of mental rules. However, one has to be cautious when relating 
Stenning and van Lambalgen’s account to mental rules theories, because the kinds of rules 
pertain to different logics. Mental rules theories have the connotation of being monotonic 
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rules from classical logic, like it was in the approaches of Braine (1978) and Rips (1994). 
Instead, the rules proposed by Stenning and van Lambalgen belong to non-monotonic logics. 
Stenning and van Lambalgen’s (2004; 2005; 2008) starting point is that before being able to 
reason with conditionals people must assign a logical form to the sentence. The assignment of 
logical form is tantamount to interpretation. Stenning and van Lambalgen call this process 
“reasoning for an interpretation”, while further inferences with the conditional are “reasoning 
from that interpretation”. Depending on how a conditional is interpreted, it may fall under the 
jurisdiction of different logics and hence correspondingly different inferences can be drawn. 
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2010) argue that conditionals are generally understood as 
default rules. For example, a conditional “if p, then q” is understood as “If p and nothing 
abnormal is the case, then q” (i.e., if p & ¬ab, then q, where ab stands for abnormality and 
represents defeaters). The decision about abnormalities is guided by close world reasoning 
(CWR). CWR states that a proposition is false, if we do not have reasons to believe that it is 
true. That is, normally reasoners assume that nothing abnormal is the case, i.e., no defeaters 
are available in the given situation. However, upon explicit evidence of abnormalities via, 
e.g., memory retrieval or explicit presentation in inference tasks (see Section 1.1.1.1), they 
incorporate them in the interpretation. For instance, in the sunscreen example reasoners 
usually assume the default situation of Jack putting sunscreen on his face when the sun is 
shining. Only if they become aware of abnormalities, i.e., defeaters such as the sunscreen 
bottle being empty, then they withdraw the conclusion that Jack puts sunscreen on his face. 
People therefore engage in defeasible reasoning whenever they are aware that abnormalities 
exist. Stenning and van Lambalgen’s (2004; 2005; 2008) account can be seen as a mental 
rules theory in the following sense. The CW assumption, or the initial interpretation of the 
conditional as a default, ‘absolutely normal’ rule, can be seen as some kind of implicit and 
automatic mental rule used to understand conditionals and draw further inferences. However, 
different from the classical mental rules theories of Braine (Braine & O’Brien, 1991) and Rips 
(1994), Stenning and van Lambalgen place the emphasis on the interpretative processes 
necessary to reason with conditionals. In fact, most of the rules they propose are thought to be 
used to construct a certain interpretation of the conditional, e.g., the CW assumption, which in 
turn selects a specific set of rules to be applied in further reasoning about that conditional.  
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1.1.2.2. Mental Models Theory 
 
Different from Braine and O'Brien’s (1991; 1998) mental rules approach, in mental 
models theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) reasoning is understood as a semantic process, 
where the meaning and the interpretation of premises are considered (Knauff, 2006). Instead 
of simply applying abstract rules to the premises, mental models theory assumes that the 
information in the premises is first represented as mental models. These models are then 
inspected, evaluated, and conclusions are drawn. According to mental models theory, 
reasoning from conditionals has three steps (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). The first is 
comprehension, when reasoners use their general and linguistic knowledge to construct 
mental models of the state of affairs described in the premises. In the second description 
phase, these mental models are inspected in order to arrive at a putative conclusion. This 
conclusion should contain new information not explicitly given in the premises. If reasoners 
cannot arrive at such a conclusion, they conclude that nothing follows. But if a putative 
conclusion is found, they proceed with the third phase, the validation phase, and search for 
counterexamples to their putative conclusion. That is, they search models in which the 
premises are true, but their putative conclusion is false. When there are no counterexamples, 
the putative conclusion is valid. Finding counterexamples deems the conclusion false, and 
reasoners have to return to the second phase in search for an alternative conclusion for which 
no counterexamples exist.  
Mental models follow the principle of truth, meaning that only what is true is 
represented. As explained in Section 1.1, according to material implication a conditional “if p, 
then q” is consistent with three true alternative situations: p and q, ¬p and q, and ¬p and ¬q. 
Accordingly, one could construct three mental models from a conditional, one for each true 
possibility (Byrne et al., 1999). However, because of working memory limitations, reasoners 
first construct just one mental model, the explicit mental model p and q, which represents the 
information explicitly provided in the conditional. All other possible mental models (¬p and 
q, and ¬p and ¬q) are only represented implicitly. For instance, for the conditional “If the sun 
is shining, then Jack puts sunscreen on his face” reasoners construct the following models: 
Sun      sunscreen 
        … 
The three dots represent the implicit models, indicating that there might be other models for 
this conditional. Only if required by the task, these implicit mental models are fleshed out into 
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fully explicit mental models. This happens, for example, when reasoners are confronted with 
an MT inference. The second premise of a MT inference states ¬q, which is not represented in 
these initial mental models of the conditional. Therefore fully explicit mental models are 
necessary to infer ¬p follows from ¬q:  
Sun      sunscreen 
¬sun    sunscreen 
¬sun    ¬sunscreen 
Mental models theory explains errors in reasoning by difficulties in searching for 
counterexamples, or by problems in fully fleshing out mental models (Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991; Johnson-Laird, Khelmani, & Goodwin, 2015). Along these lines, mental models 
theory also explains why some inferences seem harder than others: the more mental models 
are necessary to arrive at a conclusion, the more difficult the inference is (Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991). MP inferences are easy because reasoners can infer that q follows from p 
without the need to construct fully explicit mental models. Instead, the valid conclusion can 
be read off directly from the initial explicit mental model. MT inferences are more difficult, 
because as explained in the previous passage, reasoners have to construct fully explicit mental 
models in order to conclude that ¬p follows from ¬q. The difficulty of AC and DA inferences 
is explained on the one hand similarly. Mental models theory also posits an alternative 
explanation, namely that reasoners interpret the conditional as a biconditional of the form “if 
and only if” constructing the following explicit model: 
[sun]     [sunscreen] 
The brackets indicate that [sun] and [sunscreen] are exhaustively represented, meaning that 
there are no other models that include sun or sunscreen (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). 
Therefore reasoners erroneously conclude that p follows from q, or that ¬q follows from ¬p. 
In most of the conditional reasoning literature, mental models theory is used to explain 
deductive monotonic reasoning. However, mental models theory has been expanded to cover 
non-monotonic, defeasible reasoning as well (Byrne et al., 1999; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
2002). The consideration of defeaters (more specifically disabling conditions) is explained by 
mental models theory by assuming that reasoners introduce other necessary conditions for q to 
happen as additional antecedents. Imagine, for instance, that a reasoner is confronted with the 
conditional “If the sun is shining, then Jack puts sunscreen on his face” and considers the 
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possibility of a defeater, for example that the bottle of sunscreen is empty. This results in the 
following mental model: 
Sun    empty bottle    sunscreen  
                … 
Because people know that it is not possible to use sunscreen from an empty sunscreen bottle, 
they will additionally construct the following models based on general knowledge: 
empty bottle    ¬sunscreen 
¬empty bottle    sunscreen 
¬empty bottle    ¬sunscreen 
Thus, when people have to decide whether q follows from p, they will combine the models 
from background knowledge with the models of the premises, resulting in something like: 
Sun    empty bottle    sunscreen    ¬sunscreen 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002) state that general knowledge has priority here, allowing 
reasoners to conclude that, in case the sun is shining and the sunscreen bottle is empty, Jack 
will not put sunscreen on his face. This is called the principle of pragmatic modulation 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). 
Mental models theory therefore describes the consideration of defeaters in terms of 
counterexample search in general knowledge. However, the principle of pragmatic 
modulation appears somewhat arbitrary – it is not clear why the model constructed from 
general knowledge about defeaters has priority over the mental model constructed from the 
information in the conditional. Politzer (2007) points out that in fact the relationship described 
in the conditional is part of general knowledge, too. So, why is the defeater weighted more? 
Further, some researchers argue that by relying on material implication, mental models theory 
is not as different from mental rules theories as proposed (e.g., Evans, 2008; Oaksford & 
Chater, 1995a). Another problem of mental models theory is that it has difficulties in 
explaining why the frequency of exceptions sometimes overweighs the mere amount of 
defeaters, and, in general, how different degrees in beliefs in the conditionals and conclusions 
are represented. Stevenson and Over (1995) made an attempt to explain frequencies and 
probabilities within mental models theory. They argue that within a mental model, one can 
represent proportions of representative cases, so that the belief in a conclusion depends on the 
proportions of models where this conclusion holds (see also Johnson-Laird, 2001). For 
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instance, the conditional “If the sun is shining, then Jack puts sunscreen on his face” may 
result in a model where every time the sun is shining, Jack puts sunscreen on his face: 
Sun   Sunscreen 
Sun   Sunscreen 
Sun   Sunscreen 
         Sunscreen 
However, when people are aware of defeaters (i.e., that p sometimes happens without q) the 
exceptional cases are added to the model: 
Sun   Sunscreen 
Sun   Sunscreen 
Sun   Sunscreen 
         Sunscreen 
Sun 
Sun 
Depending on how many “sun sunscreen” models are in comparison to “sun” models, a 
conclusion may be believed to different degrees. Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, 
and Caverni (1999) also proposed that different degrees of belief in conclusions can be 
explained by the proportion of models in which this conclusion holds. Additionally, they 
claim that this proportion is calculated by assigning numerical values to the models. The 
numerical values represent frequencies. For instance, if there are 20 observations, and pq 
happens ten times, ¬pq four times and ¬p¬q two times, then each model has a notation of 
these frequencies and one can calculate the probability of the conditional (cf. Geiger & 
Oberauer, 2010). Although the incorporation of frequencies into mental models seems 
plausible, it is not clear to what extent such extended mental models are feasible for working 
memory. Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) already claimed that constructing fully fleshed out 
models is demanding for working memory. So, how could these models be additionally 
expanded to represent the proportion of cases in which certain models hold? This is especially 
problematic if we bear in mind that, on the one hand, reasoners do consider defeaters during 
reasoning, but, on the other hand, according to mental models’ principle of truth instances of 
p¬q should not be explicitly represented (Geiger & Oberauer, 2010). That is why Geiger and 
Oberauer (2010) proposed a different approach to incorporate probabilities in mental models 
theory. They argue that reasoners start by constructing a mental model of the minor premise 
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(e.g., p in the case of MP), which is then expanded by the model of the other component of 
the conditional (e.g., q). Afterwards, reasoners search for information in memory regarding 
the probability of the situations in each model (i.e., p and pq). The subjective probability of 
the conditional corresponds to the ratio of P(pq) to P(p). However, to my knowledge Geiger 
and Oberauer’s approach has not been tested empirically yet. 
 
1.1.2.3. Probabilistic Theories 
 
Many recent theories on conditional reasoning assume that people draw inferences by 
considering the probabilities of the premises. According to probabilistic theories people treat 
conditional statements probabilistically by understanding the probability of a conditional, P(if 
p then q), as the conditional probability of q given p, P(q│p) – a relationship known as the 
Equation (Edgington, 1995; Evans & Over, 2004). One way in which people calculate this 
probability is by performing the Ramsey test (1929/1990; see also Evans, Handley, Over, 
2003). According to the Ramsey test, people calculate the conditional probability by first 
assuming that p holds. On the basis of this hypothetical belief people then calculate how 
probable it is that q follows by computing the ratio between the instances were q happens and 
those in which q does not happen. For instance, the conditional probability of “If the sun is 
shining, then Jack puts sunscreen on his face”, reasoners first assume that the sun is shining. 
Then they start thinking about how often Jack actually puts sunscreen on his face when the 
sun is shining and how often he does not when the sun is shining. In other words, they assign 
probabilities to “The sun is shining and Jack puts sunscreen on his face” and “The sun is 
shining and Jack does not put sunscreen on his face”. The higher the probability of P(pq) is 
relative to P(p¬q), the higher the conditional probability P(q│p) is perceived to be, and the 
higher also the perceived probability of P(if p then q) (Evans & Over, 2004). 
The main advantage of probabilistic theories is that consideration of probabilities is 
well suited to human everyday reasoning, which is hardly ever in terms of “all or nothing”. 
Probabilities capture the different degrees of certainty that exist in our daily lives. Contrary to 
rule based theories or mental model theory, probabilistic theories do not treat premises as 
certain. Instead, probabilistic approaches offer tools to model how uncertain premises can be 
combined to reach uncertain conclusions. Directly linked to the idea of capturing the 
uncertainty of everyday reasoning, probabilistic theories are also perfectly suitable to explain 
defeasible reasoning. This is because all information that influences the conditional 
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probability of q given p will also affect inferences. For example, additional information which 
lowers the perceived probability of q given p will also lower the degree of certainty on the 
conclusion, and, as a result, conclusions drawn without considering this new information are 
defeated. The more disabling conditions exist for a given conditional, the higher is the 
probability of “p but ¬q” instances, and the lower the conditional probability and the 
probability of the conditional P(if p then q) gets. In fact, several studies have already shown 
that probabilistic based theories can well predict human reasoning performances, sometimes 
even better than accounts based on material implication like mental models theory. For 
instance, Liu, Lo, and Wu (1996) varied the perceived conditional probability of q given p 
and found that the higher the perceived probability of the conditionals, the more logically 
correct responses people endorsed. Accordingly, Evans et al. (2003) showed that the 
perceived probability of a conditional is best predicted by conditional probability and not by 
material implication. The authors asked participants to imagine a pack of cards, whose cards 
are either yellow or red and have either a circle or a diamond on them. In addition, Evans and 
colleagues gave participants an abstract conditional “If the card is yellow, then it has a circle 
printed on it” and the corresponding frequencies of pq, p¬q, ¬pq, ¬p¬q. The participants’ task 
was to indicate how likely they think it is that the conditional is true for a randomly selected 
card from the pack. If participants understand the probability of the conditional as the 
conditional probability, then their estimated likelihood of the conditional should correspond to 
P(q│p) = P(pq)/[P(pq)+P(p¬q)]. If they instead understand the conditional as material 
implication, then the probability of the conditional should only depend on the true cases of the 
truth table: P(MC) = P(pq) + P(¬pq) + P(¬p¬q). Clear evidence against material implication 
was found. Instead, conditional probability was the best predictors for the probability of the 
conditional. Also the conjunctive probability P(pq) was well supported by the data, but the 
conjunctive probability cannot explain why the probability of the conditional raised almost 
linearly with increased pq frequencies, and decreased with increased p¬q frequencies. This 
can only be explained by the conditional probability. Evans’ et al. findings were replicated by 
Oberauer and Wilhelm (2003) and Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley, and Sloman (2007). 
Especially interesting in this regard is the work of Over et al., because contrary to Evans et al. 
(2003) and Oberauer and Wilhelm (2003), they did not use abstract, but real world 
conditionals (e.g., “If the cost of petrol increases, then traffic congestion will improve”). This 
means it was not necessary to provide participants with frequency or probability information. 
Instead, Over and colleagues could ask for participants’ subjective probabilities in order to see 
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to what extent these predict the probability of the conditional. Similar to previous findings, 
Over et al. found that conditional probability was the best predictor.  
Because of the suitability of probabilistic approaches to everyday reasoning, many 
researchers have adopted the idea to incorporate probabilities in their theories. In fact, much 
of the work in the “new paradigm” of cognitive psychology actually assumes a probabilistic 
approach to conditionals (Elqayam & Evans, 2011; Evans, 2012; Oaksford & Chater, 2013; 
Pfeifer, 2013). On the one hand, there is the suppositional theory account of Evans and Over 
(2004). Evans also argues that the probability of the conditional equals to the conditional 
probability. MP inferences are therefore explained by arguing that the belief in the conclusion 
is a function of the probability of the conditional and thus a function of conditional probability 
(i.e., if p is given, how probable is it that q follows? see Geiger & Oberauer, 2010). MT 
inferences are also explained by suppositional inference. It is argued that reasoners first 
assume p and derive through MP that q follows. However, given that the categorical statement 
of MT inferences states ¬q, reasoners are confronted with a contradiction. This contradiction 
leads the reasoners to conclude that the previously made supposition is false, and so p must 
also be false (Evans & Over, 2004). AC and DA inferences are explained by assuming that 
reasoners add to the premises some new interpretation of the conditional. For AC inferences 
the converse of the conditional (if q then p) is added to premises, while for DA inferences its 
inverse (if ¬p then ¬q) (Evans and Over, 2004; see also Geiger & Oberauer, 2010).  
On the other hand, there is also Oaksford and Chater’s (2007; 2009) probabilistic 
theory, which is one of the first psychological theories of reasoning based on probabilities 
(Geiger & Oberauer, 2010). Oaksford and Chater were also among the first psychologists to 
emphasize the necessity to incorporate non-monotonic and defeasible reasoning in attempt to 
understand human reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 1991; 1995a). Oaksford and Chater (2003b; 
Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000) propose that a person’s degree of belief that a MP 
conclusion can be drawn depends on the belief in the conditional and thus on the conditional 
probability: 
𝑃(𝑀𝑃) =  P(q│p)  =  1 –  ε 
Hereby ε is called the exception parameter, which corresponds to the probability of ¬q given 
p. ε depends on the availability of disabling conditions: the more disabling conditions there 
are for a given conditional, the higher the ε is, and consequently the less MP inferences are 
drawn. The exception parameter thus prevents the conditional probability from being 1. 
Similarly, the probability that a person draws a MT inference is described as: 
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𝑃(𝑀𝑇) = 𝑃(¬p|¬q) =  
1 − 𝑃(𝑞) − 𝑃(𝑝)ε
1 − 𝑃(𝑞)
 
Also here, the higher the exceptions parameter is, the smaller the enumerator gets and the less 
a MT inference is drawn. The probability of inferring MT is thus the probability of ¬p given 
¬q. 
Oaksford and Chater explain people’s endorsement of AC and DA inferences in a 
similar way:  
𝑃(𝐴𝐶) = 𝑃(𝑝|q) =  
𝑃(𝑝)(1 − ε)
𝑃(𝑞)
 
 
𝑃(𝐷𝐴) = 𝑃(¬q|¬p) =  
1 − 𝑃(𝑞) − 𝑃(𝑝)ε
1 − 𝑃(𝑝)
 
 
Given that probabilistic theories do not assume mental representations of concrete p, q, 
¬p, or ¬q instances, they can explain why in addition to the amount of defeaters, also the 
overall frequency of exceptions affects inferences. Contrary to mental models theory, 
probabilistic approaches do not require people to construct mental models from general 
knowledge to be aware that p can happen without q. Instead, the effect of defeaters is 
operationalized by the probability of ¬q but p, which is directly related to the frequency of 
exceptions. In other words, theories based on probabilities can predict the inferences people 
draw by computing the conditional probability. Along these lines the effect of trustworthiness 
can also be explained: conditionals uttered by highly trustworthy speakers are considered to 
have a higher conditional probability than those uttered by low trustworthy sources (cf. 
Stevenson & Over, 2001).  
Probabilistic theories also have disadvantages. On the one hand, we seldom have 
concrete knowledge about frequencies or probabilities in our daily life in order to be able to 
compute probabilities for MP, MT, AC or DA inferences. One solution for this problem may 
be to assume that these are not factual frequencies, but subjective frequencies based on our 
experiences and semantic knowledge (see e.g. Over et al, 2007). However, the main 
disadvantage of probabilistic theories is that they do not describe what actually happens in the 
head of participants – they are no process models. Instead, they only describe on a 
computational level which conclusions will be drawn or withdrawn (Oaksford & Chater, 
1995a; 2003a). So, there is still the open question of what actually happens online in the 
reasoners’ minds. It is difficult to assume that people actually make these computations in 
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their minds. Several studies have shown that people are bad at dealing with probabilities 
(Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). People reason better 
with frequencies (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1982), but even so it is still implausible than people 
run computations as complex as needed to reach or reject MT, AC or DA inferences. One 
solution to this problem could be that people only have rough categories of how probable 
something is, as for example: very probable, somehow probable, neither/ nor, somehow 
improbable or very improbable. It is certainly necessary to further investigate how 
probabilistic theories could go beyond computational level theories, and describe what 
happens in the minds of reasoners during inference tasks.  
 
1.1.2.4. Dual Process Theories 
 
In an attempt to explain why under some circumstances people are capable of reasoning 
deductively according to classical logic but in others not, many researchers have proposed 
dual process theories (e.g., Evans & Over, 2004; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000; 
Verschueren, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2005). Dual process theories state that depending on 
the task, time constraints, cognitive capacity, motivation, etc., people may use two kinds of 
thinking or modes of processing (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Markovits, Brunet, Thompson, & 
Brisson, 2013). One kind is usually described as being heuristically driven, fast, automatic, 
unconscious, and effortless; it is often labeled Type 1 (e.g., Evans, 2012; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013) or System 1 (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). The other – labeled Type 2 or System 
2 – is described as being analytic, slow, controlled, dependent on working memory, and 
deliberative. System 1 is therefore often seen as the default system, which can be either 
overridden or supported by System 2 (Evans, 2006; 2008; Singmann, Klauer, & Over, 2014). 
Besides cognitive psychology, dual process theories have also been used in other areas of 
psychology (Evans, 2008), for example, to explain attitudes change (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) 
or moral reasoning (see Section 1.2.2). 
Evans and Over (2004) argue that System 1 is responsible for implicit pragmatic 
inferences (e.g., “If the sun is shining, I use sunscreen”), which are thought to be the default 
way of reasoning. Only when the task requires and people are willing to make additional 
efforts System 2 comes into play and people facilitates engagement in deductive reasoning. 
The implicit inferences made by System 1 can sometimes look like deductive inferences; but 
actually they are reached on the basis of beliefs and uncertain premises, for example when 
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people infer that q follows from p because it is very likely that q follows from p. Along these 
lines, Evans and Over (2004) propose that most MP inferences are made by System 1, thus 
explaining why it is so easy to defeat MP conclusions. MT inferences are thought to require 
System 2, because reasoners’ usual approach of supposing p and then deriving from this q, is 
contradicted by the categorical statement of the categorical premise ¬q. That is to say, 
automatic processes cannot deal with MT inferences, which call for additional deliberative 
processing. As for AC and DA inferences, they are thought of as a result of System 1. 
However, just like for MP inferences, Evans and Over argue that under some circumstances 
AC and DA inferences might involve explicit processing effort from the part of System 2.  
There is a wide variety of evidence in favor of dual process theories in cognitive 
psychology. For instance, Verschueren et al. (2005) found that fast and slow responses in 
inference tasks are best explained by the postulation of two types of reasoning. Fast responses 
were best explained by the likelihood of q given p (for MP and MT inferences) or the 
likelihood of p given q (for AC and DA inferences). Slow responses were instead best 
described by the availability of disabling conditions or alternative causes. Verschueren and 
colleagues argue that Type 1 reasoning is based on probabilistic reasoning, whereas Type 2 is 
based on a counterexample search like the one proposed by mental models theory. Similar 
effects of time constraints on the usage of Type 1 or Type 2 reasoning were found by Evans & 
Curtis-Holmes (2005) and Markovits et al. (2013). Moreover, De Neys (2006a) found that 
when working memory load is high, people make more errors (according to classical logic) 
because they start reasoning according to their beliefs instead of considering the logical 
validity of the argument. Also evidence that intelligence correlates with correct deductive 
reasoning, but not with belief-based reasoning, supports the idea of two different ways of 
thinking (Evans, 2008; Evans et al., 2010; Stanovich & West, 2008). Further evidence in 
favor of dual process accounts comes from Weidenfeld, Oberauer, and Hörnig (2005). In a 
path model they showed that disabling conditions predicted inferences in two ways: via a 
direct pathway affecting endorsement of valid inferences, and via an indirect pathway, where 
disabling conditions first affected conditional probabilities which then affected the 
endorsement of inferences. 
The main advantage of dual process theories is that they can explain a vast range of 
findings. The assumption of two distinct systems can also explain why people sometimes 
reason deductively and sometimes do not. Deductive reasoning performance and 
consideration of defeaters as counterexamples are usually explained by System 2 (see 
Verschueren et al., 2005). Considering uncertainties, different degrees of believability, and 
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reasoning under time constraint, are explained by System 1. However, one main problem of 
dual process theories is that it is not clear whether the two systems are qualitatively different 
or rather two extremes of a continuum (Kruglanski, 2013; see also De Neys 2006a; Osman, 
2013). In the latter case it would still be difficult to fixate a turning point along the continuum 
(Varga & Hamburger, 2014). It also can be criticized that researchers talking about dual 
process theories often evoke the impression that there is only one dual process theory on 
reasoning. But dual process theories differ: whereas some researchers propose that the two 
systems work in parallel, others argue that the relationship is sequential, yet others do not 
make any assumptions about the underlying cognitive processes (Evans, 2008). It is therefore 
not clear what exactly distinguishes the two systems nor how they are cognitively 
implemented. Also the attributes assigned to each system differ across dual process theories, 
and some of these “typical” characteristics are questionable. For instance, some propose that 
System 1 is content dependent and System 2 abstract. But according to Evans (2008) this is 
not adequate, since System 2 is also relevant for reasoning with content rich material, as 
shown by Verschueren et al. (2005). The same happens for the automatic vs. non-automatic 
dimension. Osman (2013) pointed out that reasoning performances thought to be carried out 
by System 1 do not differ significantly in time from those carried out by System 2. Under 
some circumstances these “automatic” processes can take up to 26 or 47 seconds, throwing 
doubt onto the degree to which these processes are indeed automatic. Therefore, according to 
Evans (2008) the only reliable finding is that System 2 seems to depend on working memory, 
whereas System 1 does not. But also Osman (2013) highlights here that even reasoning 
performance thought to be carried out by System 1 can be impeded by working memory load 
(see De Neys, 2006b).  
An alternative approach to explain how different conclusions are reached is proposed 
by Klauer, Beller, and Hütter (2010). In their dual source theory they propose that inferences 
depend on both, people’s background knowledge about the content of the premises and the 
logical form of the inference. The background component is influenced by the conditional 
probability of q given p. It represents therefore the degree to which people endorse a 
conclusion given their background knowledge about the premises. The form component 
instead depends on the subjective probability of the logical inference presented in the task 
(Klauer et al., 2010; Singmann et al., 2014). The form component does therefore not refer to 
the actual logical status but to the “belief in the logicality of logical forms” (Singmann et al., 
2014, p. 4), i.e., the perceived logical correctness of an inference. Based on studies employing 
abstract material and strict deductive instructions it has been shown that this perceived logical 
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correctness is highest for MP inferences, followed by MT inferences and AC and DA 
inferences. When confronted with an inference task, participants thus consider both, the 
content and the logical form of the inference. This explains why participants, when they are 
asked to estimate how probable it is that q follows from p, give higher ratings when they are 
first confronted with the corresponding “if-then” conditional rule than when they are asked 
(directly) without having been presented with a rule before (Klauer et al., 2010; see also Liu, 
2003). The dual-source model thus differs from dual process theories, to the extent that it does 
not propose that people sometimes only consider the content while sometimes do abstract 
reasoning, but that people integrate both sources of information and weigh them according to 
the emphasis placed by task instructions either on content or on context variables (Klauer et 
al., 2010). Accordingly, Klauer et al. (2010) say that they abstain from ascribing the typical 
attributes of dual-process systems (e.g., automaticity, efficiency, etc.) to one of their dual 
sources.  
In sum, although under some circumstances people seem to answer faster, less 
reflective and more belief-based, this does not necessarily mean that two different cognitive 
systems exist. On the one hand multiple cognitive or neural systems may account for the 
different types of processing (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). On the other hand, instead of 
qualitative, also quantitative differences in reasoning are plausible: many seemingly 
analytically or automatically reached conclusions can also be explained by assuming a single 
system that evokes different conclusions depending on the task difficulty (Osman, 2013). 
 
1.1.2.5. Theories on the Utilities of Conditionals 
 
Theories linking utilities to reasoning are not as wide spread as the other theories mentioned 
in this chapter. Nonetheless, utility based reasoning theories have gained attention in the last 
years. The main assumption is that the conclusions people draw or withdraw also depend on 
the utility of this conclusion for some agent (Bonnefon, 2009). Depending on the antecedent 
and/ or the consequent, some conclusions have more or less utility for reaching an agent’s 
goals. 
The role of utilities in conditional reasoning is often investigated with utility 
conditionals, which describe actions and their consequences (Bonnefon, 2009; 2012; 
Bonnefon, Girotto, & Legrenzi, 2012; see also Bonnefon & Hilton, 2004). The actions are 
usually described in the antecedent of the conditional, and the consequences – which can be 
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positive, negative or neutral – in the consequent, for example “If you turn the radio on one 
more time, then I will hit you”. The participants’ task is to decide whether an agent would 
perform the action described in the antecedent. Bonnefon showed that people conclude more 
often that an action will be taken if it is of high utility for the agent. That is, people attribute 
goals and motivations to the agents and only conclude that the action will be taken if the 
benefits of this action overweight the costs of the consequences (see also Evans, Neilens, 
Handley, & Over, 2008; Ohm & Thompson, 2006). This happens according to Bonnefon by 
folk axioms (Bonnefon, 2009). Bonnefon assumes that people have naïve understandings 
about how other people make decisions. The most important folk axioms in this respect are 
the folk axioms of Self-Interested Behavior and the one of Self-Interested Attitude. Self-
interested behavior states that reasoners believe that agents take actions that increase their 
own personal utility. In the example above, reasoners would thus conclude that the agent will 
not turn the radio on. Self-interested attitude states that reasoners think that also other agents 
will perform actions which increase their personal utility. For example, given the conditional 
“If you testify against me, then you will have an accident” reasoners assume that the agent 
will not perform the action described in the antecedent (Bonnefon et al., 2012).  
Utilities can also be used to explain defeasible reasoning. Bonnefon and Hilton (2004) 
argue that defeaters sometimes provide information about utilities which can be used to 
decide whether an inference should be drawn. In their experiment, for instance, they showed 
that when a conditional such as “If Marie’s TV is broken, she will have it fixed” is followed 
by an utility conditional implicating defeaters like “If Marie has her TV fixed, she will not be 
able to pay the electricity bill”, people refuse to endorse the MP inference that Marie will 
have the TV fixed given that her TV is broken. That is, they consider that the costs of not 
paying the bill are higher than not having a TV working and therefore defeat the MP 
conclusion. Similarly, Elqayam, Thompson, Wilkinson, Evans, and Over (2015) showed that 
when participants are confronted with conditionals like “If Robert wears the Rieti suit, then he 
will be offered a better job than he would have been otherwise”, and with additional 
information such as “The Rieti suit has been made in a factory exploiting child labor. If 
Robert wears the Rieti suit, then he will be supporting child slavery”, participants withdraw 
from the conclusion that Robert should wear the Rieti suit.  
Besides utility conditionals, the role of utilities in reasoning has been also investigated 
with deontic conditionals. Deontic conditionals (roughly introduced in Section 1.1.1.2.2) 
describe what should, may or must happen, such as “When the sun is shining, then Jack 
should put sunscreen on his face”. As already explained in Section 1.1.1.2.2, reasoning from 
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deontic conditionals can be best explained with utilities. For instance, if participants are 
confronted in an inference task with the conditional “When the sun is shining, then Jack 
should put sunscreen on his face” and are asked whether q should happen given p, then their 
answer depends on how much more they prefer the outcome pq over p¬q (Over et al., 2004). 
Perspective effects in reasoning can also be explained by utilities. Imagine you are confronted 
with a conditional rule uttered by a mother to her son: “If you tidy your room, then you may 
go out to play”, and are asked to decide when this rule is violated. Manktelow and Over 
(1991) showed that people’s perception about rule violation depends on the utilities of each 
outcome, which in turn depend on the perspective taken by the reasoner. For instance, if 
participants are asked to imagine that they are the mother uttering this conditional rule, then 
they say that the rule is violated if the son goes out to play without having tidied his room 
(¬pq). However, if participants are asked to imagine they are the son, then they say the rule is 
violated if the son tidies the room but is not allowed to go outside to play (p¬q). Manktelow 
and Over (1991) argue that this different perception of when the rule is violated results from 
different subjective utilities attributed to persons uttering rules and to persons obeying rules.  
The idea that utilities can influence reasoning conflicts with many traditional 
approaches on reasoning. In the past, there has been a clear division between research on 
reasoning and on decision making. The reasoning community usually investigated deductive 
reasoning competence, and the decision making community investigated how utilities affect 
decision making (Bonnefon, 2009; Evans, 2012). However, the idea of breaking this division 
and considering utilities in investigations of reasoning too, is promising. In fact, taking into 
account utilities in reasoning is considered one of the main characteristics of the “new 
psychology of reasoning” introduced in Section 1.1. In everyday situations it is difficult to 
disentangle reasoning from decision making: people usually reason before deciding. Imagine 
for instance that someone gives you lots of candies so that you have to decide if you eat them 
or not. In order to make this decision, you might start thinking about your experiences with 
eating candies and perhaps remember that: If a person eats lots of candies, then the person 
will get cavities. How would you decide? If we allow utilities to affect reasoning processes, 
then we might conclude that people’s decision about eating the candies reflects a reasoning 
process based on the utilities attributed to the antecedent and the consequent of the 
conditional. For instance, if we really love candies and the candies we got are our favorite 
ones, then the benefits of eating them might overweigh the costs of getting cavities. As a 
result, one might conclude that it ok to eat the candies.  
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Of course it is not possible to explain all sorts of conditional reasoning by utilities. 
There are for sure conditionals were no utilities are applicable, for example in cases were 
conditionals do not describe any actions nor present any agents, such as “If it rains, then the 
streets are wet”. However, there are still many conditionals were utilities can help to 
understand which conclusions are drawn. In fact, the main advantage of opening the 
boundaries between reasoning and decision making is that it permits the investigation of many 
other types of reasoning which may be on a first sight more related to practical reasoning and 
decision making. One of these is the domain of legal reasoning, the focus of this thesis, which 
is described in the next section. 
 
 
 
1.2. Legal Reasoning 
 
So far, I have described how conditional reasoning is investigated in cognitive psychology. I 
have explained how psychologists’ research interest has moved to the investigation of 
defeasible reasoning and how the current reasoning theories explain the withdrawal of 
conclusions. The overview on the psychological literature was necessary to get a general idea 
of what defeasible reasoning is and to understand when people defeat conclusions. However, 
to investigate legal conditional reasoning, it is now necessary to take a look on the literature 
on legal reasoning. The goal of this section is to describe legal reasoning from a law 
theoretical and a social psychological point of view, and to present some empirical findings 
on people’s legal reasoning. By doing so, in Chapter 2, I will be able to combine the findings 
from conditional reasoning and legal reasoning to develop hypotheses on how human beings 
reason with legal conditionals.  
 
 
1.2.1. Legal Reasoning and Conditionals in Legal Theory 
 
Legal reasoning is the process of reaching conclusions and decisions in legal matters. Legal 
reasoning has thus two aspects: reasoning about evidence, and reasoning about rules or norms 
as reasons for action (MacCormick, 1998). This thesis focuses on the latter, especially 
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because there are several similarities between how legal theory describes reasoning about 
rules and norms and how cognitive psychology describes conditional reasoning.  
When judges decide whether a legal rule should be applied or not, they usually have to 
make two sets of decisions. First, they must decide what the facts are (German: Sachverhalt) 
and whether there exists any legal rule applicable to this case. This step is called external 
justification (in German: externe Rechtfertigung; Alexy, 1983). For instance, if the case is 
about manslaughter, then the judge must justify that 1) a person indeed killed someone, and 2) 
that manslaughter is the right rule to be applied. The judge has to look at the concrete rule for 
manslaughter (§212 StGB: Whoever kills a human being, without being a murderer, is 
punished for manslaughter with imprisonment for not less than five years [Wer einen 
Menschen tötet, ohne Mörder zu sein, wird als Totschläger mit Freiheitsstrafe nicht unter fünf 
Jahren bestraft]) and interpret its components (e.g., what does “killing” mean? Is this what 
happened in the current case?). Only like this can a judge find out if the matters of facts agree 
with the prescribed elements of the crime (in German: Tatbestand). The external justification 
in legal reasoning is thus the most difficult step in legal reasoning, because it also depends on 
a good police investigation, and on weighting the evidence and arguments presented by 
lawyers and attorneys. Once the judge has decided which are the facts and which rule is 
appropriate, the next step is the internal justification (in German: interne Rechtfertigung; 
Alexy, 1983). Internal justification describes how a rule and the matter of facts are combined 
to a reach a verdict. According to Alexy (1983), the verdict ought to be reached deductively, 
more precisely, it must follow the structure of a MP inference: If there is a rule that punishes 
crime A, and somebody commits A, then the person should be punished for A. To better 
combine the legal rule and the matter of facts in a deductive way, many law theorists argue 
that legal rules should be understood as conditionals (cf. Bäcker, 2009, 2010; Koch & 
Rüßmann, 1982; MacCormick, 1998; Wang, 2004). I will call this conditional formulation of 
legal rules as legal conditionals. For example, if the evidence shows that somebody killed 
another human and the judge decided that the rule against manslaughter is appropriate, then 
the internal justification should follow the following schema:  
 
If a person kills another human, then the person should be punished for manslaughter (Rule) 
Bert killed another human (Facts) 
Bert should be punished for manslaughter (Legal consequence) 
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Given these two premises, one can follow the MP inference and conclude that if a person kills 
another human (p), then the person should be punished for manslaughter (q). Law theorists 
call this the judicial or legal syllogism (Alexy, 1983; Bäcker, 2009; 2010; Koch & Rüßmann, 
1982; Wróblewski, 1992). This term came about because the internal justification was 
originally introduced in the form of a syllogism (e.g., Anyone who has brought about the 
death of another person is to be punished. Someone has brought about the death of another 
person. Therefore, the person is to be punished; Bäcker, 2010). The aim of internal 
justification is to make the judge’s argumentation irrefutable, and this is why it is best served 
by deductive reasoning: a verdict is internally justified if it follows logically from its rule and 
facts premises (Alexy, 1983). However, as discussed in the introduction of this thesis, 
reaching a certain conclusion is not always that easy. Law considers circumstances that 
prevent people from being punished even though punishable acts were committed – in other 
words: legal rules are defeasible (Bäcker, 2010; Dewitz, Ryu, & Lee, 1994; Prakken, 1997; 
Prakken & Sartor, 2004; Sartor, 2009). Consider the following example: 
 
If a person kills another human, then the person should be punished for manslaughter (Rule) 
Bert killed another human (Facts) 
Because of a psychological disorder, Bert was not able to control his actions (Exculpatory 
circumstance) 
Bert should not be punished for manslaughter (Legal consequence) 
 
According to penal code, the offender should not be punished anymore, because 
absence of criminal responsibility due to psychological disorders is exculpatory evidence (or: 
exculpatory circumstance) according to law and a defeater in psychological terms. 
Besides lack of criminal liability due to psychological disorders, there are several other 
exculpatory circumstances (i.e., defeaters) regulated in penal code, such as self-defense, 
necessity, mistake of law, or age (lack of criminal liability of children). In the German law 
most of the exculpatory circumstances are written in the General Part of the Penal Code 
(German: Allgemeiner Teil) and apply therefore to (almost) all specific offences (such as 
manslaughter, bodily injury, theft, etc.) which are written in the Special Part (German: 
Besonderer Teil). As all defeaters, exculpatory circumstances prevent the consequent of a 
legal conditional to happen although the antecedent is true. In other words, exculpatory 
circumstances void sentence completely, although the prescribed elements of the crime are 
fulfilled. In German law, exculpatory circumstances can void punishment in two ways: either 
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they justify the offence, or they excuse it. When an offence is justified, a person is not 
punished because the act is not seen as unlawful. When an offence is excused, the act is still 
considered unlawful, but the offender is not punished because the guilt is considered so low, 
that punishment is not judged necessary anymore. In this thesis, I will not make the distinction 
about exculpatory circumstances justifying or excusing offences. But I want to notice that 
exculpatory circumstances are not the same as mitigating circumstances. While exculpatory 
circumstances void sentence completely (i.e., no punishment), mitigating circumstances only 
lessen a sentence (e.g., 5 instead of 8 years of imprisonment).  
The characteristic of the penal code of having separate rules for specific offences and 
for exculpatory circumstances, respectively, illustrates the defeasibility of legal rules. 
However, some legal theorists argue that this is no real defeasibility (Bäcker, 2012). The 
exculpatory circumstances presented in the last passage are actually all written down in the 
penal code. In this way, one could argue that such exculpatory evidence could simply be 
added to the antecedent as additional requirements for applying the rule (e.g., If somebody 
kills another human, and the person has no relevant psychological disorders, then the person 
should be punished for manslaughter), allowing still deductive conclusions. Some researchers 
therefore call this kind of defeasibility emerged from the structure of the penal code improper 
defeasibility (in German: unechte defeasibility; see Bäcker, 2012). However, this “improper 
defeasibility” labeling does not mean that legal rules are not defeasible. Legal theorists still 
acknowledge the defeasible character of legal rules; they argue that legal reasoning is 
defeasible because even though many exculpatory circumstances are prescribed in the penal 
code and could be added to the antecedent, it is not possible to know beforehand which 
defeaters will be relevant in future cases. That is to say, exculpatory evidence cannot be 
enumerated exhaustively (Bäcker, 2010; Wang, 2004). There will always be new cases and 
one cannot foresee all circumstances that will be relevant for these cases. This impossibility to 
enumerate all possible exculpatory circumstances beforehand as part of the antecedent is seen 
by legal theorists as proper defeasibility (in German: echte defeasibility; cf. Wang, 2004; see 
also Dewitz et al., 1994). Interestingly, the division between proper and improper defeasibility 
is not mentioned in the psychological literature on human reasoning. This is probably so 
because it only makes sense from a theoretical perspective. The conditionals with which we 
reason in our daily lives are not written in books which prescribe what to conclude from them. 
It is therefore difficult to claim that all possible defeaters can be included as additional 
antecedents. Moreover, from a cognitive point of view, the limited capacities of human 
working memory, and the ease with which people make MP inferences, also make this an 
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implausible assumption. This incapability of enumerating all relevant defeaters of an action 
with respect to a given consequence is related to the frame problem in philosophy and 
cognitive science (see Dennett 1987, Fodor 1987). To put it broadly, the problem is when to 
stop thinking about the things that may be relevant for a particular action (e.g., Fodor, 1987)
2
. 
Along these lines, because this thesis aims to investigate laypeople’s legal reasoning (and not 
the theoretical defeasibility of law), I will not use any further the distinction between proper 
and improper defeasibility. The thesis thus follows the psychological and philosophical 
definition of defeasibility, as the withdrawal of conclusions in light of additional information, 
irrespective of whether this additional information is exhaustively regulated in written form. 
Finally, legal defeasibility is not restricted to the application of rules the penal code. 
Some researchers argue that the whole legal system is based on defeasibility, in the sense that 
prosecutors and attorneys have to defeat each other’s arguments during trials (Godden & 
Walton, 2008; Prakken, 2001; see also Prakken & Sartor, 2004). Another illustration of 
defeasible reasoning in law is weighing the evidence or the relevant matter of facts. For 
example, imagine it is known that people do not normally kill the people they love. So, if 
Anna’s beloved husband Fred is found dead, then it will be concluded that Anna did not kill 
Fred. However, if new evidence shows that Anna’s clothes were soaked in Fred’s blood, then 
the previous conclusion that Anna did not kill Fred is defeated. But if further evidence shows 
that Linda put the blood on Anna’s clothes, then the conclusion is once again defeated and it 
is concluded anew that Anna did not kill Fred (example taken from Sartor, 2009). Pollock 
(1987) calls the defeaters which bring reasoners to not believe anymore that q follows from p 
rebutters (e.g., such as discovering that there is blood on Anna’s clothes). Defeaters that 
question the believability of p are called by Pollock undercutters (e.g., such as discovering 
that Linda put the blood on Anna’s clothes).  
  
                                                 
2
 The frame problem originates in artificial intelligence (see McCarthy & Hayes, 1969) as a more narrow and 
technical issue concerning the challenge of representing the non-effects of actions ( i.e., what remains unchanged 
by particular actions), but was expanded by philosophers (e.g., Fodor, 1987) to the problem of relevance 
(Murray, 2016). 
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1.2.2. Legal Rules and Justice in Social Psychology 
 
In the previous section, legal reasoning has been explained from the theoretical perspective of 
law. But how do people reason about legal rules in real life? Lawyers will probably follow the 
rules from the penal code. But the question remains how people reason without knowledge of 
these norms and regulations. To understand how laypeople reason with legal rules, I start by 
delineating the literature in social psychology and social justice. 
Research on social justice has shown that when laypeople are asked to decide about an 
offender’s sentence, they base their decisions on their own sense of justice, which is often 
described as being retributive, following “just deserts” principles (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; 
Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000; Keller, Oswald, 
Stucki, & Gollwitzer, 2010). This means that people feel that offenders should be punished 
according to the severity of an offence. But what does severity mean? When laypeople are 
confronted with offences, they often react with intuitive feelings of moral outrage and a 
“strong and immediate” desire to punish the offender (Darley, 2009, p. 2; Darley & Pittman, 
2003; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000; see also 
Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Laypeople’s severity perception thus depends primarily on the moral 
wrongfulness of an offence. The higher the feelings of moral outrage, the higher the desire to 
punish the offender, and also the higher the desired sentence for the offence (Alter, 
Kernochan, & Darley, 2007; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley, 2009; Darley et al., 2000; Gromet 
& Darley, 2009; see also Buckholtz et al., 2008; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007). 
Accordingly, also Haidt (2001; 2007) argued that moral judgments are highly intuitive and 
driven by emotions. Aspects such as utilitarian harmfulness (i.e., how severe the 
consequences of an offence are) are secondary (Darley, 2009). For instance, in one study 
Alter and colleagues (2007) created offences where moral wrongfulness and harmfulness 
were disentangled, such as an offender mistakenly spending 1000$ from another person’s 
credit card compared with an offender knowingly trying to spend 1000$ from another 
person’s credit card but being stopped on time. Alter et al. asked participants to indicate how 
long the sentence should be. They found that it was moral wrongfulness, and not harmfulness, 
that predicted the desired sentence severity. Principles of deterrence (i.e., punishing in order 
to prevent future offences) are also secondary. Carlsmith and colleagues (2002) showed that 
although people often report to think that deterrence is a good reason for punishing, their 
sentencing behavior is actually best described by just deserts principles.  
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Moral outrage is often described as “wide-spread, if not universal” (Tyler & 
Boeckmann, 1997, p. 237). Yet, there are situations when people’s primary reaction towards 
offences is less emotionally driven. Some researchers talk in this respect about dual process 
theories of moral reasoning. For instance, Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen 
(2001) showed that there are situations when people make moral decisions based on more 
deliberative and utilitarian principles. In their experiments Greene and colleagues presented 
their participants with moral dilemmas: situations where people have to decide if it is 
acceptable to sacrifice the life of one person in order to save the life of more. They found that 
when people are confronted with problems that must be resolved by directly inflicting harm to 
another person (e.g., throwing a person from a bridge in order to prevent a train killing five 
persons working on the rails), participants seem to base their moral evaluation primarily on 
autonomous emotional responses rather than on deliberate decision-making processes. 
Consequently, people usually take longer in making judgments that go against their intuitive 
emotions. In contrast, in situations of impersonal dilemmas that do not evoke such strong 
emotional responses, people primarily make decisions based on more rational utilitarian 
principles (e.g., pulling a lever to change the direction of a train, so that only one, instead of 
five persons working on the rails are killed; Greene et al., 2001). Similarly, Darley also argues 
that if an offence is considered not severe or morally acceptable, then moral outrage and the 
desire for punishment are low or nonexistent (Robinson & Kurzban, 2007). This is why it is 
often proposed that moral outrage also has a cognitive component besides its emotional one 
(Darley & Pittman, 2003).  
If reasoning about offences can be explained by dual process theories (see Darley, 
2009), it should be possible to specify when people reason analytically and when they reason 
emotionally. One factor that may influence whether people reason about offences analytically 
or emotionally is legal training. Unlike laypeople, lawyers have learned how to decide about 
offences and should thus be less driven by emotions. Consequently, they can decide about 
offences in a more elaborate and analytical way. High need for cognition has also been related 
to people’s ability to make moral judgments rationally, while controlling emotions (Haidt, 
2001). Another factor might be the rules of behavior imposed by one’s immediate social 
surrounding, e.g., religion. Religiosity is often related to forgiveness, altruism and prosocial 
behavior (e.g., McCullough & Worthington, 1999; Saroglou, Pichon, Trompette, 
Verschueren, & Dernelle, 2005; Hansen, Vandenberg, & Patterson, 1995; see also 
McCullough, 2001). Through forgiveness, religiosity could thus lessen feelings of moral 
outrage and increase deliberative reasoning; although religiosity is sometimes also related to 
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higher dogmatism (e.g. Juan & Haley, 1970; Kilpatrick, Sutker, & Sutker, 1980; Swindell & 
L’Abate, 1970; for a review see Ross, Francis, & Craig, 2005). 
The cultural context may also influence the extent to which people follow feelings of 
moral outrage. For instance, if one considers the implications of moral outrage, then people 
experiencing feelings of moral outrage towards an offender could actually agree with taking 
justice into their own hands (e.g. Cook, 2006; Haas, de Keijser, and Bruinsma, 2012). After 
all, vigilantes often only follow the feelings of moral outrage they felt after hearing about 
some preceding offence. However, given that in our culture vigilantism is not accepted and 
we have a legal system in charge of punishing offenders and guarantying security, people 
usually do not take justice in their own hands – although in experiments people often 
sympathize with vigilantes (Cook, 2006; Haas et al., 2012), and even rate a murderer’s death 
as fair, regardless of whether it was achieved by vigilantism or by a legal trial ending in the 
death penalty (Skitka & Houston, 2001). 
 
 
1.2.3. Empirical Findings on Legal Reasoning  
 
As far as I know, there are almost no psychological studies investigating how people reason 
with conditionals describing legal rules. That is, the judicial syllogism presented in Section 
1.2.1 has only been debated theoretically in legal theory, but has not received empirical 
support yet. Similarly, there are only a few studies investigating empirically the defeasibility 
of legal rules. In this section I present the few studies that can be related to legal conditional 
reasoning. Then, in Chapter 2, I develop my hypotheses on how people reason with legal 
conditional rules.  
The study more closely related to the investigation of legal reasoning was conducted 
by Manktelow, Fairley, Kilpatrick, and Over (2000). Manktelow and colleagues created 
conditionals describing two types of road traffic violations: drink-driving or speeding (e.g., If 
a car driver travels above 30 mph in a built-up area and is stopped by the police, then she or 
he is liable to a fine). These conditionals were paired with circumstance information which 
could be mitigating (e.g., doctor on call) or aggravating (e.g., late for a party). The 
participants task was to decide whether the driver must/ should/ ought to/ may /may not/ 
ought not/ should not/ or must not be fined. If participants thought that none of these answer 
options is correct, they could write down in their own words what follows (e.g., more than a 
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fine such as imprisonment). Manktelow and colleagues found that mitigating circumstances 
influenced conclusions much more strongly for speeding than for drink-driving. In fact, drink-
driving was always perceived to deserve some punishment, whereas speeding was sometimes 
completely condoned in light of mitigating circumstances. In addition, Manktelow and 
colleagues found that the effect of mitigating circumstances depended on how strongly the 
rule was violated. For instance, mitigating circumstances had less effect when the driver drove 
60mph than when he drove 35mph. 
Bonnefon, Haigh, and Steward (2013) investigated how people react to undesired 
actions. Bonnefon et al. showed that when the antecedent of a conditional describes somebody 
doing something bad (e.g., insulting or hurting someone) people expect that the consequent 
will describe something negative happening to this person (e.g., “If Brian insults Mandy, then 
he will get told off”). Similarly, if the antecedent describes somebody doing something good, 
then people expect that the consequent will describe something positive happening to this 
person (e.g., “If John helps Sarah, then he will be rewarded”). Bonnefon et al. talk in this 
respect about a justice template guiding people’s interpretation of conditionals describing 
people doing good or bad things. These justice templates even help to assign utilities to 
conditionals with nonsense words. For instance, when people are confronted with a 
conditional like “If Lisa murbs Ian, then she will be tymped” and are told that Lisa does not 
like to being tymed, then they conclude that murbing is something bad.  
Manktelow’s et al. (2000) and Bonnefon’s et al. (2013) studies show that people favor 
conclusions which punish undesired behavior, as for example violating traffic norms or acting 
disrespectful with other people. This high endorsement of conditionals describing punished or 
rewarded behaviors can also be found in the literature on inducements and advice, which is 
usually more concerned with how people reason deductively with the rules of classical logic. 
They are nonetheless related to legal reasoning because legal rules are seen as some kind of 
inducement, aiming to regularize the behaviors of a society. Newstead, Ellis, Evans, and 
Dennis (1997) constructed conditionals describing inducements like threats (e.g., “If you lose 
your next game then I shall take you out of the team) or promises (e.g., “If you wash the car 
then I’ll let you borrow it tonight”), as well as advices such as tips (e.g., “If you stand by the 
pillar you’ll be served immediately”) and warnings (e.g., “If you pull the dog’s tail then he’ll 
bite you”). They found that people endorse more MP, MT, AC, and DA inferences when the 
conditional describes inducements than advices. Follow up studies showed that this 
preference for endorsing inducements more than advices is primarily because speakers of 
inducements are perceived to have more control than the ones of advices (Evans & Twyman-
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Musgrove, 1998) and because the antecedent of inducements is perceived more sufficient and 
necessary for the consequent (Ohm & Thompson, 2004). Given the findings on inducements 
and advice, legal rules should also be perceived as being uttered by a high control source and 
consequently, their antecedents should be perceived of being sufficient and necessary for their 
consequent.  
In the literature on conditional reasoning one can also find studies on deontic 
reasoning where people must decide in the so called Wason’s (1968) selection task if a rule 
(e.g., If a person is drinking beer, then that person must be over 18 years of age) has been 
violated (e.g., Cosmides, 1989; Cox & Griggs, 1982; Holyoak & Cheng, 1995a; 1995b). At 
first sight it is tempting to relate those studies to my current aim of investigating defeasible 
reasoning with legal conditionals. However, such comparisons are difficult. First, the 
interpretation of deontic rules in those studies differs from the meaning of legal rules in law 
theory. Second, the experimental paradigm used in those studies differs in very important 
aspects from the conditional inference task, and thus also from the judicial syllogism 
presented in Section 1.2.1. I discuss further in the General Discussion why it may be 
problematic to relate the classical literature on deontic reasoning to legal reasoning (Section 
7.1.4). 
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Chapter 2: Combining Conditional and Legal Reasoning - 
Aims and Hypotheses 
 
 
In Chapter 1, conditional and legal reasoning have been dealt with separately. It has been 
shown that conditional reasoning is defeasible, and that people introduce their background 
knowledge and preferences into reasoning tasks. Relatedly, I emphasized that although people 
usually wish offenders to be punished, the penal code itself is defeasible: when exculpatory 
evidence becomes available, people should not be punished despite having committed an 
offence. But are legal rules defeasible for laypeople, too? The empirical evidence is still 
scarce. To be able to answer this question it is necessary to combine findings from conditional 
and legal reasoning. This is the goal of this Chapter.  
Predicting how lawyers or judges reason with legal rules is rather easy. As explained 
in Section 1.2.1, reasoning from legal rules can be illustrated by drawing MP inferences. 
Therefore, if lawyers are confronted with a case where somebody killed another human, they 
should answer the following question with “yes”: 
 
If a person kills another human, then the person should be punished for manslaughter. 
A person killed another human. 
Should the person be punished for manslaughter? 
 
Even when exculpatory evidence is presented as an additional premise, it is rather clear what 
lawyers should conclude. Given that lawyers know the regulations of the penal code, they 
know which circumstances count as exculpatory evidence and which do not. Consequently, if 
exculpatory evidence is introduced as an additional premise, lawyers can retrieve information 
from their knowledge of the penal code and conclude that the offender should not be 
punished. Lawyers should therefore answer the following problem with “no”: 
 
If a person kills another human, then the person should be punished for manslaughter. 
A person killed another human. 
Because of a psychological disorder it was impossible for this person to control and see the 
wrongfulness of his/her acts. 
Should the person be punished for manslaughter? 
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In this way, lawyers’ defeasible reasoning depends only on the availability of one defeater. As 
soon as they realize that the premises include exculpatory evidence, they can withdraw their 
previously drawn conclusion and conclude that the offender should not be punished. But how 
do people without legal background knowledge reason from legal conditionals? 
Chan and Chua (1994) argued that one can only consider and weigh defeaters correctly 
if one has prior knowledge about the domain in question. Accordingly, several studies found 
differences in inferences depending on whether a participant has domain knowledge or not 
(see e.g., Cummins, 1995; Markovits, 1986). For instance, Cummins (1995) compared how 
people reason with conditionals with everyday content (e.g., “If it rains, then the streets will 
be wet”), and conditionals with fictitious content (e.g., “If it thardrons, then the streets will be 
sticky”). She found that participants rejected valid inferences more often for everyday than for 
fictitious conditionals, presumably because participants had background knowledge about 
defeaters for the former but not for the latter. Also Markovits (1986) found that familiarity 
with the content of conditionals increases the consideration of information not directly 
presented in the inference task. He found that the amount of correctly rejected DA and AC 
inferences and therefore the consideration of alternative causes were positively correlated 
with the domain familiarity. Moreover, Chan and Chua (1994) tested how undergraduates and 
policemen weight potential defeaters to everyday conditionals (e.g., “If Steven is invited, then 
he would attend the dance party”) or conditionals describing police scenarios (e.g., “If he 
wants to steal car-radios, then the thief will break into the car”). They created different kinds 
of potential defeaters which differed in their relevance for the situations described in the 
conditionals (“Steven knows the host well” or “Parking attendants are on duty” vs. 
“Completes the report tonight” or “Carpark is dimly lit”). They found that while 
undergraduates and policemen did not differ in the weights they attached to the potential 
defeaters for everyday conditionals, they did so for conditionals describing police scenarios. 
Only policemen weighted the defeaters as they are actually weighed in real police situations.  
On the basis of these studies, one can expect that laypeople and lawyers differ in legal 
reasoning. Cognitive psychologists, however, also want to understand how laypeople differ 
from lawyers. More precisely, cognitive psychologists are interested in how laypeople 
actually cognitively process potential exculpatory evidence. One option would be to simply 
ignore potential exculpatory evidence: because laypeople do not know that given information 
is exculpatory, they simply do not use it and reason monotonically. Alternatively, it could be 
possible that people without domain knowledge use other knowledge bases to compensate, 
consciously or unconsciously, their lack of knowledge. Chan and Chua (1994) proposed that 
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while experts in a field have elaborated schemas about the domain in question, people without 
domain knowledge only have “simple and ill-defined” schemas, with loosely related elements 
(p. 234). Yet, the authors did not specify the meaning of “ill-defined schemas” into detail.  
My thesis expands Chan and Chua’s assumption by assuming that the ill-defined 
schemas laypeople use are actually imprinted by criteria from different, but related domains. 
Which criteria these are, certainly varies from one domain to another. For instance, if a 
conditional is about police scenarios, as in Chan and Chua (1994), people might use their 
knowledge about police investigations from TV shows (see Schweitzer & Saks, 2007). If a 
conditional is about machines or engineering they might use their knowledge about lay 
physics or their experiences in fixing household appliance. Or, if a conditional is about 
psychological constructs, they might apply folk psychology concepts or guide their answers 
on their own personality traits (Bonnefon, 2010). But which is the most closely related 
domain laypeople have access to when reasoning with legal conditionals? According to the 
literature on social justice, it is people’s own sense of justice.  
As explained in Section 1.2.2, the research on social justice shows that laypeople’s 
own sense of justice follows a just deserts principle, guided by the moral wrongfulness of 
offences instead of their harmfulness. Laypeople’s severity perception of offences is thus 
guided by feelings of moral outrage, which are difficult to control and evoke a desire to 
punish the offender. Accordingly, I hypothesize that when laypeople reason about legal 
conditional rules, they should have difficulties in accepting possible exculpatory 
circumstances. More precisely, their consideration of exculpatory circumstances (and thus 
their willingness to defeat conclusions drawn from legal rules) should depend on how morally 
outraging the offence is. This hypothesis is supported by several studies showing how 
people’s own preferences and subjective utilities influence their reasoning (see Section 
1.1.2.5). As an illustration consider the following two problems: 
 
If a person kills another human, then the person should be punished for manslaughter. 
A person killed another human. 
Because of a psychological disorder it was impossible for this person to control and see the 
wrongfulness of his/her acts. 
Should the person be punished for manslaughter? 
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Vs. 
 
If a person participates in an illegal game of chance, then the person should be punished for 
illegal gambling. 
A person participated in an illegal game of chance. 
Because of a psychological disorder it was impossible for this person to control and see the 
wrongfulness of his/her acts. 
Should the person be punished for illegal gambling? 
 
Although both problems include the very same exculpatory circumstance (which are 
according to law defeaters and thus reasons for voiding punishment), the offence described in 
the first legal conditional is clearly more morally outraging than the second. As a 
consequence, I expect laypeople to feel more reluctant to accept the exculpatory circumstance 
as a reason for voiding punishment. Laypeople should thus answer “no” and decide that the 
offender should not be punished more often in the second than in the first example. In other 
words, the more morally outrageous the initial offence is, the harder it should be for laypeople 
to accept circumstance information as exculpatory and the more they will deny this 
circumstance as being sufficiently strong to refrain from punishing the offender. This higher 
difficulty should be reflected in less no-punishment conclusions and longer decision times 
whenever they decide contrary to their feelings of moral outrage. These hypotheses are 
investigated in Chapter 3, in Experiments 1-3.  
The assumption that people use their own sense of justice to decide about the 
defeasibility of legal rules is supported by the empirical findings on legal reasoning presented 
in Section 1.2.3. If one assumes that people use their own sense of justice when reasoning 
about offences, then it is understandable why in Bonnefon’s et al. (2013) study reasoners 
concluded that antecedents describing someone doing something undesirable should be 
followed by consequents describing something negative happening to this person. Along the 
same lines, people’s own sense of justice and feelings of moral outrage also explain why in 
Manktelow’s et al. (2000) study reasoners were less influenced by mitigating circumstances in 
cases of drink-driving than in speeding. Although the authors did not relate their findings to 
moral outrage, drink-driving is probably more morally outraging than speeding, making 
reasoners more reluctant to forgive drink-driving. In this way one could say that the 
reasoners’ own preferences about what should happen to offenders will influence their 
conclusions in a legal conditional reasoning task. Also the findings on inducements and 
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advices strengthen the assumption that people should have difficulties to consider defeaters in 
legal reasoning. Given that legal rules are inducements, the antecedents of such conditionals 
are perceived to have a high necessity to its consequent (see Ohm & Thompson, 2004). 
One direct consequence of using one’s own sense of justice for legal reasoning is that 
differences in one’s sense of justice reflect in differences in legal reasoning. In Section 1.2.2 I 
presented the literature showing that people’s reactions towards offenders sometimes differ. 
Sometimes the desire for punishment results in acts of vigilantism, and sometimes one’s 
cultural norms of behavior, such as religion, dictate how we should deal with offenders. This 
thesis therefore also aims to investigate how such behavioral norms affect laypeople’s 
defeasible reasoning with legal conditionals. The effect of behavioral norms on legal 
reasoning is investigated in Chapter 4. For instance, Experiment 4 investigates how religiosity 
affects legal reasoning. There is a wide range of studies relating religiosity to either 
forgiveness or dogmatism. Regardless of which is true, religiosity should affect people’s 
defeasible reasoning and their consideration of exculpatory circumstances as reasons for 
voiding punishment. Similarly, Experiment 5 investigates cross-cultural differences in legal 
reasoning. It is investigated under which circumstances additional information describing 
offenders as vigilantes is considered exculpatory and thus a reason to withdraw conclusions.  
Besides investigating how one’s own sense of justice affects legal reasoning, another 
aim of this thesis is to explore how to moderate this effect. One way to do so is to vary the 
participants’ instructions. By asking participants to reason according to their own sense of 
justice or to try to reason like a real judge, it should be possible to affect the degree to which 
one’s own sense of justice affects legal reasoning. This is tested in Experiment 2. However, 
another more subtle influence on the degree to which people’s conclusions are based on their 
own sense of justice is the phrasing of the legal conditional. The effect of phrasing in legal 
reasoning is investigated in Chapter 5. According to legal theory, legal conditionals are 
deontic, describing what should happen to an offender. Already in Sections 1.1.1.2.2 and 
1.1.2.5 it has been shown how deontic conditionals often trigger people’s enhanced reliance 
on their own preferences and subjective utilities. Consequently, one way to moderate the 
effect of one’s sense of justice on legal reasoning is to phrase legal conditionals non-
deontically. They can be phrased as factual conditionals by changing the modal auxiliary and 
describing what will happen if an offence is committed (e.g., If a person kills another human, 
then the person will be punished for manslaughter). As shown in Section 1.1.1.2.2, the modal 
auxiliary used in conditionals affects the criteria used to draw conclusions. In this way, by 
being factual, participants’ tendency of guiding their conclusions on their own preferences 
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should diminish and their consideration of factual information, such as exculpatory evidence, 
should increase. The role of the modal auxiliary (should vs. will) is investigated in 
Experiments 6 and 7. Another way in which phrasing can influence the effect of one’s own 
sense of justice on legal reasoning is by keeping the modal auxiliary deontic, but changing 
how general the rule is phrased. If a conditional is phrased in such a way that it already 
suggests the existence of exculpatory circumstances, for example by introducing uncertainty 
or weakening the relationship between antecedent (the offence) and the consequent (the 
punishment), then people should be less prone to conclude that an offender should be 
punished even though an offence was committed. This can be done by modifying the amount 
of cases in which q follows from p, for instance by stating that all people who commit an 
offence are punished or that only some people are punished. This is tested in Experiment 8. 
Finally, one last aim of this thesis is to test whether people’s reluctance to withdraw 
from negatively-charged conclusions may also occur in everyday situations. More precisely, 
this thesis’ main assumption – that laypeople have problems in accepting exculpatory 
evidence for morally outrageous offences – can be interpreted as a difficulty in withdrawing 
from negative emotions. In other words, if something bad happens, it is difficult to let go of – 
or defeat – the negative emotions associated with this event. In Chapter 6, I go beyond the 
domain of legal reasoning to test if also in everyday situation people have difficulties in 
defeating conclusions resulting from negative emotions. In Experiments 9 and 10 I will 
therefore construct conditionals containing negative events (e.g., If my mother dies, then I am 
sad) but also positive ones (e.g., If I get my dream job, then I am happy) and test in how far 
conclusions from those conditionals can be defeated by subsequent information.  
 
 
To sum up, the main hypotheses of this thesis are: 
 
1) Laypeople’s decisions about exculpatory circumstances in legal conditional reasoning 
depend on their own sense of justice and thus on how morally outraging the offence is: 
High morally outraging offences should result in fewer acceptances of exculpatory 
circumstances, and thus less defeasible reasoning.  
 
2) Differences in people’s preferences about how to deal with offenders and offences 
should affect the conclusions laypeople draw from legal conditionals.  
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3) Linguistic factors that minimize the importance of one’s own sense of justice or that 
highlight the existence of exculpatory circumstances should reduce the effect of one’s 
own sense of justice on legal conditional reasoning.  
 
4) People’s reluctance to withdraw conclusions from conditionals describing negatively 
laden events – such as defeating the conclusion that an offender should be punished – 
also occurs in everyday situations. 
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Chapter 3: Legal Rules, Moral Outrage and Domain 
Knowledge  
 
 
The aim of the first three experiments was to test the first main hypothesis of this thesis. It is 
tested whether laypeople’s consideration of exculpatory circumstances depends on moral 
outrage by comparing their conclusions with those of lawyers, who know the regulations of 
the penal code and should therefore answer accordingly. 
In all three experiments, laypeople were students from disciplines outside law, with no 
specific law knowledge. The group of lawyers consisted of graduate lawyers (who completed 
at least the first German state examination) and advanced law students. In the latter group, it 
was ensured that all law students were already familiar with the rules of the penal code used 
in the experiments; this is usually the case after the first three to four semesters of law studies 
in Germany. Strictly speaking these law students are not yet fully-trained lawyers; nonetheless 
they are already familiar with the relevant legal rules and certainly have more legal 
experience than laypeople. Hence, for simplicity reasons, henceforth the group of people with 
law studies are referred to as ‘lawyers’. 
 
 
 
3.1. Experiment 1: The Legal Conditional Reasoning Paradigm 
 
In Experiment 1, I developed the experimental paradigm of this thesis. I created legal 
conditionals by selecting legal rules from the German penal code and by putting those in 
conditional form. In Experiment 1, only severe offences were selected. These legal 
conditionals were combined with circumstance information that could be exculpatory, neutral 
or aggravating. It was tested whether a) people defeat logically valid conclusions in light of 
such circumstances, and b) this task is appropriate to measure differences between lawyers 
and laypeople. The hypothesis is that when faced with exculpatory circumstances, lawyers 
will withdraw the conclusion to punish the offender. Laypeople may also do so to some 
extent, but since only severe offences were presented – and severe offences are related to high 
moral outrage (Darley et al., 2000) – withdrawing the conclusion to punish the offender 
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should be more difficult and thus less pronounced for laypeople. As a consequence, laypeople 
should take longer in concluding not to punish the offender than to punish him. I also added 
aggravating circumstances to the experimental design to check if, besides defeating 
conclusions, circumstance information also enhances punishment conclusions by 
strengthening the association between the antecedent (the offence) and the consequent (the 
punishment) of the legal conditional (cf. Manktelow & Fairley, 2000; Stevenson & Over, 
1995). 
 
Hypothesis 1: While lawyers withdraw the conclusion to punish the offender in light of 
exculpatory circumstances, laypeople should have difficulties in doing so and thus withdraw 
the conclusion to punish the offender less often than lawyers.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Laypeople’s difficulty in considering exculpatory circumstances should be 
reflected in decision times: no-punishment conclusions should take longer than punishment 
conclusions.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Circumstance information that strengthens the link between antecedent 
(offence) and consequent (punishment) should lead to more punishment conclusions 
compared to instances where this link is not strengthened.  
 
 
3.1.1. Methods 
 
3.1.1.1. Participants  
 
Participants were 22 lawyers (16 female) and 26 laypeople (14 female). The mean age of 
lawyers was 26.5 (SD = 6.7); the mean age of laypeople was 23.3 years (SD = 2.3). Within the 
lawyers’ group, 8 already graduated from law school, the rest were still at university but 
already had knowledge about the offences presented in the experiment
3
. Law students had 
studied for 4.6 semesters on average.  
                                                 
3
 One participant reported no knowledge of the legal text on arson. However, as this participant did report 
knowledge about exculpatory circumstances, the participant’s answers were not excluded. 
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3.1.1.2. Materials and Design  
 
The problems followed the structure of a defeasible MP inference, but were adapted to the 
legal context. They consisted of (1) a legal conditional “if p then q”, where p refers to an 
offence (manslaughter, arson, bodily injury, or theft) and q to a punishment, (2) the fact p 
stating that someone committed the offence, (3) additional information about circumstances, 
and (4) the conclusion phrased as a question about q, that is, whether the offender should be 
punished for the offence or not (yes vs. no). For each problem, participants were also asked to 
indicate on a 7-point Likert scale (5) how certain they were about their conclusion (1 = very 
unsure, 7 = very sure) and (6) how severe they perceived the offender’s action to be (1 = not 
severe at all, 7 = very severe). The latter question was meant to show whether participants 
incorporated the information about circumstances into their mental representation of the 
offence. An example problem is as follows: 
 
Legal conditional rule:  If a person kills another human, then the person should be punished 
for manslaughter. 
Fact:  Bob killed another human. 
Circumstances:  Bob is schizophrenic and had a delusion of an attack against him. 
Conclusion:  Should Bob be punished for manslaughter? 
Certainty:  How certain are you? 
Severity:  How severe do you perceive Bob’s action to be? 
 
In total, there were 48 conditional reasoning problems. The experimental manipulation 
was that all problems were presented either with situations which were potentially 
exculpatory, aggravating, or neutral (i.e., crime-irrelevant) for the given legal rule. Among the 
exculpatory circumstances, half were legally relevant (i.e., potentially exculpatory for the 
offence according to penal code, or at least permissible as such at a judge’s discretion), and 
half were legally irrelevant (i.e., probably exculpatory, or at least mitigating, according to 
some personal standards, but not according to law). The same distinction of legally relevant or 
irrelevant information was made for the aggravating circumstances. Neutral circumstances 
were, per definition, always legally and morally irrelevant. Thus, the problems with neutral 
circumstances represented the base acceptance rate of the conditional legal rule. Examples of 
the circumstances are presented in Table 4. All exculpatory, aggravating, and neutral 
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circumstances were selected from a larger pool of problems (N = 192) that were tested in a 
pilot study. In this pilot study, participants (n = 16 for theft and manslaughter; n = 17 for 
bodily injury and arson) rated how mitigating or aggravating they perceived a particular 
circumstance for a given offence. Besides exculpatory circumstances, mitigating 
circumstances were also used in this pilot study. For the main experiment, I selected those 
combinations of offences and circumstances that received the highest mean “aggravating” and 
“mitigating” ratings in the pilot study (“neutral” circumstances were those which obtained the 
mean value in the scale). In the actual experiment all circumstance descriptions were of 
similar length (61 ± 2 characters including spaces). Moreover, the name and the gender of the 
offender was varied between subjects to avoid possible effects of attitudes or preferences 
(Sporer & Goodman-Delahunty, 2009), but not as another independent variable. Overall, the 
experiment followed a 2 (group: laypeople vs. lawyers) × 2 (relevance: legally relevant vs. 
legally irrelevant) × 3 (circumstances: exculpatory vs. aggravating vs. neutral) mixed design. 
The factor expertise was a between-subjects factor; all other factors were within-subjects 
factors. I did not differentiate between the different offences in the 48 problems 
(manslaughter, arson, bodily injury or theft), so they were not treated as an additional factor.
 
In addition, I also measured participants’ legal attitude using a German translation of 
the revised version of the Legal Attitudes Questionnaire (RLAQ; Kravitz, Cutler, & Brock, 
1993) administered immediately after the experiment. Because RLAQ scores did not differ 
among participants, these results are not reported. 
 
Table 4 
Examples for legally relevant and legally irrelevant exculpatory, neutral, and aggravating 
circumstances used in Experiment 1 (original material was in German language) 
 Exculpatory Neutral Aggravating 
Legally relevant The victim was the 
first to stab Bob 
during the fight. 
Bob loves traveling by 
train while listening to 
music 
Bob wanted to get the 
money from the 
victim's live insurance. 
Legally not 
relevant 
The victim raped 
Bob’s wife several 
times when she was a 
child. 
Bob drank a glass of 
water a few minutes 
ago 
The victim was a single 
parent of a child. 
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3.1.1.3. Procedure  
 
The experiment was programmed in Cedrus® SuperLab® 4.X and conducted on a computer. 
Participants were tested individually. The experiment was introduced as an experiment about 
reasoning in law. Participants were told they will be confronted with legal cases in which a 
person committed an offence, and their task is to decide as a judge whether the person should 
be punished for the offence. The legal conditional was introduced as a general legal rule. 
Problem components (i.e., rule, fact, circumstance, and conclusion) were each presented on 
separate screens. Participants could switch from one screen to the next by pressing the space 
bar and gave their conclusions by pressing a “y” (yes) or “n” (no) key. The number pad was 
used to provide ratings for the last two questions on certainty and severity. All statements 
were presented in black font except the conclusion question, which was presented in red. 
Participants had the opportunity to take a break between problems. At the beginning of the 
experiment, participants completed six practice problems. For both practice and experimental 
trials, the order of problems was randomized. The experiment took about 45 minutes. All 
participants received monetary compensation for their participation. 
 
 
3.1.2. Results 
 
General note: In this and in all the following experiments in this thesis, data were analyzed 
with analyses of variances (ANOVAs), which will be described in more detail in the 
corresponding sections. In cases where Maulchy’s sphericity test was significant Greenhouse 
Geisser corrected values were used. Significant effects in the ANOVAs were scrutinized with 
follow-up ANOVAs or t-tests where appropriate. P values in these pairwise comparisons were 
tested against Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels. In all experiments, standardized mean 
differences (d) were computed as described by Borenstein (2009). For decision times I always 
computed the time between presentation of the potential exculpatory evidence and 
participants’ conclusions, excluding times resulting from mistyped/invalid answers. Besides 
for Experiment 5 (see Section 4.2), all problems were presented in German language. 
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3.1.2.1. Perceived Severity Ratings (Manipulation Check) 
 
Severity ratings were analyzed with a 2 (group: laypeople vs. lawyers) × 2 (relevance: legally 
relevant vs. legally irrelevant) × 3 (circumstances: exculpatory vs. aggravating vs. neutral) 
mixed ANOVA. Descriptive data can be found in Table 5. The ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of circumstances, F(1.36, 62.77) = 152.85, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .769, a main effect of 
relevance, F(1, 46) = 49.77, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .520, an interaction between circumstances and 
relevance, F(2, 92) = 118.55, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .720, and a three way interaction between all 
factors, F(2, 92) = 4.43, p = .015, ηp
2 
= .088. While the effect of circumstances did not differ 
between lawyers and laypeople for problems with legally relevant circumstances, F(1.41, 
64.79) = 0.71, p = .447, ηp
2 
= 0.015, it did for problems with legally irrelevant circumstances, 
F(1.47, 67.43) = 4.82, p = .011, ηp
2 
= .108. Laypeople were descriptively more influenced by 
irrelevant exculpatory and irrelevant aggravating circumstances than lawyers, although 
pairwise t-tests did not reach significance (ts < 1.52, ps > .137). Overall, problems with 
exculpatory circumstances (M = 4.17; SD = 0.86) were perceived as less severe than problems 
with neutral circumstances (M = 5.43; SD = 0.83), t(47) = 9.81, p < .001, d = 1.49, and those 
as less severe than problems with aggravating circumstances (M = 6.05; SD = 0.65), t(47) = 
10.16, p < .001, d = 0.75. All other effects were not significant (Fs < 2.48, ps > .110). 
Because different circumstances influenced the perceived severity of offences in the expected 
direction, it can be concluded that the manipulation was effective. 
 
Table 5 
Mean severity ratings (and standard deviations) for problems with legally relevant and 
legally irrelevant circumstances in Experiment 1  
 Circumstance information 
 exculpatory neutral aggravating 
Legally relevant circumstances 
   Laypeople 
   Lawyers 
Legally irrelevant circumstances 
   Laypeople 
   Lawyers 
 
3.56 (0.99) 
3.74 (0.89) 
 
4.53 (0.99) 
4.90 (0.64) 
 
5.47 (0.91) 
5.36 (0.84) 
 
5.55 (0.85) 
5.33 (0.82) 
 
6.14 (0.65) 
6.22 (0.63) 
 
6.04 (0.76) 
5.76 (0.71) 
Note. Severity ratings range from 1 (not severe at all) to 7 (very severe).  
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3.1.2.2. Defeated Conclusions (no-punishment) 
 
For the analysis of the amount of defeated conclusions, I calculated the percentage of no-
punishment conclusions for each of the problem categories (see Table 6). As no-punishment 
decisions were scarce for neutral and aggravating circumstances, only a 2 (group: laypeople 
vs. lawyers) × 2 (relevance: legally relevant vs. legally irrelevant) ANOVA on no-punishment 
conclusions for exculpatory circumstances was conducted. The ANOVA showed a main 
effect of relevance, F(1, 46) = 224.05, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .83, and an interaction between group 
and relevance, F(1, 46) = 11.59, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .201. In cases of legally irrelevant exculpatory 
circumstances, lawyers and laypeople showed no difference in percentage of no-punishment 
conclusions, t(32.10) = 0.47, p = .644, d = 0.13, with participants in both groups almost never 
considering legally irrelevant exculpatory circumstances as valid defeaters. In cases of legally 
relevant circumstances, however, lawyers and laypeople differed: lawyers accepted legally 
relevant exculpatory circumstances as valid defeaters much more often than laypeople 
(51.14% vs. 35.58%), t(46) = 2.39, p = .021, d = 0.69. No main effect of group was found, 
F(1, 46) = 2.14, p = .151, ηp
2 
= .044. 
 
Table 6 
Percentages (and standard deviations) for the no-punishment conclusions in Experiment 1 
 Circumstance information 
 exculpatory neutral aggravating 
Legally relevant circumstances 
   Laypeople 
   Lawyers 
Legally irrelevant circumstances 
   Laypeople 
   Lawyers 
 
35.58 (25.17) 
51.14 (18.86) 
 
6.25 (17.41) 
4.55 (6.15) 
 
1.44 (4.07) 
0.57 (2.67) 
 
0.96 (3.40) 
1.70 (5.84) 
 
0.00 (0.00) 
3.41 (8.78) 
 
0.48 (2.45) 
1.14 (3.68) 
 
 
3.1.2.3. Decision Times and Certainty Ratings  
 
Decision times and certainty ratings were analyzed separately for punishment and no-
punishment conclusions (Figure 1). As the majority of no-punishment conclusions were made 
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in light of legally relevant exculpatory circumstances, only these problems were analyzed. For 
both analyses, a 2 (decision: punishment vs. no-punishment) × 2 (group: laypeople vs. 
lawyers) mixed ANOVA was conducted.  
For the analyses of decision times the ANOVA revealed a significant interaction 
between group and punishment decision, F(1, 42) = 4.36, p = .043, ηp
2 
= .094. Whereas 
lawyers showed no differences in their decision times for punishment and no-punishment 
conclusions, t(21) = 0.94, p = .358, d = 0.21, laypeople required significantly more time to 
select no-punishment than to select punishment conclusion, t(21) = 2.80, p = .011, d = 0.62. 
However, a main effect of group also indicated that, in general, lawyers (M = 10778ms; SD = 
3496) had longer decision times than laypeople (M = 8236ms; SD = 3496), F(1, 42) = 5.82, p 
= .02, ηp
2 
= .122. No main effect of decision was found, F(1, 42) = 0.16, p = .689, ηp
2 
= .004. 
The analyses of certainty ratings showed a similar pattern. Although the interaction 
between group and punishment decision failed to reach significance, F(1, 41) = 2.70, p = 
.108, ηp
2 
= .062, descriptively only laypeople were less certain about no-punishment than 
about punishment decisions. Additional main effects revealed that lawyers were more certain 
than laypeople, F(1, 41) = 5.67, p = .022, ηp
2 
= .122, and all participants were more certain 
about punishment than no-punishment conclusions, F(1, 41) = 6.29, p = .016, ηp
2 
= .133.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Decision times and certainty ratings for punishment and no-punishment conclusions 
in Experiment 1. Error bars show standard errors. 
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3.1.3. Discussion 
 
The data shows that people indeed use additional information about the circumstances of an 
offence when reasoning with legal conditionals. However, in accordance with Hypothesis 1, 
lawyers decided not to punish offenders more often than laypeople. Since severe offences 
were used, it can be assumed that the moral outrage laypeople felt influenced their 
consideration of exculpatory circumstances. Accordingly, lawyers were quite certain of all 
their decisions, but laypeople felt more insecure and needed more time when deciding 
contrary to what moral outrage predicts (Hypothesis 2). Lawyers needed more time to make a 
decision than laypeople, without showing differences in the time needed to arrive at a 
punishment or no-punishment conclusion. This finding suggests that the underlying cognitive 
processes of lawyers were more deliberate (cf. Evans, 2008). Yet, lawyers did not consider all 
the legally relevant exculpatory circumstances that were presented, probably because for 
some of those presented in the experiment it lays within the judges' discretion whether they 
refrain from punishing or whether they only consider them as mitigating circumstances.  
In addition to exculpatory circumstances I also added aggravating circumstances into 
the experimental paradigm to test whether such information enhances the logically valid 
answer of punishing the offender (Hypothesis 3; cf. Manktelow & Fairley, 2000; Stevenson & 
Over, 1995). However, this was not the case, probably because of a ceiling effect. 
Laypeople’s severity perception of offences with neutral circumstances was already pretty 
high (M = 5.51; SD = 0.86). Accordingly, laypeople’s rate of no-punishment conclusions for 
offences with neutral circumstances was already low. So, it is possible that further 
aggravating information did not have an additional effect on participants’ preference of 
punishment conclusions. 
In summary, the results of this experiment support the hypothesis that laypeople but 
not lawyers have difficulties in accepting exculpatory circumstances as reasons for defeating 
the MP conclusion of punishing the offender. The results support the appropriateness of this 
paradigm to further investigate legal reasoning and to test whether laypeople’s punishment 
conclusions depend on moral outrage. 
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3.2. Experiment 2: Legal Conditional Reasoning and Moral 
Outrage 
 
In Experiment 1, it was shown that lawyers and laypeople differ in their acceptance of 
exculpatory circumstances as defeaters to conditional legal rules. However, I did not test 
systematically whether this difference depends on moral outrage. It could be possible that 
lawyers and laypeople differed only because laypeople always reject violations of norms per 
se, irrespective of how morally outrageous an offence is. To test the hypothesis of laypeople’s 
punishment conclusions depending on moral outrage, it is necessary to pair offences of 
differing degrees of moral outrage with the same kinds of circumstance information. If 
laypeople’s consideration of defeaters depends on how morally outrageous the offence is, then 
the difference between lawyers and laypeople in no-punishment conclusions found in 
Experiment 1 should diminish for low moral outrage offences, but remain for high moral 
outrage offences. Lower moral outrage towards an offence should make laypeople more 
willing to accept evidence as exculpatory, as they do not feel the strong desire to punish the 
offender. Overall, lawyers’ decisions should not vary with the degree of moral outrage an 
offence might evoke, but only with what is prescribed by the penal code. 
Also participants’ perspective was varied by phrasing two different instructions: one 
condition asked them to act according to their own sense of justice, while the other asked to 
act as they think a real judge would do. If decisions about exculpatory circumstances are 
influenced by moral outrage evoked by the offences, its effect should be higher for 
participants in the former group. Also, laypeople should be more certain of their decisions 
when instructed to decide based on their own sense of justice. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The more morally outraging an offence is, the higher a layperson’s reluctance 
in accepting a given exculpatory circumstance as a reason for voiding punishment. Lawyers’ 
conclusions should not depend on moral outrage. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The more morally outraging an offence is, the more laypeople’s conclusions 
will differ from lawyers’. 
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Hypothesis 3: The level of moral outrage evoked by an offence will only impact laypeople’s 
decision times, but not lawyers’.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Instructing laypeople to decide as a real judge should diminish the effect of 
moral outrage in legal conditional reasoning and thus make laypeople more uncertain about 
their decisions.  
 
 
3.2.1. Methods 
 
3.2.1.1. Participants 
 
Participants were 24 lawyers (15 female) and 40 laypeople (20 female). Three participants in 
the lawyers’ group were excluded from analysis because they failed to fulfill the inclusion 
criteria of having studied law for at least 4 semesters or having passed their intermediate law 
exam. Thus, the final sample of lawyers consisted of 21 participants (12 female). The mean 
age of lawyers was 26.48 years (SD = 4.06); the mean age of laypeople was 24.15 years (SD = 
5.31). Six participants from the lawyers’ group had already graduated, the rest were still at 
university, having studied for 9.6 semesters on average.  
 
3.2.1.2. Materials and Design  
 
The material consisted of 36 conditional problems that followed the structure of those in 
Experiment 1, but used legal conditionals that differed in the level of moral outrage evoked by 
the offences. Maltreatment of wards and child sexual abuse were considered high moral 
outrage offences, handling stolen goods and breach of domestic peace were considered 
medium moral outrage offences, and illegal gambling and obtaining benefits by devious 
means were considered low moral outrage offences. These different offences were selected 
from a large and representative (N = 448; 315 female) preliminary study in which participants 
rated on a scale from 1 to 7 the level of moral outrage felt in response to N = 36 offences from 
the German penal code. High moral outrage offences received a mean rating of M = 6.83 (SD 
= 0.48), medium moral outrage offences a mean rating of M = 3.91 (SD = 1.42), and low 
moral outrage offences a mean rating of M = 2.34 (SD = 1.24). 
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As additional information relevant exculpatory and irrelevant control circumstances 
were used. Relevant exculpatory circumstances were taken from the General Part of the 
German penal code and described scenarios of (1) absence of criminal responsibility due to 
psychological disorders, (2) mistakes of law, or (3) necessity brought about by coercion. 
Irrelevant control circumstances also pertained to psychological disorders, mistakes of law, 
and situations of coercion, but were completely irrelevant to the offence (e.g., psychological 
disorders with no legal connection to the crime, like having crime irrelevant memory 
problems in a case of maltreatment of a ward). These control circumstances were selected 
from a larger pool from three online studies (N = 21, N = 20, and N = 27) and were used to 
ensure that participants attended to the task and read all of the circumstance information to 
make a decision. The crucial manipulation of Experiment 2 was that each circumstance was 
paired with each legal conditional. This allowed assessing whether the same circumstances 
were weighted differently depending on the degree of moral outrage of the offence with 
which it is presented. Offenders described in the problems were always male. Examples of the 
circumstances can be found in Table 7. 
There were two different sets of instructions specifying the perspective that 
participants should take during evaluation of the conclusion. All lawyers and half of the 
laypeople were instructed to imagine that they were a judge who always relies on 
prescriptions of the legal system (“legal system” instruction). The other half of the laypeople 
were instructed to imagine that they were a judge who makes decisions based on his or her 
own sense of justice irrespective of regulations of the legal system (“own sense of justice” 
instruction). The experiment used a 3 (moral outrage: high vs. medium vs. low) × 3 (group: 
laypeople - own sense of justice vs. laypeople - legal system vs. lawyers - legal system) × 2 
(circumstances: exculpatory vs. control) mixed design. The subject condition was a between-
subjects factor, and the other factors were within-subject factors.  
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Table 7 
Example of problems used in Experiment 2 translated into English language. This problem 
describes relevant exculpatory vs. irrelevant control circumstances in a case concerning 
maltreatment of wards (“If a person maltreats a minor in their charge, then the person should 
be punished for maltreatment of wards”). 
 Moral outrage evoked by the offence 
 High  Medium  Low  
Relevant exculpatory 
circumstances 
Relevant case of: 
Psychological disorder 
Because of a psychological disorder, it was impossible for Bob to 
control his action and realize that his acts were harmful. 
Mistake of law  
It was impossible for Bob to know that this was an illegal 
educational method. 
Situation of necessity brought about by coercion 
Under threats to his life and physical integrity, Bob was coerced 
by a third person into harming the child. 
Irrelevant control 
circumstances 
Irrelevant case of: 
Psychological disorder  
Because of a psychological disorder, Bob could not remember 
what the minor likes or the gifts the minor gave him. 
Mistake of law  
It was impossible for Bob to know that children also have a sense 
of humor. 
Situation of necessity brought about by coercion  
Under threats to his life and physical integrity, Bob was coerced 
by a third person into not seeing any violent movies. 
Note. Offences of high, medium and low moral outrage were always paired with all six kinds 
of circumstance information. 
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3.2.1.3. Procedure  
 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. Similarly, the experiment was introduced to 
participants as an experiment about reasoning in legal contexts. Participants were told that 
they would be confronted with legal cases, and their task would be to decide whether a legal 
conditional rule should be followed. However, in contrast to the previous experiment, the 
instruction focused more explicitly on the aspect of applying rules and mentioned that the 
application of a rule would lead to punishment of the offender. Different components of the 
problems were presented on sequential screens; participants could switch from one statement 
to the next by pressing the space bar. Decisions about applying the conditional rule and 
punishing the offender were indicated by pressing a “y” (yes) or “n” (no) key. Ratings about 
certainty and severity were provided using the number pad. The perspective to be taken by 
participants was given during the instructions and was highlighted in blue. After reading the 
instructions, it was made sure that participants understood the perspective to be taken by 
asking them to rephrase the instructions. Before the experiment, participants solved six 
practice problems. All problems were presented randomly. The experiment took about 30 
minutes. All participants received either course points or a monetary compensation. 
 
 
3.2.2. Results 
 
3.2.2.1. Perceived Severity Ratings (Manipulation Check)  
 
Perceived severity ratings (upper part of Table 8) were analyzed using a 3 (moral outrage: 
high vs. medium vs. low) × 3 (group: laypeople - own sense of justice vs. laypeople - legal 
system vs. lawyers - legal system) × 2 (circumstances: exculpatory vs. control) mixed 
ANOVA. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of moral outrage, F(1.37, 79.57) = 323.64, p < 
.001, ηp
2 
= .848. High moral outrage offences (M = 6.17, SD = 0.87) were perceived as more 
severe than medium moral outrage offences (M = 3.58, SD = 1.25), t(60) = 16.36, p < .001, d 
= 2.37, and those as more severe than low moral outrage offences (M = 2.86, SD = 1.26), t(60) 
= 8.39, p < .001, d = .0.57. Also an interaction between moral outrage and group was found, 
F(2.74, 79.57) = 5.34, p = .003, ηp
2 
= .156, however, pairwise t-tests did not reach the 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha of 0.0167. Additionally, also a main effect of circumstances, F(1, 
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58) = 72.30, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .555, and an interaction between circumstances and moral outrage 
was found, F(2, 116) = 3.99, p = .021, ηp
2 
= .064. Problems with exculpatory circumstances 
were perceived as less severe than problems with control circumstances, yet this was 
especially the case for medium moral outrage offences, t(60) = 7.82, p < .001, d = 0.72 (for 
high moral outrage: t(60) = 6.82, p < .001, d = 0.70; for low moral outrage: t(60) = 5.77, p < 
.001, d = 0.51). All other effects were not significant (Fs < 1.66, ps > .200). 
 
3.2.2.2. Certainty Ratings  
 
Certainty ratings (lower part of Table 8) were analyzed using a 3 (moral outrage: high vs. 
medium vs. low) × 3 (group: laypeople - own sense of justice vs. laypeople - legal system vs. 
lawyers - legal system) × 2 (circumstances: exculpatory vs. control) mixed ANOVA. The 
ANOVA showed main effects of group, F(2, 58) = 25.08, p < .001, ηp
2
=.464, of 
circumstances, F(1, 58) = 69.80, p < .001, ηp
2
=.546, and of moral outrage, F(2, 116) = 8.36, p 
< .001, ηp
2
=.126, and interactions between circumstances and moral outrage, F(1.84, 106.41) 
= 16.30, p < .001, ηp
2
=.219, moral outrage and group, F(4, 116) = 2.94, p = .023, ηp
2
=.092, 
and group and circumstances, F(2, 58) = 4.99, p = .010, ηp
2
=.147. Participants were more 
certain about their decisions in cases of control (M = 6.20, SD = 0.69) than in cases of 
exculpatory circumstances (M = 5.38, SD = 0.89), primarily in cases of high moral outrage, 
t(60) = 10.60, p < .001, d = 1.53, followed by medium, t(60) = 4.64, p < .001, d = .0.67, and 
low moral outrage, t(60) = 3.53, p = .001, d = .51. In cases of high moral outrage, certainty 
ratings did not differ between laypeople and lawyers, F(2, 58) = 1.78, p = .117, ηp
2 
= 0.058. 
However, they did in cases of medium, F(2, 58) = 8.24, p = .001, ηp
2 
= 0.221, and low moral 
outrage, F(2, 58) = 11.596, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .286. Laypeople in the own sense of justice and in 
the legal system group were less certain than lawyers in cases of medium (t(39) = 2.47, p = 
.018, d = 0.77; t(37.99) = 4.03, p < .001, d = 1.25; respectively), and in cases of low moral 
outrage (t(29.04) = 4.20, p < .001, d = 1.29; t(39) = 3.75, p = .001, d = 1.17, respectively). In 
cases of exculpatory circumstances, laypeople in the own sense of justice group (M = 5.31, 
SD = 0.59) were more certain about their decisions than laypeople in the legal system group 
(M = 4.65, SD = 0.8), t(34.94) = 2.95, p = .006, d = 0.93 (for irrelevant circumstances p > 
.370). The three way interaction was not significant, F(3.670, 106.41) = 0.61, p = .643. 
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Table 8  
Mean severity ratings and certainty ratings (and standard deviations) for problems with 
irrelevant control and relevant exculpatory circumstances in Experiment 2  
 Moral outrage of the conditional 
 High Medium Low 
Severity ratings 
Irrelevant control circumstances 
Laypeople (own sense of justice) 
Laypeople (legal system) 
Lawyers (legal system) 
 
 
6.73 (0.49) 
6.58 (0.51) 
6.22 (1.33) 
 
 
3.95 (1.40) 
3.98 (1.18) 
4.26 (1.71) 
 
 
2.64 (1.06) 
3.26 (1.30) 
3.71 (1.76) 
Relevant exculpatory circumstances 
Laypeople (own sense of justice) 
Laypeople (legal system) 
Lawyers (legal system) 
 
6.18 (0.90) 
6.06 (0.64) 
5.30 (1.18) 
 
3.06 (1.30) 
3.15 (0.84) 
3.06 (1.53) 
 
2.22 (0.97) 
2.50 (1.26) 
2.81 (1.36) 
Certainty ratings 
Irrelevant control circumstances 
Laypeople (own sense of justice) 
Laypeople (legal system) 
Lawyers (legal system) 
 
 
6.60 (0.57) 
6.34 (0.74) 
6.77(0.29) 
 
 
6.01 (0.93) 
5.86 (1.08) 
6.58 (0.60) 
 
 
5.67 (0.91) 
5.45 (1.05) 
6.48 (0.43) 
Relevant exculpatory circumstances 
Laypeople (own sense of justice) 
Laypeople (legal system) 
Lawyers (legal system) 
 
5.20 (1.02) 
4.73 (0.92) 
5.84 (0.80) 
 
5.41 (0.77) 
4.69 (0.82) 
6.39 (0.55) 
 
5.32 (0.84) 
4.53 (1.01) 
6.20 (0.58) 
Note. Severity and certainty ratings range from 1 (not severe at all/ not certain at all) to 7 
(very severe/ very certain). 
 
 
3.2.2.3. Defeated Conclusions (no-punishment) 
 
Percentages of no-punishment conclusions are shown in Table 9. As participants hardly 
considered irrelevant control circumstances, only a 3 (moral outrage: high vs. medium vs. 
low) × 3 (group: laypeople - own sense of justice vs. laypeople - legal system vs. lawyers - 
legal system) mixed ANOVA for problems with relevant exculpatory circumstances was 
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conducted. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of group, F(2, 58) = 12.70, p < .001, ηp
2 
= 
.305, of moral outrage, F(1.80, 104.31) = 45.11, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .437, and an interaction 
between both factors, F(3.60, 104.31) = 3.75, p = .009, ηp
2 
= .114. For low moral outraging 
offences there were no differences between lawyers and both groups of laypeople, F(2, 58) = 
2.63, p = .081, ηp
2 
= .083. However, there were differences in cases of medium, F(2, 58) = 
6.84, p = .002, ηp
2 
= .191, and especially in cases of high moral outrage, F(2, 58) = 18.91, p < 
.001, ηp
2 
= .395. Laypeople in the own sense of justice and in the legal system group made 
less no-punishment conclusions than lawyers in cases of medium moral outrage (t(34.31) = 
2.83, p =.008, d = .89; and t(39) = 3.77, p = .001, d = 1.18; respectively) and even less no-
punishment conclusions in cases of high moral outrage (t(39) = 5.55, p < .001, d = 1.73; and 
t(39) = 4.92, p < .001, d =.1.54; respectively). Both groups of laypeople did not differ from 
each other neither in cases of high, nor in cases of medium moral outrage (ts < 0.595, ps > 
.555). Note that according to this Chapter’s Hypothesis 1, lawyers’ no punishment decisions 
for high and low moral outrage offences did not differ significantly, t(20) = 1.60, p = .126, d = 
0.47. 
 
 
Table 9 
Percentages (and standard deviations) for no-punishment conclusions in Experiment 2 
 Moral outrage of the conditional 
 High Medium Low 
Irrelevant control circumstances 
Laypeople (own sense of justice) 
Laypeople (legal system) 
Lawyers (legal system) 
 
0.00 (0.00) 
3.33 (10.26) 
4.76 (15.04) 
 
6.67 (11.34) 
9.17 (15.74) 
5.56 (12.17) 
 
21.67 (17.19) 
12.50 (16.11) 
10.32 (12.33) 
Relevant exculpatory circumstances 
Laypeople (own sense of justice) 
Laypeople (legal system) 
Lawyers (legal system) 
 
24.17 (21.95) 
28.33 (22.36) 
63.50 (23.35) 
 
60.00 (26.16)  
55.83 (22.48) 
80.16 (18.72) 
 
64.17 (23.74)  
56.67 (27.78) 
73.81 (20.12) 
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3.2.2.4. Decision Times  
 
Decision times for punishment and no-punishment conclusions for problems with relevant 
exculpatory circumstances were analyzed in two separate 2 (conclusion: punishment vs. no-
punishment) × 3 (moral outrage: high vs. medium vs. low) within-subjects ANOVAs – one 
for laypeople and one for lawyers (Figure 2). Laypeople were analyzed as a single group 
because the two sets of instructions (own sense of justice and legal system) did not affect their 
punishment conclusions. Only participants from whom I had punishment and no-punishment 
conclusions in each moral outrage condition were considered in the analysis (25 laypeople 
and 12 lawyers). This was necessary to be able to make reliable within subject comparisons. 
Due to technical problems, decision times of one participant were not included in the analysis. 
To control for different sentence lengths, decision times were adjusted by computing the 
latency per character for each sentence and multiplying it by the mean sentence length.  
For laypeople, the ANOVA revealed no main effects (Fs < 2.38, ps > .136), but a 
significant interaction between conclusion and moral outrage, F(1.63, 39.13) = 5.39, p = .013, 
ηp
2 
= .183. As shown in Figure 2, whereas laypeople’s decision times for punishment 
conclusions did not differ according to moral outrage, F(1.35, 32.44) = 0.96, p = .392, ηp
2 
= 
.038, the decision times for their no-punishment conclusions did, F(1.21, 28,93) = 5.81, p = 
.018, ηp
2 
=.195. Descriptively, in cases of no-punishment, decision times were longer for high 
than for medium moral outrage, t(24) = 2.22, p = .036, d = 0.26, and decision times of 
medium moral outrage were longer than those of low moral outrage , t(24) = 2.08, p = .048, d 
= 0.43. Even though the significance did not reach the Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 
0.025, the linear trend analysis was significant, F(1, 24) = 6.58, p = .017, ηp
2 
= .215. This 
interaction between conclusion and moral outrage was not replicated for lawyers, F(2, 22) = 
0.53, p = .596, ηp
2 
= .046. Rather, there was only a main effect of decision, F(1, 11) = 5.23, p 
= .043, ηp
2 
= .322, with lawyers taking overall more time to decide punishment (M = 
11531ms; SD = 5235) than no-punishment (M = 8107ms; SD = 1439). Also the main effect of 
moral outrage was not significant, F(1.35, 14.80) = 0.32, p = .647, ηp
2 
= .028. 
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Figure 2. Decision times for punishment and no-punishment conclusions for laypeople and 
lawyers in Experiment 2, separated by the moral outrage (MO) evoked by the conditionals. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
3.2.3. Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 2 show that laypeople’s decisions about exculpatory circumstances 
depend on how morally outrageous the offence in the legal conditional is. This supports 
Hypothesis 1. When the offence was of high moral outrage, laypeople only seldom decided 
not to punish offences in light of exculpatory circumstances. Yet, when the offence was of 
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low moral outrage, laypeople decided in the majority of the cases not to punish the offender. 
Consequently, laypeople’s punishment conclusions did not differ from lawyers in cases of low 
moral outrage, but only in cases of high moral outrage. This supports Hypothesis 2 and 
suggests that laypeople do not reject exculpatory circumstances because of the violation of a 
norm per se, but because the moral outrage evoked by the violation affects the way they 
reason about exculpatory circumstances. Likewise, since the different offences were paired 
with the very same exculpatory circumstances (absence of criminal responsibility due to 
psychological disorders, mistakes of law, and situations of necessity brought about by 
coercion), the different punishment conclusions laypeople made cannot be attributed to not 
recognizing these circumstances as exculpatory. All in all, the fact that laypeople sometimes 
decided to punish in light of a given exculpatory circumstance and sometimes not indicates 
that their consideration of exculpatory circumstances as defeaters depended on the degree of 
moral outrage evoked by the offence.  
The hypotheses are also supported by the decision times: the higher the moral outrage, 
the longer laypeople took to reach a no-punishment decision; this reflects the difficulty in 
deciding against moral outrage; as proposed by Hypothesis 3. As shown in Figure 2, when the 
offence was only of low moral outrage, decision times for not punishing the offences were 
faster than for punishing. Cases of illegal gambling or obtaining benefits by devious means 
are not offences with a high moral necessity of punishment, so deciding in favor of 
punishment is almost counterintuitive and may consequently take longer. Accordingly, 
laypeople in the own sense of justice group also showed a tendency to not to punish offenders 
for low moral outrage offences with irrelevant circumstances (see Table 9). However, also in 
cases of medium moral outrage no-punishment decisions were somewhat faster than 
punishment decisions. Though they were chosen to evoke some amount of moral outrage, the 
severity ratings showed that these offences were not considered very severe (around 3.5 on a 
7 point scale). Therefore these offences, too, were likely judged not to deserve strict 
punishment.  
Lawyers decided about exculpatory circumstances according to the penal code. They 
were somewhat stricter in cases of high moral outrage, but this was probably only because of 
the legal principle of proportionality, but not primarily because of moral outrage. This 
interpretation is supported by the decision times, where no significant differences depending 
on moral outrage were found. In fact, lawyers were always faster in selecting a no-punishment 
conclusion, indicating that most of the exculpatory circumstances were recognized quickly 
and without bias. The high decision times for punishment conclusions indicate that when 
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lawyers decided to incorrectly reject an exculpatory circumstance, this was a hard decision for 
them. However, because of the small sample size of people selecting punishment as well as 
no-punishment conclusions for all conditions, these results should be interpreted with caution. 
The two different instructions (own sense of justice vs. legal system) given to 
laypeople did not affect their punishment conclusions. The results did thus not support 
Hypothesis 4. I expected a higher moral outrage effect for laypeople in the own sense of 
justice condition than for laypeople in the legal system condition. Yet, the effect of moral 
outrage was found in both conditions. One possible explanation is that participants did not 
follow the instructions to decide on the basis of the regulations of the legal system. However, 
I do not think this was the case: laypeople given legal system instructions seemed to 
understand the perspective they were to take. On the one hand, they were less certain than 
laypeople in the own sense of justice condition in deciding about problems with relevant 
exculpatory circumstances. On the other hand, laypeople assigned to the legal system 
condition reported in an open-ended questionnaire at the end of the experiment that they 
followed the instructions and tried to reason like a real judge. Nevertheless, 65% of them also 
said that this was a difficult task due to conflicts with their own sense of justice or that they 
were aware that their opinions and sense of morality still influenced their decisions. This 
indicates how deeply our morality and sense of justice is engrained in our beliefs about 
exceptions to legal rules and how this affects people’s willingness to withdraw the conclusion 
from a legal conditional rule. 
 
 
 
3.3. Experiment 3: Generating Exculpatory Circumstances 
 
In the previous two experiments exculpatory circumstances were always presented explicitly 
together with the legal conditional and the categorical statement; participants were not 
instructed to think of exculpatory circumstances themselves. But how well can people 
themselves retrieve from memory exculpatory circumstances to a legal rule? And is the 
availability of exculpatory circumstances affected by the level of moral outrage evoked by an 
offence? In Section 1.1.1.1 I discussed the importance of memory in accepting conditional 
rules (Chan & Chua, 1994; De Neys et al., 2003a; Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002; see also 
Markovits & Quinn, 2002). These studies showed that when people make a conditional 
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inference they search their memory for domain relevant information, e.g., potential defeaters 
to the rule. The discovery of defeaters in memory increases the probability of not accepting 
the conditional rule and triggers the withdrawal of MP inferences (De Neys et al., 2003a). 
Hence, if the search for defeaters in memory is essential to the application of conditional 
rules, then the previous experiments might indicate that the ability to recall exculpatory 
circumstances for legal rules varies between lawyers and laypeople. To test this, I changed the 
experimental paradigm and asked participants to generate exculpatory circumstances in a 
paper-and-pencil task. My assumptions are that (1) lawyers know exculpatory circumstances 
from their law studies and should therefore be able to recall them independently of moral 
outrage, whereas (2) laypeople’s capacity to retrieve exculpatory circumstances depends on 
the moral outrage evoked by the offence: the higher the feelings of moral outrage, the more 
difficult it should be to retrieve an exculpatory circumstance. As the number of exculpatory 
circumstances in memory may be confounded with the familiarity of the domain, I also asked 
participants to generate aggravating circumstances and compared those with the number of 
exculpatory circumstances. It is predicted that it should be more difficult for laypeople to 
think of exculpatory circumstances than aggravating circumstances, and this difficulty should 
vary with the moral outrage evoked by the offence. In contrast, lawyers’ amount of retrieved 
exculpatory circumstances should not depend on moral outrage. 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: Laypeople generate less exculpatory circumstances than lawyers. However, 
laypeople do not differ from lawyers in the generation of aggravating circumstances because 
aggravating circumstances do not conflict with laypeople’s desire to punish offenders. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The amount of exculpatory circumstances laypeople generate depends on the 
degree of moral outrage evoked by the offence: The more morally outraging the offence is, 
the less exculpatory circumstances compared to aggravating circumstances laypeople 
generate. Lawyers are not affected by moral outrage. 
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3.3.1. Methods 
 
3.3.1.1. Participants  
 
Participants were 20 lawyers (9 female) and 20 laypeople (13 female). One additional 
layperson also took part but was unable to complete the experiment and was therefore 
removed from the data file. The mean age of lawyers was 25.4 years (SD = 1.96); the mean 
age of laypeople was 23 years (SD = 1.41; 5 missing values). Two participants from the 
lawyers’ group finished their law studies. The rest were still at university and studied for 9.2 
semesters on average.  
 
3.3.1.2. Material and Design  
 
For the experiment six offences from the German penal code were selected: theft, coercion, 
bodily injury, abortion, manslaughter and incest. These offences differ in their penalty range 
and were selected on the basis of the amount of exculpatory and aggravating circumstances in 
the German penal code. An online study (N = 312; 224 female) was conducted to measure 
levels of moral outrage evoked by these offences. Participants rated their level of moral 
outrage on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = no moral outrage, 7 = great moral outrage). This online 
study showed that the offences evoke different levels of moral outrage: manslaughter (M = 
6.54; SD = 0.83), bodily injury (M = 5.71; SD = 1.12), coercion (M = 5.15; SD = 1.24), theft 
(M = 4.33; SD = 1.30), incest (M = 4.31; SD = 1.89), and abortion (M = 2.55; SD = 1.72).  
In the main study, offences were presented in a paper booklet consisting of two parts. 
One part asked for exculpatory and mitigating circumstances, and the other part asked for 
aggravating circumstances. The order of these parts was counterbalanced across participants. 
On each page there were two offences. The sequence of pairs of offences over all problems 
was randomized. Participants were also asked for mitigating circumstances to guarantee that 
exculpatory circumstances were actually considered exculpatory and not just mitigating. The 
experiment followed thus a 3 (category: exculpatory vs. mitigating vs. aggravating) × 2 
(group: laypeople vs. lawyers) design. However, as mitigating circumstances were only used 
to ensure the clarity of the distinction between exculpatory and aggravating circumstances, 
these were not included in the analysis.  
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3.3.1.3. Procedure 
 
The experiment was a paper and pencil experiment and participants were tested either in 
groups or individually. The instructions explained the meaning of exculpatory, mitigating, and 
aggravating circumstances. Participants were instructed to write down all thinkable situations 
they would consider exculpatory, mitigating, or aggravating circumstances for a given 
offence. Exculpatory circumstances were described as circumstances which prevent 
punishment entirely, mitigating circumstances as those that lower a sentence, and aggravating 
circumstances as those that elevate a sentence. Participants were told that it was irrelevant 
whether the situations were regulated in the penal code. One sample problem was given to 
illustrate the tasks. There were no time restrictions. The experiment took about 45 minutes. 
All participants received monetary compensation for their participation. 
 
 
3.3.2. Results 
 
Two raters independently counted the number of situations generated for the different 
offences (Kendall’s tau =.967 for exculpatory circumstances; Kendall’s tau=.949 for 
aggravating circumstances). The mean number of these situations (i.e., defeaters) was 
analyzed using a 2 (circumstances: exculpatory vs. aggravating) × 2 (group: laypeople vs. 
lawyers) mixed ANOVA. The ANOVA revealed main effects of group, F(1, 38) = 14.03, p = 
.001 ηp
2 
= .270, of circumstances, F(1, 38) = 6.43, p = .015, ηp
2 
= .145, and an interaction 
between group and circumstances, F(1,38) = 9.28, p = .004, ηp
2 
=.196. Laypeople (M = 3.56; 
SD = 1.42) and lawyers (M = 4.38; SD = 1.56) did not differ in the amount of aggravating 
circumstances generated, t(38) = 1.73, p = .092, d = 0.55, but laypeople generated 
significantly fewer exculpatory circumstances (M = 1.60; SD = 0.75) than lawyers (M = 4.56; 
SD = 3.17), t(21.133) = 4.06, p = .001, d = 1.28. Moreover, lawyers did not generate different 
amounts of exculpatory and aggravating circumstances, t(19) = 0.29, p = .778, d = 0.06, 
whereas laypeople listed twice as many aggravating than exculpatory circumstances, t(19) = 
6.15, p < .001, d = 1.67.  
To test whether the difference in number of exculpatory and aggravating 
circumstances was related to moral outrage, the difference between the amount of aggravating 
and amount of exculpatory circumstances was computed for each offence. As expected, I did 
CHAPTER 3: LEGAL RULES, MORAL OUTRAGE AND DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE 
 79 
find such an effect: the higher the moral outrage evoked by an offence, the fewer exculpatory 
(compared to aggravating) circumstances laypeople generated (Figure 3), with the following 
trend: manslaughter > bodily injury > coercion > theft > incest > abortion. This rank order 
was corroborated by Page's trend test, Page’s L = 1628, p < .01, and resembles the moral 
outrage ratings from the online study for the different offences. Lawyers did not show this 
trend (although Page’s trend was still significant, Page’s L = 1545.5, p < .05, but as can be 
seen Figure 3, the pattern among offences was not clear for this group and did not resemble 
that of laypeople at all).  
 
 
Figure 3. Mean differences between the amount of aggravating and exculpatory 
circumstances per offence in Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
3.3.3. Discussion 
 
The results of this experiment suggest that lawyers and laypeople have different mental 
representations of exculpatory circumstances. Whereas lawyers easily generated exculpatory 
and aggravating circumstances, laypeople had difficulties in thinking of exculpatory 
circumstances, especially for offences of high moral outrage. This supports Hypotheses 1 and 
2. These results show that the effect of moral outrage is not limited to inferences with legal 
conditionals; it also affects retrieval of exculpatory circumstances from memory, and thereby 
the interpretation of the conditional itself. However, one can still argue that the difficulty to 
retrieve exculpatory circumstances for specific offences does not indicate that they are not 
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stored in memory. Exculpatory circumstances may be stored in memory, but not retrieved 
because they are not in accordance with the person’s moral values. This explanation is 
plausible and might also apply to other experiments where participants are asked to generate 
exceptions (e.g. Cummins, 1995; Cummins et al., 1991; De Neys et al., 2003b). However, 
when investigating how people reason with legal conditionals, only the defeaters that are 
actually retrieved and considered are important for the inference process. The results of 
Experiment 2 show that, when instructed to act like a real judge, laypeople still decide 
according to moral outrage, which in turn indicates that even if there are some defeaters 
available in memory, they are rarely considered and therefore have no observable effect on 
reasoning.  
Despite these correspondences between the amount of exculpatory circumstances 
retrieved from memory and the moral outrage of an offence, the relationship is only 
correlational. One cannot know whether the difficulty in generating exculpatory 
circumstances is caused by the moral outrage evoked by the offence or whether the moral 
outrage evoked by an offence is caused by a small number of exculpatory circumstances 
stored in memory. Although this aspect cannot be clarified here, I believe that the influence is 
bidirectional: if not finding many exculpatory circumstances leads participants to classify an 
offence as highly morally outrageous, then this assessment will in turn hinder them when 
searching for other possible exculpatory circumstances. Further empirical evidence is needed 
to ground this. 
 
 
 
3.4. Summary and Implications of Chapter 3 
 
In this first block of experiments, I showed that lawyers and laypeople defeat conclusions 
from legal conditionals in light of exculpatory circumstances, but in a different way: lawyers 
seem to weigh circumstance information according to what is prescribed by the penal code, 
but laypeople seem to base their decisions on their own sense of justice, guided by feelings of 
moral outrage. Because of that, laypeople had difficulties in accepting exculpatory 
circumstances when the offence was of high moral relevance, adhering therefore more 
strongly to an initial conditional rule than lawyers. Consequently, compared to lawyers, 
laypeople had difficulties in withdrawing a logically (and perhaps morally) valid conclusion, 
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even when instructed to decide like an actual judge. Experiment 3 suggests that this difficulty 
seems to arise from an incapability to retrieve exculpatory circumstances for morally 
outrageous offences from memory.  
The results of all three experiments show that accepting a given fact as a defeater is 
not a trivial task. The acceptance of defeaters depends on a person’s domain knowledge and 
on a person’s attachment to the initial conditional rule – which in the case of legal 
conditionals is a person’s own sense of justice. In this way, the feelings of moral outrage 
evoked by the offences in the legal conditionals probably affected the perceived sufficiency of 
the antecedent (i.e., the offence) to its consequent (i.e., the punishment). The more morally 
outraged reasoners were by the offence described in the antecedent, the more they concluded 
that the offender should be punished and – consequently – the less affected they were by 
potential defeaters. Applying the terminology of Markovits and Potvin (2001) and De Neys 
and colleagues (2002; 2003b) one could argue that the associative strength between offence 
and punishment in cases of high moral outrage is so strong, that it is hard for defeaters to 
break it. That is, reasoners’ conclusions are modulated by their own preferences and attitudes 
towards offences. In this respect it is also possible to relate the effect of moral outrage on 
laypeople’s acceptance of exculpatory circumstances to the literature on the importance of 
utilities in reasoning. As explained in Section 1.2.2, feelings of moral outrage are related to a 
desire to punish offenders. It is therefore possible that the perceived utility of punishing 
somebody is greater than the subjective utility of acquitting somebody of an offence. This 
utility based explanation would account for why laypeople decided to rely on the legal 
conditional rule (Experiments 1 and 2) even when they can actually think of at least one 
exculpatory circumstance (Experiment 3). However, utilities cannot account for the lawyers’ 
conclusions, because they actually know which information invalidates which conclusions 
without the need of computing utilities. The discussion on how the reasoning processes of 
laypeople and lawyers differ, and which reasoning theory best explains the effects observed in 
this chapter, is continued in the General Discussion in Chapter 7. 
In sum, the results of this first experimental block support the hypothesis that 
laypeople’s own sense of justice affects the conclusion they draw from legal conditionals. But 
what happens if people or groups of people differ in their feelings of justice? In the next 
Chapter, I will investigate how differences in a person’s attitudes to offenders and offences 
affect legal conditional reasoning and the withdrawal of conclusions.  
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Chapter 4: Legal Conditional Reasoning, Religiosity, and 
Culture  
 
 
Chapter 3 showed that laypeople’s sense of justice influences their withdrawal of conclusions 
in legal reasoning. The more morally outrageous an offence is, the less laypeople accept 
exculpatory circumstances as reasons for voiding punishment, and the less they defeat the 
otherwise valid conclusion of punishing the offender. As explained in Section 1.2.2, these 
reactions of moral outrage and the desire to punish offenders are usually described as wide-
spread (Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; see also Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). 
However, people’s intuitive desire to punish offenders can be lessened. In the previous 
chapter I showed that lawyers’ punishment decisions were not influenced by moral outrage. 
Similarly, also societal rules of behavior may shape people’s perception of offences. For 
instance, if societal norms of behavior enhance forgiveness, then people might be more open 
to except exculpatory circumstances and thus engage more in defeasible reasoning. Similarly, 
if one’s close social environment enhances the condemnation of offences, then people should 
be even more reluctant to withdraw punishment. The aim of this second block of experiments 
is to investigate the second main hypothesis of this thesis: whether differences in a 
layperson’s attitudes about offenders and offences affect legal conditional reasoning. If 
cultural or ideological norms of behavior enhance or inhibit the excuse of offences, then it 
should have the same twofold effect on laypeople’s defeasible reasoning with legal rules. I 
will test this hypothesis by focusing on two fields: religiosity and culture.  
 
 
4.1. Experiment 4: Religiosity
4
 
 
Religions often provide behavioral guidelines which are concerned with injustices and 
offences. A good example are Christianity’s Ten Commandments, which prohibit killing, 
stealing, adultery, and giving false testimony. Experiment 4 therefore investigates how 
religiosity affects people’s consideration of exculpatory circumstances in legal reasoning. I 
                                                 
4
 Data for this experiment was partially gained during the Bachelor Thesis of Christian Kirchner (Kirchner, 
2013), which I supervised. 
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will concentrate on Christianity whose primary guidelines concerning offences are set out in 
the Ten Commandments. The existence of such clearly formulated and rather inflexible rules 
suggests that highly religious people are more dogmatic than less religious ones. In fact, 
several studies have found such correlations (e.g. Juan & Haley, 1970; Feather, 1964; 
Kilpatrick et al., 1980; Swindell & L’Abate, 1970; for a review see Ross et al., 2005). 
Moreover, studies also show that highly religious people are more compliant with rules (e.g., 
Grasmick, Kinsey, & Cochran, 1991). Consequently, by relating this high dogmatism to 
defeasible reasoning, we can expect highly religious people to be more reluctant to accept 
violations of legal rules and therefore show little consideration of exculpatory circumstances; 
even for low morally outraging offences. That is, their defeasible reasoning should be rather 
low. 
However, the literature on religiosity is inconsistent. Religion is not only related to 
dogmatism; but also to forgiveness. For instance, Laurin, Shariff, Henrich, and Kay (2012) 
showed that people’s belief in a powerful intervening god leads to diminishing choice of a 
stronger punishment. In fact, several studies show that greater religiosity is related to a more 
prosocial behavior (e.g., Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Mattis, et al., 2000; Saroglou et al., 2005; 
Smith, 1999; see also Batson & Gray, 1981; Hansen et al., 1995), and that forgiveness and 
prosociality are closely linked (see e.g. Karremans, Van Lange, & Holland, 2005; 
McCullough, 2001). As a result – contrary to what could be expected when linking religiosity 
to high dogmatism – this relationship between religiosity and forgiveness should lead highly 
religious people to be more open to accept exculpatory circumstances when compared to less-
religious people; even when the offence causes strong moral outrage. That is, highly religious 
people’s defeasible reasoning should be rather high. 
The inconsistent literature on religiosity does not permit reliable predictions on how 
religiosity might influence people’s defeasible reasoning with legal rules. That is, it is difficult 
to predict whether highly religious people will be more open to defeat punishment 
conclusions than less-religious ones. However, the fact that one’s religion promotes both, 
dogmatism and forgiveness, should result in feelings of ambivalence and uncertainty. This 
ambivalence should lead highly religious people to feel conflict when presented with 
exculpatory circumstances. Such people cannot rely solely on their feelings of moral outrage 
to determine punishments; they must also consider their religion’s doctrines of dogmatism 
and forgiveness which might point towards different verdicts. Although this conflict inhibits 
reliable predictions about concrete punishment decisions, it should result in lower certainty 
ratings and longer decision times. Conversely, less-religious people should not feel this 
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conflict between dogmatism and forgiveness, or at least not as strongly as highly religious 
people. Less-religious people can decide based on what they spontaneously feel, without 
having to compare their preferences to religious standards. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Highly religious people need more time to decide about exculpatory 
circumstances than less-religious people.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Highly religious people should be less certain than less religious people when 
deciding about exculpatory circumstances. 
 
 
4.1.1. Methods  
 
4.1.1.1. Participants 
 
Participants were selected based on a preliminary study (N = 604) using a German translation 
of the religiosity scale used by Hardy and Carlo (2005). The preliminary study was conducted 
online via SoSci Survey (Leiner, 2014) and LimeSurvey™, as well as in person in the lab. 
The religiosity scale by Hardy and Carlo (2005) consists of seven items which measure 
religious salience or commitment, religious activity or involvement, and religious identity. It 
uses 5-point Likert scales in which higher ratings are related to greater religiosity. The items 
were: (a) How important is religion in your life? (b) How often do you go to church? (c) How 
often do you attend church-related activities like e.g. youth activities (other than worship 
services)? (d) I am a spiritual person. (e) I practice my religion. (f) My faith never deserts me 
during hard times; and (g) My faith makes me who I am. Hardy and Carlo (2005) report to 
have taken the last four items from the spiritually subscale of the Values in Action Inventory 
of Strengths for Youth (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). 
In order to find highly and less-religious participants I computed the mean score over 
all items (cf. Hardy & Carlo, 2005). Participants with one point were classified as less 
religious and participants with four or more points as highly religious. For the experiment, 20 
participants (10 females) were classified as highly religious and 20 participants (12 females) 
as less religious. The group of highly religious participants reached a mean score of 4.46 
points (SD = 0.25) and the group of less-religious participants reached a mean score of 1.00 
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point (SD = 0.00). The difference in mean scores was highly significant, t(19) = 62.21, p < 
.001, d = 19.67. Highly religious participants had a mean age of 24 years (SD = 2.94) and 
less-religious participants had a mean age of 23.2 years (SD = 3.46). It was ensured that all 
participants in the high-religious group were Christians: 40% were Catholics, 55% were 
Protestants (4 of them from a free church), and one participant simply described himself as a 
Christian. In the less-religious group 40% reported to be Christians by baptism, but given 
their scores in the preliminary study it was concluded that religion was not important to them. 
In an open interview in the end of the experiment many of them reported that religion was 
unnecessary, manipulative, and only for tradition. 
 
4.1.1.2. Materials, Procedure, and Design 
 
Material and procedure were the same as in Experiment 2 (Chapter 3), with the only 
difference that now all participants were instructed to use their own sense of justice during the 
experiment. The experiment followed thus a 2 (religiosity: high vs. low) x 3 (moral outrage: 
high vs. medium vs. low) x 2 (circumstance: legally exculpatory vs. control) mixed design.  
Religiosity was varied between individuals; all other factors were varied within individuals. 
 
 
4.1.2. Results 
 
4.1.2.1. Perceived Severity  
 
Severity ratings were analyzed with a 2 (religiosity: high vs. low) x 3 (moral outrage: high vs. 
medium vs. low) x 2 (circumstances: legally exculpatory vs. control) mixed ANOVA. Results 
can be found in the upper part of Table 10. The ANOVA showed a main effect of 
circumstances, F(1, 38) = 54.23, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .588, a main effect of moral outrage, F(1.55; 
58.77) = 328.06, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .896, and an interaction between moral outrage and 
circumstances, F(1.80; 68.47) = 10.25, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .212. Problems with control 
circumstances were perceived as more severe than problems with legally exculpatory 
circumstances (M = 4.71; SD = 0.75 and M = 3.8; SD = 0.84, respectively). High-moral 
outrage offences were always perceived as more severe than medium-moral outrage offences 
(M = 6.41; SD = 0.66 and M = 3.60; SD = 0.91, respectively), t(39) = 19.86, p < .001, d = 
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3.49, and medium-moral outrage offences as more severe than low-moral outrage offences (M 
= 2.74; SD = 1.03), t(39) = 7.62, p <. 001, d = 0.89. However, the interaction between 
circumstances and moral outrage shows that the mitigating effect of legally exculpatory 
circumstances was higher for problems with a medium level of moral outrage, t(39) = 7.443, p 
< .001, d = 1.20, compared to cases with high, t(39) = 4.616, p < .001, d = 0.68, or low-moral 
outrage, t(39) = 5.722, p < .001, d = 0.76. No main effect of religiosity or interactions 
concerning religiosity were found (all Fs < 0.60, p > .450). That means participants’ 
religiosity had no effect on severity ratings. 
 
 
Table 10 
Severity and certainty ratings of highly and less-religious participants for legally exculpatory 
and control circumstances in Experiment 4 
 Moral Outrage 
 
High Medium Low 
Severity ratings 
Highly religious 
Legally exculpatory 
Control 
Less-religious 
Legally exculpatory 
Control 
Certainty ratings 
Highly religious 
Legally exculpatory 
Control 
Less-religious 
Legally exculpatory 
Control 
 
 
6.11 (0.84) 
6.70 (0.60) 
 
6.14 (1.10) 
6.71 (0.40) 
 
 
4.87 (1.28) 
6.53 (0.52) 
 
5.40 (1.24) 
6.55 (0.76) 
 
 
2.94 (1.00) 
4.40 (1.15) 
 
2.99 (1.10) 
4.08 (1.03) 
 
 
4.87 (1.17) 
5.98 (0.94) 
 
5.41 (1.20) 
5.90 (1.25) 
 
 
2.32 (1.02) 
3.28 (1.19) 
 
2.28 (1.10) 
3.08 (1.30) 
 
 
4.83 (1.15) 
5.58 (1.00) 
 
5.60 (1.08) 
5.78 (0.96) 
Note. Severity and certainty ratings range from 1 (not severe at all or very unsure, 
respectively) to 7 (very severe or very sure, respectively). The numbers in brackets indicate 
the corresponding standard deviations.  
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4.1.2.2. Defeated Conclusions (no-punishment) 
 
The percentages of no-punishment conclusions were analyzed with a 2 (religiosity: high vs. 
low) x 3 (moral outrage: high vs. medium vs. low) x 2 (circumstances: legally exculpatory vs. 
control) mixed ANOVA. Results can be found in Figure 4. The ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of circumstances, F(1, 38)=158.27, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .806, a main effect of moral outrage, 
F(1.54, 58.67) = 38.34, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .502, and an interaction between moral outrage and 
circumstances, F(1.65, 62.79) = 33.13, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .466. However, there was also a three-
way interaction showing that participants’ punishment decisions depended on the quality of 
the circumstance information, F(1.65, 62.79) = 6.96, p = .003, ηp
2 
= .155. Therefore, I decided 
to further analyze the data by conducting two separate 2 (religiosity: high vs. low) x 3 (moral 
outrage: high vs. medium vs. low) ANOVAs, one for legally exculpatory circumstances and 
one for control circumstances. The ANOVA for legally exculpatory circumstances only 
showed the expected moral-outrage effect, F(1.56, 59.39) = 51.281, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .574. 
Participants made fewer no-punishment decisions when offences were of medium-moral 
outrage compared to high-moral outrage (M = 62.50%; SD = 25.53 and M = 26.67%; SD = 
26.09, respectively), t(39) = 7.78, p < .001, d = 1.39. Descriptively participants made also 
fewer no-punishment conclusions for offences of low-moral outrage (M = 67.50; SD = 25.30) 
compared to medium-moral outrage. However, this last comparison was not significant, 
t(39)=1.64, p = .110, d = 0.20. No effects of religiosity were found (all Fs < 0.3, p > .600). 
The ANOVA for control circumstances, however, showed a different pattern. 
Although no-punishment decisions were generally scarce, the ANOVA revealed a main effect 
of religiosity, F(1, 38) = 5.64, p = .023, ηp
2 
= .129, a main effect of moral outrage, F(1.31, 
49.78) = 13.70, p < .001, ηp
2 
= 0.265, and an interaction between both factors, F(1.31, 49.78) 
= 7.09, p = .006, ηp
2 
= .157. As shown in Figure 4, highly religious and less-religious people 
differed in their percentages of no-punishment conclusions for offences with irrelevant 
defeaters. Even though the offences were paired with crime irrelevant circumstance 
information, less-religious people decided not to punish the offender for medium moral 
outrage offences in 9.2% of the cases, and for low moral outrage offences in 30.8% of the 
cases. Highly religious people did not show this effect and almost always decided to punish 
the offender. This preference of less-religious people to not punish offenders with control 
circumstances was highly significant for low-moral outrage offences, t(23.43) = 2.68, p = 
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.013, d = 0.85, but did not reach significance for medium-moral outrage offences, t(22.58) = 
1.93, p = .068, d = 0.61. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4. Percentages of no-punishment decisions made by less and highly religious 
participants for problems with a) relevant exculpatory and b) control circumstances in 
Experiment 4. 
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4.1.2.3. Decision Times  
 
Decision times were only analyzed for the problems with legally exculpatory circumstances 
since they were the only ones where participants selected punishment and no-punishment 
conclusions for all levels of moral outrage in a representative manner (cf. Section 3.2.2). 
These decision times were adjusted for reading time as in Experiment 2 and are shown in 
Figure 5. First, decision times were analyzed with a 2 (religiosity: high vs. low) x 3 (moral 
outrage: high vs. medium vs. low) x 2 (decision: punishment vs. no-punishment) mixed 
ANOVA. This ANOVA revealed only an interaction between moral outrage and decision, 
F(1.48, 26.54) = 4.68, p =. 027, ηp
2 
= .206, but no main effect of religiosity, F(1, 18) = 2.45, p 
= .135, ηp
2 
= .120. However, the three way interaction was also close to reach significance, 
F(1.48, 26.54) = 2.89, p = .087, ηp
2 
= .138. As can be seen in Figure 5, decision times of 
highly and less religious participants seem to follow a different pattern. It was therefore 
decided to analyze the decision times of both groups of participants separately with two 3 
(moral outrage: high vs. medium vs. low) x 2 (decision: punishment vs. no-punishment) 
ANOVAs. For less-religious people no significant main effects or interactions were found (all 
Fs < 1.03, ps ≥ .379). However, the ANOVA for highly religious people showed a significant 
interaction between decision and moral outrage, F(2, 18) = 4.91, p = .020, ηp
2 
= .353. As 
shown in Figure 5, when the offence was of high-moral outrage, highly religious people 
showed longer decision times when deciding not to punish compared to deciding to punish. 
But when the offence was of low-moral outrage, highly religious people showed longer 
decision times when deciding to punish compared to deciding not to punish. These differences 
were tested with one-tailed post hoc t-tests. For these t-tests, only the participants that were 
considered in the ANOVA were considered (i.e., the participants that had selected punishment 
and no-punishment for all three conditions of moral outrage). Even though the results showed 
a trend, they did not reach the Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level of 0.016, probably because of 
the small sample size and large variance (t(9) = 2.20, p = .028, one-tailed, d = 0.48 for high 
moral outrage; t(9) = 1.96, p = .041, one-tailed, d = 0.95 for low moral outrage). Therefore, I 
decided to test the same differences with non-parametric one-tailed Wilcoxon tests. As 
expected, when the offence was of high-moral outrage highly religious people took longer to 
decide not to punish compared to deciding to punish, Z = -2.29, p = .011 (one-tailed), r = .73. 
When the offence was of low-moral outrage highly religious participants took longer to 
decide to punish compared to deciding not to punish, Z = -2.50, p = .007 (one tailed), r = .79. 
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Decision times for punishment and no-punishment decisions for offences with medium-moral 
outrage did not differ, Z = -0.36, p = 0.361 (one-tailed), r = .11. All other main effects of the 
ANOVA were not significant (all Fs < 0.31, ps ≥ .597) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Decision times for punishment and no-punishment decisions for problems with 
relevant exculpatory circumstances in Experiment 4 for a) highly and b) less-religious 
participants. 
 
  
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
High moral outrage Medium moral
outrage
Low moral outrage
D
e
ci
si
o
n
 t
im
e
 (
m
s)
 
punishment
no-punishment
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
High moral outrage Medium moral outrage Low moral outrage
D
e
ci
si
o
n
 t
im
e
 (
m
s)
 
punishment
no-punishment
b) 
a) 
CHAPTER 4: LEGAL CONDITIONAL REASONING, RELIGIOSITY, AND CULTURE 
 91 
4.1.2.4. Certainty  
 
Certainty ratings were analyzed with a 2 (religiosity: high vs. low) x 3 (moral outrage: high 
vs. medium vs. low) x 2 (circumstances: legally exculpatory vs. control) mixed ANOVA. 
Results can be found in the lower part of Table 10. Again, the ANOVA revealed a main effect 
of circumstances, F(1, 38) = 32.84, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .464, a main effect of moral outrage, 
F(1.81, 68.87) = 7.82, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .171, and an interaction between moral outrage and 
relevance, F(1.56, 59.43) = 16.59, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .304. Participants were more certain when 
problems contained control circumstances (M = 6.05, SD = 0.84) compared to legally 
exculpatory circumstances (M = 5.16, SD = 1.10). Participants were also more certain when 
the problem was of high-moral outrage (M = 5.84, SD = 0.82) compared to medium-moral 
outrage (M = 5.54, SD = 1.00), t(39) = 2.58, p = .014, d = 0.32, but not when the problem was 
of medium-moral outrage compared to low-moral outrage (M = 5.45, SD = 0.92), t(39) = 1.03, 
p = .310, d = 0.10. However, the interaction between moral outrage and circumstances 
showed that the higher certainty in control problems compared to experimental problems was 
highest for high-moral (M = 6.54, SD = 0.64; M = 5.13, SD = 1.27, respectively), t(39) = 7.64, 
p < .001, d = 1.30, followed by medium-moral outrage offences (M = 5.94, SD = 1.15; M = 
5.14, SD = 1.20, respectively), t(39) = 4.13, p < .001, d = 0.68, and low-moral outrage 
offences (M = 5.68, SD = 0.97; M = 5.22, SD = 1.17, respectively), t(39) = 2.58, p = .014, d = 
0.42. Interestingly, the ANOVA also revealed a trend towards an interaction between 
religiosity and circumstance, F(1, 38) = 3.33, p = .076, ηp
2 
= .08: As can be seen in Table 10, 
highly religious people were somewhat less certain when deciding about legally exculpatory 
circumstances than less-religious people. No further effects were found (all Fs < 1.60, ps ≥ 
.214). 
 
 
4.1.3. Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 4 show that religiosity influenced participants’ legal reasoning. It 
was expected that due to Christianity’s ambivalence between dogmatism and forgiveness, 
highly religious people – in contrast to less-religious people – should have conflicting feelings 
when deciding if an offender should be punished or not. This ambivalence should result in 
longer decision times and less certainty ratings. As expected by Hypothesis 2, highly religious 
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people where descriptively somehow less certain than less religious people when deciding 
about legal conditionals with exculpatory circumstances. However, I did not find support for 
Hypothesis 1. Highly religious people were not overall slower than less-religious people. 
Instead, there were differences in their overall response pattern. While less-religious 
participants showed no preferences in choosing between punishment and no-punishment, the 
decision times of highly religious participants depended on how morally outrageous the 
offence was. When the offence was of high moral outrage, highly religious people needed 
longer to decide not to punish than to punish. And when the offence was of low moral 
outrage, they took longer in deciding to punish than not to punish. These differences in 
decision times can be explained by assuming that the conflict between dogmatism and 
forgiveness is particularly high when dogmatism and forgiveness also conflict with feelings of 
moral outrage, which, according to Experiments 1-3 (Chapter 3), are stronger in cases of high 
and low moral outrage. However, even though these differences in decision times can be 
related to conflicts between the dogmatism and the forgiveness triggered by Christianity, it is 
still not clear why highly religious participants are not overall slower than less-religious 
people. In fact, when comparing the decision times of highly religious people with those of 
the laypeople in Experiment 2 (see Figure 2), there are salient similarities. In both cases 
participants needed longer for no-punishment decisions in cases of high moral outrage, and 
for punishment decisions in cases of low moral outrage. The explanation that the participants 
in Experiment 2 were probably also religious is not plausible. The preliminary study of this 
experiment suggests that the Median value on the religiosity scale in a student’s population 
lays at 2.35 (1 = little religious; 5 = highly religious). Another explanation could be instead 
that although highly religious people felt somewhat unsure about what to decide (as shown by 
the smaller certainty ratings), their ambivalence between dogmatism and forgiveness did not 
have any particular effect on decision times. Instead, it could be that less-religious people 
were particularly spontaneous when deciding to punish or not to punish offenders, without 
experiencing conflicts when deciding against feelings of moral outrage. This, however, 
conflicts with the results from Experiments 1 and 2 and requires further investigations and 
replications. 
Also the punishment decisions on problems with control circumstances showed an 
interesting pattern of results. Although highly and less-religious participants did not differ in 
their severity ratings, they did differ in their punishment decisions. For low-moral outrage 
problems, less-religious people decided not to punish the offender although there was no real 
reason for not punishing. In contrast, highly religious people did not show this effect. This 
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difference can be explained by assuming that highly and less-religious people use different 
standards when making punishment decisions. When less-religious people perceive an offence 
as not severe they feel little or no moral outrage and decide not to punish the offender even 
though the offender has committed a legal offence. But when highly religious people perceive 
an offence as not severe and also feel little or no moral outrage, they nonetheless decide to 
punish the offender because an offence has been committed and must be punished. This 
explanation fits with the higher dogmatism attributed to highly religious people and is 
therefore relevant when trying to pin down the effect of moral outrage on defeasible 
reasoning. The fact that highly religious people decided to punish even though the severity 
ratings suggest that they were not morally outraged shows how norms of behavior imposed by 
one’s religion can moderate the effect of moral outrage on punishment decisions. However, 
since this result was not replicated for problems with legally exculpatory circumstances, 
further studies are necessary. 
 
 
 
4.2. Experiment 5: Culture 
 
Another factor that may influence people’s legal reasoning and withdrawal of conclusions is 
culture. Culture can shape people’s legal reasoning by prescribing which behavior is desirable 
and which not. Most criminal offences such as manslaughter, theft, sexual abuse or bodily 
injury are prohibited by law and also condemned by people across cultures. However, 
sometimes there are behaviors which are prohibited by law, but not necessarily condemned 
equally across cultures. One of these is vigilantism. Vigilantism, or vigilante justice, refers 
usually to groups of people enforcing rules they believe will not be enforced by the legal 
system (Robinson & Darley, 2007). Yet, vigilantism can also be applied to refer to single 
individuals taking justice into their own hands (Haas et al., 2012). Taking justice into one’s 
own hands is usually prohibited by law because the judiciary is the only entity allowed to 
decide if a behavior deserves punishment. Without the prohibition of vigilantism, the whole 
idea of a legal system would be obsolete. However, people’s attitude towards vigilantism 
differs across cultures. Whereas in countries like the Netherlands support of vigilantism is low 
(see Haas et al., 2012), cases of vigilantism are more frequent in countries like Nigeria, 
Ghana, Indonesia, Bolivia, Venezuela and Peru (e.g., Benson, Fischer, & Thomas, 2008; 
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Harnischfreger, 2003; Huggins, 1991; Goldstein, 2003; Tankebe, 2009, Tyson, 2013; Onken, 
2011). People from those countries often even sympathize with vigilantes and thank them for 
punishing criminals (e.g., Goldstein, 2003; Harnischfreger, 2003, Tankebe, 2009). Some 
researchers argue that these differences between countries in people’s acceptance of 
vigilantism depend on how well-functioning people perceive their legal systems to be. The 
less people feel they can trust in their legal system and their police, the more they sympathize 
with vigilantes (e.g., Adinkrah, 2005; Benesh & Howell, 2001; Black, 1983; Cook, 2006; 
Goldstein, 2003; Haas, de Keijser, & Bruinsma, 2014; Harnischfeger, 2003; Tankebe, 2009). 
Consequently, when people perceive their legal system as legitimate, they show a greater 
compliance with the system’s rules (e.g., Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002; see also Mishler & 
Rose, 2001).  
Experiment 5 aims to investigate laypeople’s defeasible reasoning in law by making 
use of the cross-cultural differences that exist in peoples acceptance of vigilantism. It is 
assumed that people from countries with a higher acceptance of vigilantism should evaluate 
vigilantism differently than people from countries with less acceptance of vigilantism. 
Imagine for instance you are confronted with a case of manslaughter. According to the 
findings of Chapter 3, people should conclude that the offender should be punished. But what 
happens if additional information explains that the offender decided to kill the victim because 
the “victim” sexually abused the offender’s child? According to the literature on vigilantism 
people with positive attitudes towards taking justice into one’s own hands should be more 
willing to excuse this offender. After all, by killing the “victim” the offender only fulfilled the 
desire for punishment that moral outrage evokes, and consequently reaffirmed the violated 
moral rule (see Cook, 2006; Haas et al., 2012; Skitka & Houston, 2001; Vidmar & Miller, 
1980). That is, people who favor vigilantism should defeat the conclusion of punishing 
offenders if they become aware that an offence was committed in an attempt to do justice. 
People against vigilantism, instead, should not excuse the killing. 
For this cross-cultural study I decided to test people from Germany and Peru, because, 
on the one hand, essential parts of the Peruvian penal code – specifically the ones related to 
the definitions and regulations of culpability – historically originate from German penal code 
(Código Penal, 1991/2014, section Exposición de Motivos). This makes the systems 
comparable. On the other hand, the two countries significantly differ in their criminality 
(Global Study on Homicide - United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013) and their 
citizens’ trust in the courts and police. The World Values Study (2014), for instance, shows 
that whereas 71.3% of Germans declare to have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in 
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courts, only 17.4% of Peruvians does so. Similarly, whereas 81.7% of Germans declare to 
have a great deal or quite a lot confidence in the police, only 27.9% of Peruvians do so 
(World Values Study Association, 2014, World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014).  
To test people’s consideration of vigilantism as a defeater in legal reasoning I created 
legal conditional inference tasks which had either no information about circumstances (i.e., 
baseline), or additional information describing exculpatory circumstances (as hitherto) or 
circumstances that put the offender as a vigilante (“Oscar killed the victim because the victim 
had killed the offender’s wife before”). Participants from Germany and Peru were asked to 
decide whether the offender should be punished. It was hypothesized that participants from 
both countries should not differ in their conclusions about legal conditionals without 
circumstance information. That is, according to the results of Experiments 1-3 (Chapter 3) 
they should favor punishment as long as the offence is morally outraging. Due to the 
similarities between the two penal codes, participants from Germany and Peru should also not 
differ significantly when deciding about legally relevant exculpatory circumstances. Their 
acceptance should depend on how morally outrageous the offence was (see Experiments 1-3). 
However, differences are expected when deciding about circumstances framing the offence as 
an act of vigilantism. Germans should be reluctant to excuse an offence if it happened as an 
act of vigilantism. Peruvians instead should be more open to conclude that an offender should 
not be punished if the offence was committed only to make justice. In addition, considering 
that moral outrage is related to peoples acceptance of vigilantism (see Cook, 2006; Haas et al., 
2012; Skitka & Houston, 2001; Vidmar & Miller, 1980), Peruvians’ acceptance of vigilantism 
as a defeater should be highest for high morally outraging offences.  
 
 
Hypothesis 1: People from Peru should be more prone to accept vigilante circumstances as 
defeaters and reasons for voiding punishment than people from Germany. Especially, when 
the prior offence (to which the vigilante reacts) was morally outraging.  
 
Hypothesis 2: In light of no additional information about circumstances, or when the 
circumstance information is exculpatory, people from Peru and Germany should not differ in 
their punishment decisions. Their decisions should only depend on how morally outraging the 
offence described in the legal conditional is.  
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4.2.1. Methods  
 
4.2.1.1. Participants 
 
The experiment was conducted online (see Section 4.1.1.2). In total, 191 participants 
completed the online experiment. However, because the target sample included only 
participants between 20 and 40 years old, without scholar legal knowledge, and living in their 
corresponding countries, all participants who did not fulfill these requirements were excluded 
from the analysis. The final sample consisted of 54 Peruvians (27 female) and 108 Germans 
(81 female). The mean age of Peruvians was 26.96 years old (SD = 4.23; Median = 26), the 
mean age of the Germans was 24.48 years old (SD = 3.53; Median = 24). Participants from 
both countries had similar high levels of education. All German participants finished high 
school, all but one studied at a university, and 39.9% indicated having some kind of university 
degree. All of the Peruvian participants also finished high school and 92.5% were studying at 
a university or an institute, or already had a university degree. Three participants gave no 
educational specification, but indicated they worked as a commercial pilot, flight dispatcher, 
and audiovisual communicator.  
 
4.2.1.2. Material, Procedure, and Design 
 
The experiment was programmed and conducted online on SoSci Survey (Leiner, 2014). The 
link was administered via a university database and social networks.  
The experiment consisted of two parts. The first part was designed to measure 
people’s general attitudes towards the offence used in this experiment. For this, participants 
were presented with three legal conditional rules without any information about 
circumstances. The problems consisted of (a) the legal conditional rule, (b) the fact that 
somebody committed an offence, and (c) the question about the conclusion. As offences I 
selected manslaughter (“If a person kills another human, then the person should be punished 
for manslaughter”), bodily injury (“If a person physically maltreats another human, then the 
person should be punished for bodily injury”), and defamation (in German “Üble Nachrede“–
“If a person asserts denigrating facts about another person, then the person should be punished 
for defamation”). A online pilot study (N = 568) showed that these offences are perceived 
differently with respect to moral outrage, with manslaughter evoking the highest and 
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defamation the lowest degree of moral outrage. All information (rule, fact, and question about 
the conclusion) were presented at once, and the participants had to answer with a yes or no 
key whether the offender should be punished (an example is given in the upper part of Table 
11). The presentation order was randomized. After having solved all problems, participants 
were again presented with each of the offences and had to rate their severity on a 1 (not at all 
severe) – 7 (very severe) Likert scale. The severity ratings were added to the procedure to 
measure how the participants actually perceived the offences and whether participants from 
both countries perceived the offences as equally wrong and deserving of punishment. 
The second part of the experiment was designed to test people’s perception of 
vigilantism as a defeater. For this, I created defeasible conditional inferences tasks like in 
Experiments 1, 2, and 4. Participants received the same three legal conditionals from the first 
part (manslaughter, bodily injury, and defamation), but this time offences were paired with 
additional information about circumstances. The circumstance either described 1) the “victim” 
as the offender in a preceding crime and the offender taking justice into their own hands 
(henceforth: vigilante circumstances), or it described 2) legally exculpatory circumstances 
(henceforth: exculpatory circumstances). Each of the three legal conditionals (manslaughter, 
bodily injury, and defamation) was combined with two vigilante circumstances and two 
exculpatory circumstances, making a total of twelve problems. The problems consisted thus 
of (a) the legal conditional rule, (b) the fact that somebody committed an offence, (c) the 
vigilante or exculpatory circumstance information, and (d) the question about the conclusion.  
The vigilante circumstances described two different eye-for-an eye scenarios. In one 
scenario, the offender is doing to the “victim” the same as the “victim” did to his wife before 
(i.e., killing the victim after the victim had killed the offender’s wife; physically maltreating 
the victim after the victim had physically maltreated the offender’s wife; and defaming the 
victim after the victim had defamed the offender’s wife). In the other scenario, the “offender” 
responded with a different but similarly severe offence (i.e., killing the victim after the victim 
had sexually abused the offender’s child; physically maltreating the victim after the victim 
had threatened the offender’s child with harm; and defaming the victim after the victim had 
pinched the offender’s girlfriend). These scenarios were used to make sure that the severity 
and level of moral outrage in the vigilant act and the preceding offence were comparable. The 
legally exculpatory circumstances included mistakes of law or situations of necessity. They 
served as control problems to which participants from Peru and Germany were expected to 
respond similarly. Examples of problems with vigilante and exculpatory circumstances can be 
found in Table 11. Both offender and victim were always male. The names of offender and 
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victim exist in both countries (sometimes in slightly adapted forms, e.g. Georg vs. Jorge) and 
were varied randomly between the offences. All premises were presented at once and 
participants had to decide whether they accepted the conclusion or not by pressing either a yes 
or no key. The problems were presented randomly. After the conditional inference task 
participants were again asked to rate the severity of the offences on a 1 (not at all severe) – 7 
(very severe) Likert scale, but this time the offences were presented in combination with the 
corresponding circumstance information (e.g., “Oscar physically maltreated Daniel because 
Daniel threatened Oscar’s child with harm”).  
 
 
Table 11 
Exemplary problems used in the second part of Experiment 5 illustrated with the example of 
bodily injury  
 Example 
No circumstance  If a person physically maltreats another human, then the person 
should be punished for bodily injury. 
A person physically maltreated another human. 
Should the person be punished for bodily injury? 
Vigilante circumstances 
 
Eye-for-an-eye If a person physically maltreats another human, then the person 
should be punished for bodily injury. 
Oscar physically maltreated Daniel. 
Oscar did this because his wife had been physically maltreated 
by Daniel. 
Should Oscar be punished for bodily injury? 
Comparable severity If a person physically maltreats another human, then the person 
should be punished for bodily injury. 
Oscar physically maltreated Daniel. 
Oscar did this because his child had been threatened with harm 
by Daniel. 
Should Oscar be punished for bodily injury? 
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Exculpatory circumstances 
Mistakes of law  If a person physically maltreats another human, then the person 
should be punished for bodily injury. 
Oscar physically maltreated Daniel. 
Oscar believed erroneously that Bert tried to attack him 
Should Oscar be punished for bodily injury? 
Necessity brought 
about by coercion 
If a person physically maltreats another human, then the person 
should be punished for bodily injury. 
Oscar physically maltreated Daniel. 
Under threats to his life and physical integrity, Oscar was 
coerced into committing the crime. 
Should Oscar be punished for bodily injury? 
 
 
Participants had no time limits and were instructed to decide using their own sense of 
justice. Peruvians were tested in Spanish and Germans in German. After the experiment they 
had the opportunity to take part in a lottery for a gift card. 
 
 
4.2.2. Results 
 
4.2.2.1. No Circumstance Information  
First the severity ratings and the mean number of no-punishment decisions (in percent) for 
problems without any circumstance information were analyzed. This served to determine if 
participants from both countries had in general similar attitudes to the offences used in the 
reasoning problems. This is an important prerequisite for this experiment. I also added gender 
as an additional factor to control for the different distribution of females and males in both 
samples. This results in two separate 2 (country: Peru vs. Germany) x 3 (offence: 
manslaughter vs. bodily injury vs. defamation) x 2 (gender: female vs. male) ANOVAs (one 
for the percentage of no-punishment decisions and one for severity ratings). The results are 
presented in Table 12. The ANOVA for the percentage of no-punishment decisions without 
any circumstance information did not show differences between participants from Peru and 
Germany. In fact, all participants agreed with the legal rule and almost never decided not to 
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punish the offender. Accordingly, no main effects of country, gender, and offence, and no 
interactions were found (all Fs ≤ 3.08, ps ≥ .053). 
The ANOVA on severity ratings showed a main effect of offence, F(1.52, 240.68) = 
222.95, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .585, and an interaction between offence and country, F(1.52, 240.68) 
= 4.35, p = .023, ηp
2 
= .027. Manslaughter was always perceived as more severe than bodily 
injury (M = 6.90; SD = 0.40 and M = 6.30; SD = 0.88, respectively), t(161) = 9.18, p < .001, d 
= 0.82, and bodily injury as more severe than defamation (M = 4.67; SD = 1.37), t(161) = 
20.13, p < .001, d = 2.17. Yet, German participants perceived manslaughter and bodily injury 
as slightly more severe than Peruvians (t(61.74) = 2.48, p =.016, d = 0.53; t(77.30) = 2.54, p = 
.013, d = 0.48, respectively). However, these differences were not high (see Table 12). No 
main effect of country was found, F(1, 158) = 0.63, p = .430, ηp
2 
= .004. A main effect of 
gender also showed that female participants (M = 6.10; SD = 0.55) perceived offences 
somewhat more severe than male participants (M = 5.65; SD = 0.76), F(1, 158) = 19.43, p < 
.001, ηp
2 
= .109. All other effects were not significant (all Fs ≤ 3.69, ps ≥ .056). 
 
 
Table 12 
Percentage of no-punishment decisions and severity ratings of participants from Germany 
and Peru for problems without circumstance information 
 Offence 
 
Manslaughter Bodily injury Defamation 
No-punishment decisions (%) 
German participants 
Peruvian participants 
Severity ratings 
Germany participants 
Peruvian participants 
 
5.56 (23.01) 
11.11 (31.72) 
 
6.96 (0.23) 
6.76 (0.58) 
 
1.85 (13.54) 
5.56 (23.12) 
 
6.44 (0.73) 
6.02 (1.09) 
 
7.41 (26.31) 
14.81 (35.86) 
 
4.62 (1.32) 
4.78 (1.48) 
Note. Severity ratings range from 1 (not severe at all) to 7 (very severe). The numbers in 
brackets indicate the corresponding standard deviations. 
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4.2.2.2. Vigilante and Exculpatory Circumstances  
 
In the main part of the analyses, I compared the mean frequency of punishment decisions (in 
percent) and the severity ratings as a function of the additional vigilante and exculpatory 
circumstance information. This was done with two separate 2 (country: Peru vs. Germany) x 2 
(circumstance: vigilante vs. exculpatory) x 3 (offence: manslaughter vs. bodily injury vs. 
defamation) x 2 (gender: female vs. male) mixed ANOVAs; one for punishment decisions 
(Figure 6) and one for severity ratings (Table 13).  
The ANOVA for the percentage of no-punishment decisions revealed main effects of 
offence and of circumstance (both Fs ≥ 6.19, ps ≤ .003), two-way interactions between 
country and circumstance and between offence and circumstance (both Fs > 7.04, ps ≤ .007), 
and a three-way interaction between offence, country, and circumstance, F(2, 316) = 3.59, p = 
.029, ηp
2 
= 0.022. Also a main effect of gender was found showing that the percentage of no-
punishment decisions was higher for male participants (M = 37.65%; SD = 22.88) than for 
female participants (M = 28.40%; SD = 17.39), F(1, 158) = 5.71, p = .018, ηp
2 
= 0.035. All 
other effects were not significant (all Fs ≤ 2.90, ps ≥ .059). Since the three way interaction 
showed that the effect of country and offences depended on which kind of circumstance 
information was presented, I continued the analyses by conducting two separate 2 (country: 
Peru vs. Germany) x 3 (offence: manslaughter vs. bodily injury vs. defamation) ANOVAs for 
problems with legally exculpatory circumstances and for problems with vigilante 
circumstances. In these analyses, the ANOVA for problems with legally exculpatory 
circumstances only revealed a main effect of offence, F(2, 320) = 8.70, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .052. 
The percentage of no-punishment decisions was lower for manslaughter (M = 33.64%; SD = 
33.36) compared to bodily injury (M = 46.30%; SD = 37.20), t(161) = 4.39, p < .001, d = 
0.36, and compared to defamation (M = 47.84%; SD = 32.18), t(161) = 4.71, p < .001, d = 
0.43. No-punishment decisions for bodily injury and defamation did not differ, t(161) = 0.50, 
p = 0.62, d = 0.04. All other effects were not significant (all Fs ≤ 2.36, ps ≥ .096). 
In contrast, the ANOVA for problems with vigilante circumstances showed 
differences between countries. This main effect of country shows that the percentage of no-
punishment decisions for offences with vigilante circumstances was higher for participants 
from Peru than for participants from Germany (M = 30.56%; SD = 27.23 and M = 15.28%; SD 
= 23.80, respectively), F(1, 160) = 13.45, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .078. Yet, an interaction between 
country and offence shows that this effect depended on how morally outrageous the prior 
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crime was, F(1.89, 302.9) = 6.29, p = .003, ηp
2 
= .038. As can be seen in Figure 6, the 
percentage of no-punishment decisions for offences with vigilante circumstances was only 
higher for participants from Peru than from Germany for bodily injury, t(86.96) = 4.41, p < 
.001, d = 0.79, but not for defamation, t(96.74) = 0.92, p = .360, d = 0.16. Peruvian 
participants also condoned vigilantism more often than German participants for manslaughter, 
t(83.84) = 2.21, p = .030, d = 0.40, but the effect did not reach the Bonferroni adjusted alpha 
level of 0.016. Because of this interaction, the main effect of offence was significant, F(1.89, 
302.9) = 5.18, p = .007, ηp
2 
= .031.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Percentages of no-punishment decisions made by participants from Germany and 
Peru for problems with a) legally exculpatory and b) vigilante circumstances.  
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Results for the severity ratings are presented in Table 13. The analysis of the severity 
ratings revealed a main effect of offence, F(1.45, 229.53) = 69.19, p < .001, ηp
2 
= 0.305, two-
way interactions between country and offence and between offence and circumstance (both Fs 
≥ 5.08, ps ≤ .008), and a three-way interaction between offence, country, and circumstance, 
F(1.84, 291.21) = 4.12, p = .02, ηp
2 
= .025. Additionally, a main effect of gender showed that 
female (M = 4.82; SD = 1.08) participants perceived offences as more severe than male 
participants (M = 4.31; SD = 1.25), F(1, 158) = 5.21, p = .024, ηp
2 
= 0.024. All other effects 
were not significant, including the interaction between country and offence (all Fs ≤ 3.79, ps 
≥ .053). As for the analysis of no-punishment decisions, the tree way interaction allowed to 
continue the analyses by conducting two separate 2 (country: Peru vs. Germany) x 3 (offence: 
manslaughter vs. bodily injury vs. defamation) ANOVAs; one for problems with legally 
exculpatory circumstances and one for problems with vigilante circumstances. Both ANOVAs 
– the one for exculpatory and the one for vigilante circumstances – revealed a main effect of 
offence (F(1.75, 280.40) = 95.25, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .373; and F(1.40, 224.03) = 32.02, p < .001, 
ηp
2 
= .167; respectively): manslaughter was perceived as more severe than bodily injury and 
bodily injury as more severe than defamation (all ts ≥ 7.21, ps ≤ 0.001). In both ANOVAs 
interactions between offence and country were found (F(1.75, 280.40) = 5.32, p = .01, ηp
2 
= 
.031; and F(1.40, 224.03) = 11.34, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .066; respectively). However, only for 
problems with vigilante circumstances the post-hoc t-tests reached the Bonferroni adjusted 
alpha of 0.016: when offences were paired with vigilante circumstances, participants from 
Germany perceived manslaughter and bodily injury as more severe than participants from 
Peru (t(81.97) = 2.79, p = .007, d = 0.51; and t(87.31) = 3.80, p < .001, d = 0.68; 
respectively). For defamation there were no differences, t(160) = 0.80, p = .427, d = 0.13. As 
a consequence, the main effect of country was significant for problems with vigilante 
circumstances, F(1, 160) = 7.64, p = .006, ηp
2 
= .046, but not for problems with exculpatory 
circumstances, F(1, 160) = 1.85, p = .176, ηp
2 
= .011.  
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Table 13 
Severity ratings of participants from Germany and Peru for problems with legally exculpatory 
and vigilante circumstances 
 Offence 
 
Manslaughter Bodily injury Defamation 
Legally exculpatory circumstances 
German participants 
Peruvian participants 
Vigilante circumstances 
German participants 
Peruvian participants 
 
5.68 (1.23) 
5.08 (1.76) 
 
5.62 (1.1.49) 
4.75 (2.04) 
 
4.68 (1.43) 
4.32 (1.52) 
 
5.06 (1.41) 
4.01 (1.78) 
 
3.77 (1.45) 
3.88 (1.58) 
 
3.94 (1.57) 
4.15 (1.46) 
Note. Severity ratings range from 1 (not severe at all) to 7 (very severe). The numbers in 
brackets indicate the corresponding standard deviations. 
 
 
4.2.3. Discussion 
 
Experiment 5 aimed to investigate cross-cultural differences in legal reasoning. It was 
expected that the consideration of vigilantism as a defeater in legal reasoning varies between 
people from Peru and Germany. The results show that all participants, regardless of their 
country of origin, agreed that offences like manslaughter, bodily injury, and defamation 
should be punished. This supports Hypothesis 2. In addition, they agreed that in light of 
legally exculpatory circumstances it is acceptable not to punish offenders (with slight 
differences depending on how moral outraging the offence is). However, Peruvians and 
Germans differed in their punishment decisions for problems with vigilante circumstances. As 
expected by Hypothesis 1, participants from Peru were more inclined not to punish an 
offender if the circumstances described the offence as an act of vigilantism. Germans did not 
show this effect. That is, only Peruvians withdrew the conclusion of punishing the offender in 
light of information framing the offence as an act of vigilantism. Nevertheless, even for 
Peruvians the prior offence to which the vigilante reacted had to be severe enough to engage 
in defeasible reasoning. If the vigilante’s act was only committed to avenge low morally 
outraging offences like defamation, participants from both countries decided to punish the 
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offender. This finding suggests that moral outrage moderates the acceptance of vigilantism as 
a defeater.  
An unexpected finding of the study, however, is that the highest acceptance of 
vigilantism was found for bodily injury and not for manslaughter. One explanation could be 
that the acceptance of an-eye-for-an-eye retribution is limited to less extreme cases of 
vigilantism. It is possible that paying for a life with another life is too extreme to be excused. 
In such cases the vigilante’s act probably also evokes strong feelings of moral outrage so that 
condoning the act becomes unacceptable. Such conflicting effects of strong feelings of moral 
outrage against both the prior offender and the vigilante have been described before as 
possible reactions to vigilantism (see Cook, 2006; Haas et al., 2012). In this context, also the 
gender differences in the attitudes towards vigilantes are notorious. Interestingly, men 
perceived offences as less severe than women: Men decided more often not to punish the 
offender. This was the case for all men – both from Peru and Germany – and across all kinds 
of circumstance information – no circumstance, exculpatory circumstances, and vigilante 
circumstances. This finding agrees with previous studies that show men to be more supportive 
of vigilantism than women (e.g., Briceño-León, Camardiel, & Avila, 2006).  
One open question that still remains is why exactly Peruvians and Germans differed in 
their attitudes towards vigilantism. According to the literature on vigilantism, it could be that 
Peruvians and Germans differ in their trust in the legal system. As shown by the World 
Values Study less than one fourth of Peruvians trust their legal system, whereas the majority 
of Germans do. However, in the present experiment I did not measure people’s trust in the 
legal system directly. It may be possible that the academic population tested in this study 
differs from the general population of the World Values study. In an attempt to have a more 
reliable measure on people’s trust in the legal system and the relationship to vigilantism, I 
conducted an additional online study via LimeSurvey™ with a sample from the same 
population of this experiment. In this study, participants (N = 39 Germans; N = 24 Peruvians) 
had to answer several questions about their experiences and attitudes on legal matters. I will 
report here only the results on trust and vigilantism. The single questions and descriptive data 
can be found in Table 14. As expected, Peruvians scored significantly lower on the trust-
related questions than Germans, t(61) = 11.78, p < .001, d = 3.06, and had accordingly more 
positive attitudes towards vigilantism than Germans, t(61) = 3.10, p = .001, d = 1.07. In fact, 
measures of trust and vigilantism correlated significantly, r = - .622, p < .001. Especially this 
last correlation suggests that the differences found between Peruvians and Germans in the 
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consideration of vigilantism as a defeater are related to differences in their trust in the legal 
system.  
 
 
Table 14 
Results of the follow-up study on Peruvians’ and Germans’ trust in the legal system and 
attitude towards vigilantism (Experiment 5) 
 M (SD)  
p 
 
d PE DE 
Trust towards the legal system 
(1 = yes a lot; 7 = not at all) 
    
 - Are you satisfied with your LS? 
- Do you trust in your LS? 
- Does your LS persecute some offences 
too little?
a
 
Mean 
6.2 (0.9) 
6.2 (0.7) 
 
5.9 (1.5) 
6.1 (0.9) 
2.8 (1.0) 
2.7 (1.0) 
 
4.5 (1.6) 
3.3 (0.9) 
 
 
 
 
<.001 
 
 
 
 
3.06 
Attitude towards vigilantism 
(1 = yes, a lot; 7 = not at all) 
    
 - Do you think vigilantism is acceptable? 
- Do you think there are circumstances 
were vigilantism should be allowed? 
- Do you think there are offences where 
vigilantism should be allowed? 
- Should two offenders get the same 
punishment, if the victim of one of them 
is a criminal?
 a
 
Mean 
4.6 (2.1) 
 
3.8 (2.3) 
 
5.1 (2.2) 
 
 
2.6 (2.5) 
4.7(1.7) 
5.9 (1.4) 
 
6.1 (1.3) 
 
6.4 (1.3) 
 
 
1.8 (1.7) 
6.1 (1.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.07 
Note. Comparisons between Peruvians and Germans were done by comparing the means of 
each category with t-tests for independent samples. PE = Peruvians; DE = Germans; LS = 
Legal system. 
a
 For better comparison, results for this item were recoded to its reverse polarity  
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To further test the effect of trust in the legal system on vigilantism and legal reasoning, 
it is nonetheless necessary to continue testing people from other countries whose inhabitants 
also differ in their attitudes towards their legal system. In a first attempt to do this, I am 
currently testing people from Russia. Russian participants should answer similarly to 
Peruvians, because according to the World Values Study (World Values Study Association, 
2014, World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014) only 32.5% of Russians have a great deal or 
quite a lot of trust in the courts and 31.7% in the police. First results support this hypothesis: 
Russian participants (N = 42) decided not to punish vigilantes in 28.6% of the cases of 
manslaughter, in 44% of the cases of bodily injury, and in 19% of the cases of defamation. 
 
 
 
4.3. Summary and Implications of Chapter 4 
 
In this second block of experiments it was investigated whether differences in a person’s 
attitudes about offenders and offences affects legal conditional reasoning. It was assumed that 
if cultural or ideological norms of behavior support or condemn excusing offences, then their 
willingness to withdraw conclusions from legal rules should be enhanced or inhibited, 
respectively. The results of this Chapter are widely in accordance with these assumptions. In 
Experiment 4 differences between highly and less religious people were found in decision 
times and in punishment decisions for crime irrelevant circumstance information. The 
differences in decision times were difficult to interpret, but the tendency of highly religious 
participants to punish offenders even for little morally outraging offences indicates that the 
dogmatism usually linked to high religiosity affects legal reasoning. Especially Experiment 5 
showed how different attitudes towards offences have an effect on punishment conclusions. 
While Peruvians excused offences in light of vigilante circumstances, Germans did not. That 
is, people’s defeasible reasoning in light of vigilante circumstances varied between countries. 
However, one question which requires further discussion is whether Peruvians and 
Germans, or highly and little religious people, differed only in their punishment decisions or 
also in their feelings of moral outrage. Robinson and Darley (2007) argue that people’s 
negative reactions towards morally wrong offences and the desire to punish these offenders is 
universal and intuitive. Accordingly also the severity ratings of Peruvians and Germans, and 
highly and less religious people, did not differ much. But when there are no big differences in 
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moral outrage, how can one explain the differing punishment decisions? Robinson and Darley 
answer by saying that what is universal is people’s wish to punish offenders, but which 
particular punishment one thinks is appropriate varies between people and cultures. In other 
words, the perception that, for instance, manslaughter is worse than theft is homogenous 
across countries. Robinson and Darley talk in this respect about a correlation of Kendalls W = 
.95 (see Robinson & Kurzban, 2007). Yet, whether manslaughter should be punished with 
death sentence, life prison or 15 years of jail differs across people. In this sense the 
participants in this Chapter were probably similarly morally outraged by the offences (as 
suggested by the severity ratings), but decided differently when it came to the implications of 
these feelings of moral outrage. For instance, while both Peruvians and Germans perceived 
bodily injury as a severe offence which requires punishment, only Peruvians concluded that a 
vigilante can deliver this punishment. This chapter’s findings can thus be related to the 
literature on the role of emotions on behavior. Emotions evoked by certain events do not 
necessarily result in a specific behavior (Baumeister, DeWall, Vohs, & Alquist, 2010; 
Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Like fear can lead to fight or flight responses, feelings of moral 
outrage towards offences can lead to desire for different types of punishments.  
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Chapter 5: Linguistic Factors in Legal Conditional 
Reasoning 
 
 
So far, the experiments I presented have shown that laypeople do not readily accept 
exculpatory circumstances as defeaters. But does this finding not conflict with the vast 
literature on conditional reasoning showing that people usually do engage in defeasible 
reasoning? As explained in Chapter 1, in everyday situations people do consider defeaters and 
exceptions during reasoning, sometimes even when instructed to ignore background 
knowledge and to reason solely on the basis of the premises (see Vadeboncoeur & Markovits, 
1999). So why is it that the participants in this thesis have difficulties to withdraw previous 
conclusions when given additional information about exculpatory circumstances for an 
offence?  
One possible reason was already considered in the hypotheses of this thesis, namely 
the importance of punishing offenders in our society. As explained in Chapter 1 and 2, people 
experience negative feelings of moral outrage when faced with offences, resulting in a desire 
of punishment (Alter et al., 2007; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley, 
2009; Darley & Pittman, 2003; also see Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 
2001; 2007; Keller, et al., 2010).  
Another reason why participants have difficulties in accepting defeaters in legal 
reasoning might have something to do with the phrasing of the legal conditional. On the one 
hand, all legal conditionals were phrased deontically, asking about what should happen to an 
offender. On the other hand, legal conditionals were phrased as universal rules, stating 
implicitly that every time the antecedent is the case, the consequent follows. In the following I 
will present three experiments that consider the role of phrasing in legal conditional 
reasoning. More precisely, it is investigated whether the effect of one’s own sense of justice 
on legal reasoning can be modulated by changing the way in which the legal conditional is 
phrased.  
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5.1. Experiment 6: The Modal Auxiliary 
 
One reason why reasoners have ignored so far potential exculpatory circumstances might be 
the modal auxiliary used in the legal conditional. In the previous experiments legal 
conditionals were phrased with the modal “should”, and not with “will” as it is the case in 
most of the literature on conditional reasoning (Kilpatrick, Manktelow, & Over, 2007). In 
legal theory, modals such as “should” or “ought” stand for the normative nature of legal rules 
(Bäcker, 2009; 2010). However, when presented in a MP inference, the modal “should” can 
have additional implications, as can be seen in the following example: 
 
If a person kills another human, then the person should be punished for manslaughter. 
A person killed another human.  
Should the person be punished for manslaughter? 
 
The “should” in the conclusion can be understood as asking for what should happen according 
to the deontic principles of this rule (see deontic possibilities; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; 
Quelhas & Byrne, 2003), or, one step further, according to the reasoner’s own deontic 
standards. Participants might ignore exceptions because they answer in line with what is 
correct according to their own sense of justice. As already explained in Section 1.1.1.2.2, 
Over et al. (2004) argued that for deontic conditionals, the acceptance of conditional rules 
depends on the preference for the different outcomes such a rule can have. The more a 
reasoner prefers the outcome ‘p and q’ (in our case: committing an offence and being 
punished for that) over ‘p and ¬q’ (in our case: committing an offence and not being punished 
for that), the more the rule will be accepted. In the case of deontic legal conditionals, I expect 
the preference of ‘p and q’ over ‘p and ¬q’ to be correlated with moral outrage: the more 
morally outraged a reasoner is by the offence in the legal conditional, the more (s)he will 
prefer the outcome ‘p and q’ (i.e., offence and punishment) over ‘p and ¬q’ (i.e., offence and 
no punishment), and the more she or he will conclude that the offender should be punished. 
But what happens if instead of “should”, the legal conditional is phrased with the 
modal “will”? Consider following example: 
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If a person kills another human, then the person will be punished for manslaughter. 
A person killed another human. 
Will the person be punished for manslaughter? 
 
Different from “should”, the modal “will” in the conclusion suggests that the inference is 
asking about what happens in the real world, i.e., what is factually the case (see factual 
possibilities, Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Quelhas & Byrne, 2003). Therefore, when 
thinking about what happens in real world, the own sense of justice should lose importance, 
and the perceived frequency of exceptions should gain importance. The more frequently 
participants perceive exceptions to occur for a given offence, the less they will think q 
happens given p, and thus the less the rule will be accepted. In this case, when asked whether 
an offender will be punished, a reasoner might conclude that the offender will not be punished 
even though the offence is severe and morally outrageous.  
The fact that different modals can have different implications – either by their meaning 
per se or by the context in which they are uttered – is known from linguistics (e.g., 
Groefsema, 1995) and has also received some psychological support (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 
1978). Bell and Johnson-Laird (1998), for instance, showed that depending on which modal is 
used (“can” vs. “must”), inferences are drawn differently fast: when asked about what can be 
the case participants take longer to answer affirmatively than to answer negatively, but when 
asked about what must be the case it is the other way around. Further, Ferguson and Sanford 
(2008) showed that modals in counterfactual conditionals can affect interpretation of 
subsequent information. In fact, the difference between asking about deontic states or factual 
states is widely known in the psychological literature (e.g., Beller, 2008a; Bucciarelli & 
Johnson-Laird, 2005). However, most of the research about the difference between factual 
and deontic reasoning has been done with Wason’s selection task (Wason, 1968; see also 
Beller, 2008a; Kilpatrick et al., 2007; Manktelow & Over, 1991; see Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; 
Cosmides, 1989) where participants have to choose cards in order to falsify or violate a rule 
(for details and problems on the Wason’s selection task see Section 7.1.4 in the General 
Discussion). All in all however, the role of modals in the consideration of exceptions in 
inference tasks has not received much attention to date. To fill this gap, Experiment 6 aims to 
investigate the effect of modals on the consideration of exceptions in legal conditional 
reasoning. Because of the implications of asking about “should” or “will” I predict different 
answer patterns depending on how the legal conditional is phrased. If the legal conditional has 
the modal “should” (deontic legal conditionals), just like in the previous experiments 
CHAPTER 5: LINGUISTIC FACTORS IN LEGAL CONDITIONAL REASONING 
 112 
reported, I expect that people base their conclusions on their own sense of justice and feelings 
of moral outrage, ignoring the existence of exceptions. This should reflect in the participants’ 
acceptance of a rule, given their preference of ‘p and q’ over ‘p and ¬q’ (see Over et al., 
2004). However, if the legal conditional has the modal “will” (factual legal conditionals), 
people are expected to base their conclusions on their knowledge about what happens in real 
world, leaving their own sense of justice aside and considering exceptions. This consideration 
of exceptions should be reflected in the perceived frequency of cases of ‘p but ¬q’ (cf. Geiger 
& Oberauer, 2007; see Section 1.1.1.1).  
 
Hypothesis 1: When the legal conditional is phrased deontically with the modal should, then 
reasoners’ conclusions should depend on their sense of justice and thus on their preference of 
pq over p¬q. The frequency of exceptions should be irrelevant.  
 
Hypothesis 2: When the legal conditional is phrased factually with the modal will, then 
reasoners’ conclusions should depend on the frequency of exceptions; that is, how often they 
think p¬q happens in the real world. Their own sense of justice should be irrelevant.  
 
 
5.1.1. Methods 
 
5.1.1.1. Participants  
 
42 participants took part in the experiment. Two participants were excluded from the analysis 
because they afterwards reported to have specialized knowledge of logic or about the German 
penal code. The final sample consisted of 40 participants (20 female), with a mean age of 23.7 
years (SD = 3.0). Half of the participants received deontic legal conditionals, the other half 
factual legal conditionals. 
 
5.1.1.2. Material and Design  
 
The materials were selected through a large (N = 298) preliminary study via SoSci Survey 
(Leiner, 2014). In the first half of the preliminary study participants’ acceptance of legal rules 
was measured. Based on the proposal of Over et al. (2004), participants were confronted with 
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legal rules together with their outcomes ‘p and q’ and ‘p and not q’ (e.g., “A person kills 
another human and is punished for manslaughter” and “A person kills another human and is 
not punished for manslaughter”). In total I tested N = 92 legal rules but each participant 
received only 14 - 16 of them. The participants’ task was to indicate their preference for each 
of these two possible outcomes on a scale from 1 (completely in favor) to 7 (completely 
against). A participant’s acceptance of a rule was computed by dividing the ratings she or he 
gave for the outcome ‘p and not q’ by the ratings for the outcome ‘p and q’. The higher this 
quotient, the more a participant accepted a rule.  
In the second half of the preliminary study, participants were asked to rate the 
frequencies of exceptions for each rule. For this they were confronted once more with the 
same rules and asked to rate in how many of 100 cases they think p (i.e., the offence) occurs, 
but without the following q (i.e., the punishment; e.g., “A person kills another human, but the 
person is not punished for manslaughter. In how many of 100 cases do you think this is the 
case?”).  
The offences finally used for the conditionals in the actual experiment were selected 
depending on the ratings obtained in both parts of the preliminary study. I selected 8 offences: 
two with high acceptance rates and high frequency of exceptions, two with high acceptance 
and low frequency of exceptions, two with low acceptance and high frequency of exceptions, 
and two others with low acceptance and low frequency of exceptions. The assignment to each 
category was corroborated statistically. The list of the legal conditionals used in the 
experiment together with their ratings from the preliminary study can be found in Table 15.  
 
Table 15 
Legal conditionals used in Experiment 6, together with means (and standard deviations) for 
rule acceptance (RA) and frequency of exceptions (EX) from the preliminary studies. 
Items RA (SD) EX (SD) 
High RA, high EX (high-high) 
1. If a person downloads child pornography, then the person 
should/ will be punished for possession of child 
pornography.   
2. If a person pollutes the soil and thereby harms animals, 
then the person should/ will be punished for soil 
pollution. 
 
6.3 (1.5) 
 
 
5.4 (2.2) 
 
56.6 (27.9) 
 
 
70.9 (24.9) 
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High RA, low EX (high-low) 
1. If a person abducts a human being in order to coerce a 
third person to commit an act, then the person should/ 
will be punished for hostage taking. 
2. If a person kills another human, then the person should/ 
will be punished for manslaughter 
 
6.5 (1.3) 
 
 
5.8 (2.1) 
 
19.9 (17.4) 
 
 
22.9 (22.1) 
Low RA, high EX (low-high) 
1. If a person downloads music from the internet without 
allowance, then the person should/ will be punished for 
breaching the copyright law.  
2. If a person participates in an illegal game of chance, then 
the person should/ will be punished for illegal gambling.  
 
1.9 (2.2) 
 
 
2.1 (1.8) 
 
69.9 (34.7) 
 
 
62.2 (25.5) 
Low RA, low EX (low-low) 
1. If a person kills another human because of the explicit 
and earnest request of the person killed, then the person 
should/ will be punished for homicide upon request.  
2. If a shop-owner opens his/ her shop without allowance 
on a Sunday, then the person should/will be punished for 
breaching the Shop Closing Act. 
 
2.0 (2.3) 
 
 
1.9 (2.0) 
 
14.8 (21.6) 
 
 
26.5 (26.3) 
 
 
For the experiment, each offence was phrased as a legal conditional and presented 
once in an MP and once in an MT inference, creating a total of 16 problems. The conclusion 
was phrased as a question. Thus the inference problems consisted of 1) a legal conditional 
rule, 2) the fact p or ¬q (for MP and MT inferences, respectively), and 3) the question about 
the conclusion, asking whether q should or will follow (for MP inferences) or whether p is the 
case (for MT inferences). Contrary to the previous experiments, exculpatory circumstances 
were not presented explicitly as part of the inference task. This was not necessary because 
they were already tested implicitly by the preliminary study on the frequency of exceptions. 
Half of the participants got the problems with the modal “should” and the other half with 
“will”. See Table 16 for an illustration. Thus the experiment followed a 2 (modal: should vs. 
will) x 2 (rule acceptance: high vs. low) x 2 (frequency of exceptions: high vs. low) x 2 
(inference: MP vs. MT) mixed design. The modal was varied as a between subjects factor, all 
other factors were varied within individuals.  
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Table 16 
Structure of the problems used in Experiment 6 illustrated by the legal conditional of 
manslaughter. R=Conditional rule; F=Fact; C=Conclusion. 
 Modus Ponens Modus Tollens 
Should R: 
 
 
F:  
 
C: 
 
If a person kills another human, 
then the person should be punished 
for manslaughter. 
A person kills another human. 
 
Should the person be punished for 
manslaughter? 
R:  
 
 
F: 
 
C:  
If a person kills another human, 
then the person should be punished 
for manslaughter. 
A person should not be punished for 
manslaughter.  
Did the person kill another human? 
Will R: 
 
 
F:  
 
C: 
If a person kills another human, 
then the person will be punished for 
manslaughter.  
A person kills another human. 
 
Will the person be punished for 
manslaughter? 
R: 
 
 
F: 
 
C: 
 
If a person kills another human, 
then the person will be punished for 
manslaughter. 
A person is not punished for 
manslaughter 
Did the person kill another human? 
 
 
I also created a generation and an evaluation task. The generation task served as an 
additional measure for the availability of exceptions. Participants were presented with the 
same eight offences from the inference task and were asked to generate reasons of why 
somebody who committed those offences should/ will not be punished (“A person kills 
another human, but this person should/ will not be punished for that”). The modal used in the 
generation task was the same the participants had received in the inference task. Following 
previous studies (see Cummins, 1995; Cummins et al., 1991; De Neys et al., 2003a; 2003b) 
participants had 1.5 minutes to write down as many reasons as they could think of. After 10 
seconds of inactivity, the 1.5 minutes ended prematurely.  
In the evaluation task participants were confronted once more with the same eight 
offences and asked to indicate on a 7-point-Likert scale how morally outraged they were by 
each (1= no moral outrage, 7= high moral outrage). Since feelings of moral outrage towards 
offences are an essential part of people’s sense of justice (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Carlsmith & 
Darley, 2008; Darley, 2009; Darley & Pittman, 2003), I expected the moral outrage ratings to 
correlate with the acceptance ratings from the preliminary study.  
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5.1.1.3. Procedure  
 
Participants were tested individually on a computer. The experiment was presented with 
Cedrus Superlab © 4.5 and was introduced as an experiment on reasoning in law. The 
participants were told that they will be confronted with general rules that are embedded in 
specific situations and that their task is to decide whether this rule should (for participants in 
the deontic legal conditionals condition) or will (for participants in the factual legal 
conditional condition) be applied in the given situation. Apart from the modal used for 
describing the task, instructions were kept constant across conditions. After one practice trial 
consisting of two items with the legal conditional for tax aversion (once as MP, once as MT), 
participants were left alone in the experimental room. The two premises were presented on 
subsequent screens and participants could move to the next screen by pressing the space bar. 
The conclusion was always phrased as a question and written in red. After reading this 
question, participants had to answer on a 7 point Likert scale ranging from yes, very certainly 
to no, very certainly not. The polarity of the scale was reversed for half of the participants. 
Between each problem participants had the opportunity to take a break. After the inference 
task, the two supplementary tasks were presented in random order. After the experimental 
session participants were asked in an open interview about their knowledge about logic and 
law.  
 
 
5.1.2. Results 
 
5.1.2.1. Inference Task 
 
For the MP inferences “yes, very certainly” answers were scored with 0 points and “no, very 
certainly not” answers with 6 points. The ratings in-between were scored respectively with 1 
to 5 points. For the MT inferences the opposite was done. “No, very certainly not” were 
scored with 0 points and “yes, very certainly” with 6 points. Again, the ratings in-between 
were scored respectively with 1 to 5 points. These scores were averaged separately for MP 
and MT inferences and indicate the degree of rejection of the logically valid conclusion. I will 
call this the “rejection rating”. The higher the rejection rating, the less the MP or MT 
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inferences were accepted. The rejection ratings for MP and MT inferences can be found in 
Figure 7.  
A 2 (modal: should vs. will) x 2 (rule acceptance: high vs. low) x 2 (frequency of 
exceptions: high vs. low) x 2 (inference: MP vs. MT) ANOVA on rejection ratings showed a 
main effect of frequency of exceptions, F(1,38) = 14.06, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .270, a main effect of 
rule acceptance, F(1, 38) = 23.05, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .378, and a main effect of rule, F(1,38) = 
21.69, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .363. However, the ANOVA also showed that the kind of inference (MP 
vs. MT) interacted significantly with rule acceptance, F(1, 38) = 30.03, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .441, 
with the frequency of exceptions and the modal auxiliary, F(1, 38) = 6.73, p = .013, ηp
2 
= .15, 
and marginally with the frequency of exceptions, F(1, 38) = 3.08, p = .087, ηp
2 
= .075, and 
with the modal auxiliary, F(1,38) = 3.128, p = .085, ηp
2 
= .076. Therefore, I decided to 
analyze the data from MP and MT inferences with two separate 2 (modal: should vs. will) x 2 
(rule acceptance: high vs. low) x 2 (frequency of exceptions: high vs. low) ANOVAS. As can 
be seen in Figure 7, results for MP and MT indeed differed.  
For MP inferences the ANOVA showed main effects for modal auxiliary, F(1, 38) = 
5.78, p = .021, ηp
2 
=.132, for rule acceptance, F(1, 38) = 43.988, p < .001, ηp
2 
=.537, and for 
frequency of exceptions, F(1, 38) = 20.021, p < .001, ηp
2 
=.345. These effects were explained 
in terms of the expected interactions between the modal auxiliary and rule acceptance, F(1, 
38) = 7.62, p = .009, ηp
2 
=.167, and between the modal auxiliary and the frequency of 
exceptions, F(1, 38) = 12.51, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .248. On the one hand, the interaction between 
the modal auxiliary and frequency of exceptions shows that the frequency of exceptions had a 
strong effect on factual legal conditionals, but did not have any effect on deontic legal 
conditionals: whereas rejection ratings were higher for factual conditionals with high 
frequency of exceptions (M = 2.34; SD = 1.43) than for those with low (M = 1.16; SD = 0.60), 
t(19) = 4.91, p < .001, d = .81, rejection ratings for deontic conditionals with high (M = 1.13; 
SD = 1.05) and low frequency of exceptions (M = 0.99; SD = 0.83) did not differ, t(19) = 
0.49, p = .428, d = 0.14 (Bonferroni adjusted alpha level: α = .025). On the other hand, the 
interaction between modal auxiliary and rule acceptance shows that the effect of rule 
acceptance on rejection ratings was higher for deontic legal conditionals than for factual legal 
conditionals: although rejection ratings for conditionals with low rule acceptance were always 
higher than rejection ratings for conditionals with high rule acceptance, this effect was higher 
for deontic (M = 1.88; SD = 1.48 vs. M = 0.24; SD = 0.43; respectively), t(19) = 5.58, p < 
.001, d = 1.24, than for factual conditionals (M = 2.09; SD = 1.13 vs. M = 1.41; SD = 0.95; 
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respectively), t(19) = 3.58, p = .002, d = 0.64 (Bonferroni adjusted alpha level: α = .025). All 
other effects were not significant (all F ≤ 1.6, p ≥ .21). 
The ANOVA for the MT inferences did not show any significant effects at all (all F ≤ 
1.60, p ≥ .214). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Rejection ratings (0 - 6) for Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens inferences for 
deontic and factual legal conditionals in Experiment 6. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
5.1.2.2. Generation Task 
 
Two raters counted independently the amount of exceptions generated by participants and 
also the quality of each exception (ρ = .98 for the amount of exceptions in general, ρ = .98 for 
amount of factual, and ρ = .92 for the amount of deontic exceptions). Exceptions describing 
cases of malpractice (e.g., not being caught, not being accused, influences, etc.) were counted 
as factual exceptions. Exceptions describing cases were an offender should not be punished as 
a matter of principle (e.g., lack of criminal liability) were counted as deontic exceptions. The 
amount of exceptions generated was analyzed within a 2 (modal: should vs. will) x 2 (rule 
acceptance: high vs. low) x 2 (frequency of exceptions: high vs. low) ANOVA. Only a main 
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effect for the modal auxiliary, F(1, 38) = 4.55, p = .04; ηp
2 
= .107, and a main effect of the 
amount of exceptions was found, F(1, 38) = 5.25, p = .028; ηp
2 
= .121. Participants in the 
factual condition generated more exceptions than participants in the deontic condition (M = 
2.53; SD = 1.28 vs. M = 1.83; SD = 0.69, respectively). Despite not being a big difference 
descriptively, participants also generated more exceptions for offences classified as having a 
low frequency of exceptions than for offences classified as having high frequency of 
exceptions (M = 2.29; SD = 1.16 vs. M = 2.06; SD = 1.08, respectively). In addition, the 
quality of exceptions differed depending on whether the participant was confronted with 
deontic or factual legal conditionals: while participants in the factual condition generated in 
53% of the cases factual exceptions, participants in the deontic condition did this only in 20% 
of the cases. Along the same lines, deontic exceptions were more frequent in the deontic 
condition than in the factual condition (77% vs. 43%, respectively).  
 
5.1.2.3. Moral Outrage 
 
The moral outrage ratings given to offences in the inference task were correlated with the 
corresponding rule acceptance ratings for the same offences from the preliminary study. As 
expected, the mean moral outrage ratings correlated with the mean rule acceptance ratings. 
This was the case for both, the moral outrage ratings given in the “should”, condition, r = .95, 
p < .001, and the ones in the “will” condition, r = .97, p < .001. The more the participants 
accept a legal rule, the more moral outrage they feel when this rule is broken.  
 
 
5.1.3. Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 6 show that the modal auxiliary used in legal conditionals affects 
MP inferences. If the conditional is phrased with the modal auxiliary “should”, participants 
seem to rely on their own sense of justice: whereas for conditionals about severe offences 
participants show very low rejection ratings (i.e., favoring that the offender should be 
punished), for conditionals about mild offences - which they do not accept - they show higher 
rejection ratings (i.e., favoring that the offender should not be punished). This supports the 
Hypothesis 1 and replicates the findings of Experiments 1-5. However, the effect is attenuated 
for conditionals phrased with the modal “will”. For factual conditionals also the frequency of 
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exceptions matters. Whereas for conditionals with a low frequency of exceptions participants 
show small rejection ratings (i.e., favoring that the offender will be punished), for conditionals 
with a high frequency of exceptions they show higher rejection ratings (i.e., favoring that the 
offender will not be punished). Since this was the case for both severe and mild offences, the 
modal “will” seems to make people think that factual information, and not deontic principles, 
are asked for. This is in accordance to Hypothesis 2 and is corroborated by the generation 
task, where factual exceptions were much more present in the factual condition than in the 
deontic one. Yet, an unexpected result was that the conclusions drawn from factual 
conditionals were not only influenced by the frequency of exceptions, but also by the 
participants’ acceptance of the rule. One probable explanation is that participants still 
followed their own sense of justice to some extent. This is in accordance with the results of 
Experiment 2, where laypeople were still affected by their feelings of moral outrage even 
though instructed to decide like a real judge.  
Contrary to the results for MP inferences, those for MT were not so straightforward. I 
expected to find the same pattern of results as for MP inferences, but this was not the case. 
None of the factors influenced the conclusions selected for MT inferences. This is not the first 
time MT produces unexpected results (e.g., De Neys et al., 2003a; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1991; Singmann et al., 2014). A common explanation is that the negation in the MT inference 
makes the task more difficult (De Neys et al., 2003a; see Chapter 1 for further explanations). 
In this thesis, this higher difficulty might have led to more logical errors, which might have 
covered the effects of modals, exceptions, and rule acceptance. In fact, participants showed 
higher rejection ratings for MT (M = 2.48; SD = 1.45) than for MP inferences (M = 1.40; SD 
= 0.97), t(39) = 4.54, p < .001, d = 0.86.  
An alternative explanation is that the higher rejection ratings for MT inferences 
occurred because participants were in some way led to assume that p was the case although q 
was not. According to Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) principle of relevance, people make 
inferences about the messages they get assuming that all the information is relevant to them. 
In this way, the information given in MT inferences of somebody being not punished (i.e., ¬q) 
is only relevant if there are reasons to assume that the person could have been punished, e.g., 
because the person actually committed the offence. So, if people think that someone actually 
committed an offence, but find out that the person is not punished, then they should implicitly 
consider that some exception occurred. That is, the utterance denying that person is punished 
is only relevant if there are reasons for thinking that the offender could be punished but some 
exception occurred (e.g., not being caught, having some legal justifications).  
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The idea that the negation in MT inferences suggests that the antecedent is actually 
true, but that some exception happened was already tested empirically by Bonnefon and 
Villejoubert (2007; see also Oaksford and Chater, 2013). To test if this explanation also 
applies for legal conditionals I conducted an online study where participants (N = 112) were 
confronted with negated consequents of legal conditionals (e.g., Sven is not punished for 
bodily injury) and were asked to write down why somebody would utter this sentence. While 
in only 7% of the cases participants said that ¬q was uttered because of ¬p, in 37% of the 
cases they said ¬q was uttered because p happened but some exception occurred. In the 
remaining cases participants did not provide any concrete reasons for this utterance, but for 
instance, described situations when such sentence could be uttered leaving unclear whether 
they thought p was the case or not (e.g., “after a trial”). Notwithstanding these results, it is 
still premature to conclude that conversational implicatures are responsible for the high 
rejection ratings of MT inferences. Further studies are necessary, especially to understand 
why frequencies of exceptions did not affect MT inferences.  
A last point I want to make is that participants generated slightly more exceptions in 
the generation task for conditionals with a low frequency of exceptions compared with 
conditionals with a high frequency of exceptions. Although testing the relationship between 
frequency and amount of exceptions was not a primary aim of this experiment, this mismatch 
between amount and frequency of exceptions is not surprising. As explained in Chapter 1, 
already Geiger and Oberauer (2007) showed that, although often correlated, the amount of 
exceptions and the frequency of exceptions do not always lead to the same effects (cf. 
Fernbach & Erb, 2013). There may be exceptions which happen often (e.g., self-defence or 
necessity) and exceptions which happen less often (e.g., being coerced by threats to life and 
physical integrity). It is important to keep this difference in mind especially when dealing 
with legal conditionals. In legal reasoning, when asking whether an offender will be punished 
or not, it is necessary to know how often exceptions occur and not how many different 
exceptions there may exist. In other words, it is important how often an offence will be 
punished, and not how many different causes may exist in principle for not punishing 
somebody. As Fernbach and Erb (2013) proposed, the power of the antecedent in predicting 
the consequent does not only depend on the amount of exceptions, but also on how relevant 
they are, and in this way - maybe - also on how often they occur. If further studies corroborate 
the results found in this paper, then in a next step one could let participants assign 
probabilities to the premises and conclusions of legal conditionals, and test in how far 
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probabilistic accounts can explain this thesis’ results (cf. Evans, Thompson, & Over, 2015; 
Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Singmann et al., 2014). 
 
 
 
5.2. Experiment 7: The Modal Auxiliary and Closeness with the 
Offender 
 
In Experiment 6 it was shown that people follow their own sense of justice when reasoning 
with deontic legal conditionals, but that this can be attenuated by changing the modal 
auxiliary into will. The aim of Experiment 7 was to test one further implication of using 
different modals in legal reasoning. If “should” prompts following one’s own deontic 
preferences and “will” prompts using one’s knowledge about what happens in the real world, 
then it should be possible to introduce experimental manipulations that affect only inferences 
for either deontic or factual legal conditionals. Along these lines, in Experiment 7 the 
offenders were presented as people we love (i.e., family members or best friends). People are 
usually more forgiving and caring with those they are close with and whom they like (e.g., 
Fehr, Gelfand, & Nag, 2010; McCullough et al. 1998; Sprecher & Fehr, 2005), and do not 
want them to be hurt or in danger (e.g., Buckley, Chapman, Sheehan, & Cunningham, 2012; 
see also Swann et al., 2014). Consequently presenting the offender as someone close should 
affect deontic legal conditionals by making people less strict than when deciding about a 
random person (as they did in Experiment 6). However, it should not affect factual 
conditionals, because the relationship one has with an offender does not influence what 
actually happens in the real world (e.g., events involving police, judges, penal code, etc.). 
 
Hypothesis 1: When the legal conditional is phrased deontically with the modal should, then 
framing the offender as a close or beloved person should affect inferences, making 
conclusions less punitive.  
 
Hypothesis 2: When the legal conditional is phrased factually with the modal will, then 
framing the offender as a close or beloved person should not affect inferences. Inferences 
should depend on the frequency of exceptions.  
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5.2.1. Methods 
 
5.2.1.1. Participants 
 
42 students participated in the experiment. All participants with academic knowledge about 
law or formal logic were excluded. The final sample thus consisted of 40 participants (20 
female). Half of the participants received deontic legal conditionals, the other half factual 
legal conditionals. 
 
5.2.1.2. Material, Design, and Procedure 
 
Experiment 7 was constructed as Experiment 6, with the only difference that the offender in 
the second premise was specified as being one’s mother, father, best friend (either female – in 
German: “beste Freundin”, or male – in German: “bester Freund”). Which offence was paired 
with which relative was selected randomly for MP and MT inferences. It was made sure that 
family members and friends are distributed uniformly among all offence categories. As an 
illustration: 
 
If a person kills another human, then the person should/will be punished for manslaughter. 
Your father killed another human.  
Should/Will your father be punished for manslaughter? 
 
As in Experiment 6, participants had to solve in addition to the inference task a 
generation task and a moral outrage task. The offenders in these supplementary tasks were 
also family members and friends.  
 
 
5.2.2. Results 
 
5.2.2.1. Inference Task 
 
The conclusion ratings were transformed as in Experiment 6 into rejection ratings. The 
rejection ratings for MP and MT inferences can be found in Figure 8. These were analyzed in 
CHAPTER 5: LINGUISTIC FACTORS IN LEGAL CONDITIONAL REASONING 
 124 
a 2 (modal: should vs. will) x 2 (rule acceptance: high vs. low) x 2 (frequency of exceptions: 
high vs. low) x 2 (inference: MP vs. MT) ANOVA. The ANOVA showed main effects of rule 
acceptance, F(1,38) = 20.93, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .355, and of frequency of exceptions, F(1,38) = 
32.93, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .464, but also interactions between inference and rule acceptance, 
F(1,38) = 4.74, p = .036, ηp
2 
= .111, between inference, rule acceptance and modal, F(1,38) = 
11.51, p = .002, ηp
2 
= .232, and between inference, rule acceptance, and frequency of 
exceptions, F(1,38) = 8.00, p = .007, ηp
2 
= .174. Because of these interactions I continued 
analyzing the data in two separate 2 (modal: should vs. will) x 2 (rule acceptance: high vs. 
low) x 2 (frequency of exceptions: high vs. low) ANOVAs for MP and MT inferences.   
For MP inferences the ANOVA revealed a main effect of rule acceptance, F(1, 38) = 
22.95, p <. 001, ηp
2 
= .373, a main effect of frequency of exceptions, F(1, 38) = 9.99, p = .003, 
ηp
2 
= .208, and an interaction between rule acceptance and modal auxiliary, F(1, 38)=7.25, p = 
.01, ηp
2 
=.160. The interaction between modal auxiliary and rule acceptance shows that rule 
acceptance affected deontic legal conditionals, but not factual legal conditionals: whereas 
rejection ratings for deontic conditionals were higher for low (M = 2.44; SD = 1.39) than for 
high acceptance rules (M = 1.04; SD = 0.95), t(19) = 4.25, p < .001, d = 1.16, for factual 
conditionals this effect did not reach the Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .025, t(19) = 2.13, 
p = .046, d = 0.44 (M = 1.96; SD = 0.95 vs. M = 1.58; SD = 0.79; respectively). In fact, the 
rejection ratings found for deontic legal conditionals were generally higher than the 
corresponding ones from Experiment 6, showing that participants tended to punish less when 
offenders are close relatives. This observation was confirmed by comparing the mean 
rejection rating of deontic MP inferences in Experiment 7 (M = 1.74; SD = .93) with that in 
Experiment 6 (M = 1.06; SD = .87), t(38)=2.39, p = .022, d = 0.76. All other effects, including 
the interaction between modal auxiliary and frequency of exceptions, were not significant (all 
Fs ≤ 1.51, ps ≥ .227).  
The ANOVA for MT inferences showed a main effect of rule acceptance, F(1, 38) = 
7.827, p = .008, ηp
2 
= .171, a main effect of frequency of exceptions, F(1, 38) = 24.22, p < 
.001, ηp
2 
= .389, and an interaction between both factors, F(1, 38) = 10.632, p = .002, ηp
2 
= 
219. All other effects were not significant (Fs ≤ 1.85, p ≥ .181). The interaction shows that 
frequency of exceptions affected conditionals with highly and little accepted rules differently. 
For highly accepted rules frequency of exceptions did not affect inferences: participants 
showed low rejection ratings for offences with high (M = 1.41; SD = 1.16) and low (M = 1.05; 
SD = 1.47) frequency of exceptions, concluding that if an offender is not punished (not q), 
then this offender probably did not commit an offence (not p), t(39) = 1.49, p = .144, d = 0.27. 
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However, for little accepted rules the frequency of exceptions mattered: if the offence had 
only a low frequency of exceptions, participants showed lower rejection ratings (M = 1.00; SD 
= 1.15) than when the offence had a high frequency of exceptions (M = 2.40; SD = 1.82), 
t(39) = 5.81, p < .001, d = 0.87 (Bonferroni adjusted alpha level: α = .025). For better 
comparisons I plotted the rejection ratings for deontic and factual legal conditionals together 
(since there was no effect of modals) and compared them with the corresponding rejection 
rates for MT in Experiment 6. A 2 (frequency of exceptions: high vs. low) x 2 (rule 
acceptance: high vs. low) x 2 (experiment: 6 vs. 7) ANOVA confirmed the initial analysis: a 
main effect of experiment shows that participants indeed accept MT inferences more when the 
offender is a close relative compared to when the offender is not specified, F(1, 78) = 12.66, p 
= .001, ηp
2 
= .14, and a three-way-interaction between all factors confirms that the interaction 
between frequency of exceptions and rule acceptance is unique for Experiment 2, F(1, 78) = 
6.316, p = .014, ηp
2 
= .075 (all other effects were explained by the three-way interaction or 
were not significant).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Rejection ratings (0 - 6) for Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens inferences for 
deontic and factual legal conditionals in Experiment 7. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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5.2.2.2. Generation Task 
 
Two independent raters coded the amount and quality of exceptions generated (ρ = .99 for the 
amount of exceptions in general, ρ = .96 for amount of factual, and ρ = .92 for the amount of 
deontic exceptions). The amount of exceptions was analyzed within a 2 (modal: should vs. 
will) x 2 (rule acceptance: high vs. low) x 2 (frequency of exceptions: high vs. low) ANOVA. 
Only an interaction between modal auxiliary and rule acceptance was found, F(1, 38) = 9.48, 
p = .004, ηp
2 
= 0.2. Participants in the deontic condition generated slightly more exceptions 
for low (M = 2.03; SD = 0.99) than for high (M = 1.73; SD = 0.88) acceptance rules, while 
participants in the factual condition showed a trend in the opposite direction (M = 1.9; SD = 
0.77; M = 2.29; SD = 1.10; respectively). However, pairwise t-tests did not reach the 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of α = .025 (t(19) = 2.40, p = .027, d = 0.32 and t(19) = 2.09, 
p = .050, d = 0.38; respectively). Yet, as in Experiment 6, participants in the factual condition 
generated in 65% of the cases factual exceptions and only in 33% of the cases deontic 
exceptions. For participants in the deontic condition it was the other way around (75% deontic 
exceptions and 22% factual exceptions).  
 
5.2.2.3. Moral Outrage 
 
Moral outrage ratings given to offences in the inference task correlated with the 
corresponding rule acceptance ratings for the same offences from the preliminary study (r = 
.91, p = .002 for the correlation between the moral outrage ratings given in the “should”, 
condition, and r = .93, p = .001 for the ones in the “will” condition).  
 
 
5.2.3. Discussion 
 
The results once more show that the modal auxiliary affects the conclusions drawn from legal 
conditionals. For MP inferences, when asked whether an offender should be punished or not, 
people generally decide that severe offences should be punished and minor offences not. 
However, this effect is attenuated when the modal auxiliary is changed to “will”. In addition, 
also the relationship with the offender affects the impact of rule acceptance on deontic 
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punishment decisions. People are less severe when the offender is a close relative, probably 
because they do not want that somebody they like to be punished.  
When planning Experiment 7 it was thought that describing offenders as close people 
should only affect inferences for deontic legal conditionals, but not for factual legal 
conditionals. Yet, the present results show that the relationship with the offender also 
influenced inferences for factual legal conditionals. As shown in Figure 8, different to the 
results found in Experiment 6, the frequency of exceptions only affected factual legal 
conditionals with highly accepted rules. When the conditional contained a little accepted rule, 
participants did not differentiate between offences with high or low frequency of exceptions. 
On the contrary, they also decided that for offences with a low frequency of exceptions the 
offender will not be punished. Although unexpected, this result can be explained if it is 
considered that frequency of exceptions was calculated in the preliminary study of 
Experiment 6 by asking participants about the frequency of exceptions for an unspecified 
person (“A person kills another human, but the person is not punished for manslaughter. In 
how many of 100 cases do you think this is the case?”). It is possible that when participants 
are told that it was a close relative who committed the offence – and it is a mild and therefore 
understandable offence – they calculate the probability of being punished differently, 
assuming that the relative’s offence will be one of the few exceptional cases were no 
punishment follows. As Fernbach and Erb (2013) postulated, the power of an antecedent in 
predicting the consequent depends on the context. This could also explain why in the 
generation task of Experiment 7 the mismatch between frequency of exceptions and amount 
of exceptions found in Experiment 6 could not be replicated. Given that the frequency of 
exceptions estimations were calculated in the preliminary study by asking about an 
unspecified person, and the generation task asked to generate exceptions for one specific close 
person (e.g., Your best friend killed another person but should/ will not be punished for that. 
Why?), it could be possible that this mismatch covered any advantage of frequency over 
amount of exceptions.  
Contrary to Experiment 6, participants in Experiment 7 only seldom rejected MT 
inferences, suggesting that when the offender is someone close, the negated consequent stated 
in MT inferences does not suggest the existence of exceptions. This result can be explained by 
remarking that people normally do not believe that beloved people commit regrettable actions. 
Because of this, when people hear that a beloved person is not punished, they do not conclude 
that he or she committed an offence and that some exception happened. Instead, they simply 
conclude that he or she did not commit the offence. Only if the offence is mild and people 
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know that a lot of exceptions exist, people can imagine that the offence was committed but 
that an exception occurred (as suggested by the elevated rejection rates for conditionals with 
little accepted rules and high frequency of exceptions). 
 
 
 
5.3. Experiment 8: Quantifier
5
 
 
Another way in which changes in legal conditionals can enhance the consideration of 
defeaters is by suggesting the existence of exceptions through the phrasing of the legal 
conditional. In all experiments so far, legal rules have been presented as conditionals, 
describing the relationship between the offence and the punishment by an if-then relation, for 
example: “If a person kills another human, then the person should be punished for 
manslaughter.” But what happens if instead of these if-then relations, legal rules are phrased 
with quantifiers? Quantifiers allow statements about the amount or quantity of objects in the 
domain of discourse (Knauff, 2006). They can thus be either universal (i.e., All As are Bs) or 
existential (i.e., Some As are Bs). This peculiarity of quantifiers, that is to describe either 
universal relations or relations which allow exceptions, can be used to manipulate people’s 
consideration of exceptions in legal reasoning. Imagine for instance a legal rule phrased 
universally (e.g., “All persons that kill another human should be punished for manslaughter”) 
and compare it to a rule phrased existentially (e.g., “Some persons that kill another human 
should be punished for manslaughter”). How would you decide when faced with the fact that 
an offence has been committed? As far as I know, all research on the consideration of 
exceptions in defeasible reasoning has been done with conditionals with the classical logical 
connective if-then. However, based on the logical and linguistic implications of universal and 
existential quantifiers, existential quantifiers should trigger the consideration of exceptions. 
Reasoners should defeat more conclusions when the rule is phrased with an existential 
compared to a universal quantifier. In other words, people’s defeasible reasoning should be 
enhanced by using existential quantifiers. As a consequence, reasoners should also take longer 
to reach a conclusion from existential compared to universal rules. When reasoning with 
universal legal rules reasoners can simply answer according to their own sense of justice 
                                                 
5
 Data for this experiment was partially gained during the Bachelor Thesis of Katharina Horn (Horn, 2014), 
which I supervised. 
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guided by feelings of moral outrage. However, when people reason from existential rules, 
then the exceptions such a rule implies might conflict with one’s own sense of justice, 
needing more time to draw a conclusion and making people less certain about their 
conclusions – at least for highly morally outraging offences.  
 
 
Hypothesis 1: When legal rules are phrased as universal rules, then reasoners make more 
punishment decisions than when the rule is phrased as an existential rule. 
 
Hypothesis 2: When legal rules are phrased as existential rules, then reasoners take longer to 
draw conclusions than when the rule is phrased as a universal rule – at least for highly morally 
outraging offences. 
 
Hypothesis 3: When legal rules are phrased as existential rules, then reasoners are less certain 
about their conclusions than when the rule is phrased as a universal rule – at least for highly 
morally outraging offences. 
 
 
5.3.1. Methods 
 
5.3.1.1. Participants  
 
43 participants took part in the experiment. Two participants had to be excluded because of 
technical problems and another one because the participant afterwards reported to study law. 
The remaining 40 participants were on average 23.08 years old (SD = 3.24). 
 
5.3.1.2. Materials and Design  
 
For Experiment 8 I selected from a pilot study (N = 87 and N = 82) 6 high and 6 low morally 
outraging offences. These offences were embedded into quantified legal rules by either adding 
an “All” or a “Some” in the beginning of each statement (for an illustration see Table 17).  
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Table 17  
Rephrasing high and low morally outraging legal rules as universal or existential rules in 
Experiment 8 
Rule 
Moral Outrage of Offence 
High Low 
Legal Rule Whoever kills a human being, 
without being a murderer, is 
punished for manslaughter with 
imprisonment for not less than five 
years 
Whoever organizes without 
governmental permission a game of 
chance or provides the facilities for 
this, is punished with imprisonment 
up to two years or with fine.  
Universal All persons that kill another human 
should be punished for 
manslaughter. 
All persons that organize a game of 
chance without governmental 
permission should be punished for 
unauthorized organization of games 
of chance. 
Existential Some people that kill another 
human should be punished for 
manslaughter.  
Some persons that organize a game 
of chance without governmental 
permission should be punished for 
unauthorized organization of games 
of chance. 
 
 
The kind of quantifier was varied between individuals (n = 19 got the rules with universal, 
and n = 21 with existential quantifiers) and each quantified rule was presented twice, once as 
an MP and once as an MT inference. Examples are given in Table 18. After each inference, 
participants were told to rate their certainty on a 3-point-Likert scale (uncertain – neutral – 
certain). In total, participants were confronted with 24 problems. Experiment 8 thus followed 
a 2 (moral outrage: high vs. low) x 2 (inference: MP vs. MT) x 2 (quantifier: universal vs. 
existential) mixed design. 
  
CHAPTER 5: LINGUISTIC FACTORS IN LEGAL CONDITIONAL REASONING 
 131 
Table 18 
Structure of the problems used in Experiment 8 illustrated by the legal conditional of 
manslaughter. R=Conditional rule; F=Fact; C=Conclusion. 
 Modus Ponens Modus Tollens 
All R: 
 
 
F:  
 
C: 
 
All persons that kill another human 
should be punished for 
manslaughter  
A person kills another human. 
 
Should the person be punished for 
manslaughter? 
R:  
 
 
F: 
 
C:  
All persons that kill another human 
should be punished for 
manslaughter  
A person is not punished for 
manslaughter.  
Did this person kill another human? 
Some R: 
 
 
F:  
 
C: 
Some persons that kill another 
human should be punished for 
manslaughter. 
A person kills another human. 
 
Should the person be punished for 
manslaughter? 
R: 
 
 
F: 
 
C: 
 
Some persons that kill another 
human should be punished for 
manslaughter. 
A person is not punished for 
manslaughter 
Did this person kill another human? 
 
 
5.3.1.2. Procedure  
 
The experiment was programed in Superlab 4.5 from Cedrus Cooperation. Participants were 
tested individually. In the instructions participants were told that they will be confronted with 
statements describing legal cases, including some general rule about the offence and that they 
have to decide for each case whether they would apply the initial legal rule or not. Each 
statement (the quantified legal rule, fact, and conclusion) was presented on a separate screen. 
Participants could switch to the next screen by pressing the space bar. They gave their answer 
about the conclusion – which was written in red font – by either pressing a “Y” (yes) or “N” 
(no) key on the keyboard. The certainty ratings were given by pressing one of three keys from 
the numerical pad. Dependent variables were participants’ conclusions, the decision times, 
and the certainty ratings. Participants were told to answer intuitively and that right or wrong 
answers do not exist. The 24 inference problems were presented in a random order after a 
short practice trial. 
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5.3.2. Results 
 
Three separate 2 (moral outrage: high vs. low) x 2 (inference: MP vs. MT) x 2 (quantifier: 
universal vs. existential) mixed ANOVAs were conducted; one for the conclusions, one for 
decision times (corrected for sentence length as in Experiments 2 and 4), and one for certainty 
ratings. Descriptive statistics are given in Table 19.  
For the analysis of the conclusions, I computed the percentage of logically “incorrect” 
responses per category. That is, for MP inferences percentages of no-punishment conclusions 
were computed, and for MT inferences the percentage of conclusions stating that the offence 
was committed. This measure therefore resembles the “rejection rating” from Experiments 6 
and 7. The ANOVA showed a main effect of moral outrage, F(1, 38) = 28.37, p < .001, ηp
2 
= 
.43, but also an interaction between moral outrage and inference, F(1, 38) = 34.87, p < .001, 
ηp
2 
= .48. For MP inferences, when the offence was of high moral outrage, participants 
selected significantly less often to conclude that the offender should not be punished (M = 
5.83; SD = 10.37) compared to when the offence was of low moral outrage (M = 35.83; SD = 
26.30), t(39) = 7.03, p < .001, d = 1.47. In contrast, for MT inferences moral outrage did not 
affect the participants’ conclusions (M = 18.75; SD = 30.71; M = 16.25; SD = 27.60; for high 
and low moral outrage respectively), t(39) = 0.80, p = .430, d = 0.08. All other effects were 
not significant (F ≤ 2.75, p ≥ .106). 
The ANOVA for decision times showed a main effect of inference, F(1, 38) = 25.82, p 
< .001, ηp
2 
= .41. Participants needed more time to decide for MT inferences (M = 3.95s; SD = 
1.56) than for MP inferences (M = 2.80s; SD = 1.08). Also an interaction between inference 
and moral outrage was found, F(1, 38) = 4.68, p = .037, ηp
2 
= .11. For MP inferences 
participants were descriptively faster when the offence was of high moral outrage (M = 
2596ms; SD = 1155) than of low moral outrage (M = 2993; SD = 1280), but for MT it was the 
other way around (M = 4070; SD = 1489; M = 3821; SD = 2050; respectively). However, both 
post hoc t-tests did not reach the Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .025 (ts ≤ 2.22, p ≥ .033). 
All other effects were not significant (F ≤ 3.31, p ≥ .077). 
The ANOVA for certainty ratings revealed a main effect of moral outrage, F(1, 38) = 
8.48, p = .006, ηp
2 
= .18, a main effect of inference, F(1, 38) = 47.92, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .56, and 
an interaction between moral outrage and offence, F(1, 38) = 35.25, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .48. For 
MP inferences participants were more certain when the rule contained a high moral outrage 
offence (M = 2.87; SD = 0.17) compared to when it contained a low moral outrage offence (M 
CHAPTER 5: LINGUISTIC FACTORS IN LEGAL CONDITIONAL REASONING 
 133 
= 2.50; SD = 0.35), t(39) = 6.08, p < .001, d = 1.34. For MT inferences, however, differences 
in certainty ratings for offences with high and low moral outrage did not reach the Bonferroni 
adjusted alpha level of .025 (M = 2.05; SD = 0.63; M = 2.17; SD = 0.50; respectively), t(39) = 
2.14, p = .039, d = 0.21. All other effects were not significant (F ≤ 2.01, p ≥ .164). 
 
 
Table 19  
Percentage of no-punishment/ offence-committed conclusions (C), decision times in seconds 
(DT), and certainty ratings (CR) for high and low morally outraging universal and existential 
rules for Modus Ponens (MP) and Modus Tollens (MT) inferences in Experiment 8. Standard 
deviations are shown in brackets 
 
Rule 
High Moral Outrage Low Moral Outrage 
MP MT MP MT 
Universal 
C 
DT 
CR 
 
7.89 (11.6) 
2.9 (1.1) 
2.9 (0.2) 
 
15.79 (26.3) 
4.4 (1.6) 
2.1 (0.5) 
 
39.47 (25.6) 
3.2 (0.8) 
2.4 (0.3) 
 
10.53 (17.8) 
4.3 (2.3) 
2.2 (0.3) 
Existential 
C 
DT 
CR 
 
3.97 (9.0) 
2.3 (1.1) 
2.9 (0.2) 
 
21.43 (34.6) 
3.8 (1.4) 
2.0 (0.7) 
 
32.54 (26.3) 
2.8 (1.6) 
2.6 (0.4) 
 
21.43 (33.8) 
3.4 (1.7) 
2.1 (0.6) 
 
 
5.3.3. Discussion 
 
The aim of Experiment 8 was to show that people’s defeasible reasoning can be enhanced 
when legal rules are phrased as existential rules instead of universal rules. However, the 
results do not support my hypotheses. No effects of quantifiers were found, not even in 
decision times or certainty ratings. There are several reasons why the quantifier used in the 
legal rule may not have affected inferences. One reason is that the legal rule was still phrased 
deontically, with the modal auxiliary “should”. It is possible that the effect of the modal 
“should” was stronger than the subtle variation in the quantifier. In other words, it might be 
that reasoners simply ignored the quantifier used in the rule. This maybe happened because 
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the quantifier was varied between subjects. In this experiment I decided to work with a 
between subjects design to avoid artefacts because of demand characteristics. Further studies 
could therefore test if the quantifier is still ignored in within designs. If in within designs 
people do consider the quantifier, then this would show that people know the differences 
between both quantifiers but that they do not care about these differences spontaneously. 
Another explanation related to the previous one is that the manipulation of the 
quantifier only affected the antecedent of the general legal rule, but not the conclusion. The 
question about the conclusion in both – universal and existential – conditions was still the 
same, namely whether the offender should be punished (MP) or whether the offence was 
committed (MT). It is possible that in the moment of deciding which conclusion to draw, 
people only look at this specific question about the conclusion. Which in the case of being 
deontically, asking about what should happen, evokes the reasoners’ own sense of justice as 
showed in Experiments 6 and 7. The way the previous premises were written are ignored or 
forgotten, only their main message (e.g., somebody killed another human and this requires 
punishment) is extracted; especially if the premises are presented one after the other – without 
the possibility to scroll back – as it was the case in this experiment.  
There are of course other explanations for the missing effects in this study, such as that 
the dichotomous answer modality did not differentiate sufficiently (see Markovits, Forgues, & 
Brunet, 2010). It could also be possible that people do not represent the logical differences 
between universal and existential quantifiers mentally, or at least not in a way it could affect 
inferences. Newstead (1989) already showed that reasoners do not understand quantifiers in 
the same way logic does. However, it is important to notice that in this study no logical 
interpretation of quantifiers was necessary. The differences between universal and existential 
quantifiers used in everyday language were thought to be enough to evoke different 
conclusions. The distinction we draw in our everyday life between all and some should have 
evoked or at least made participants aware that some includes exceptions. In fact, it is the 
logical interpretation which actually allows us to use some even if no exceptions exist. In this 
way the explanation of not understanding the meaning of all and some cannot explain the 
results of Experiment 8.  
In sum, varying the kind of quantifier did not moderate the effect of one’s own sense 
of justice on legal reasoning. However, the results of Experiment 8 are still interesting for 
cognitive psychology. The results show that people defeat conclusions also when reasoning 
with quantified legal rules. When quantified legal rules described low morally outrageous 
offences and were framed in MP inferences, participants defeated the conclusion to punish the 
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offender more often than when the offence was of high moral outrage (and were less certain 
in their judgment). Yet, when quantified legal rules were framed in MT inferences, moral 
outrage did not affect conclusions. Moral outrage likely affected MP but not MT inferences 
because only the conclusion of the former activates personal values by asking what should 
happen to an offender. Contrary to MP, the structure of MT inferences is less emotionally 
charged, because MT conclusions only ask whether an offence was committed or not. This is 
in accordance with the findings from Experiments 6 and 7: also Experiment 8 shows how 
important the specific phrasing of the conclusion is. The conclusions people draw depend on 
what is asked for and how it is asked for it.   
 
 
 
5.4. Summary and Implications of Chapter 5 
 
The results from Chapter 5 show the significance of linguistic factors in reasoning. 
Experiments 6 and 7 show that the way a conditional rule is phrased affects which kind of 
information is used for reasoning and which conclusions are drawn. People’s own sense of 
justice is only highly predictive for legal reasoning when the legal conditionals are phrased 
deontically, asking for what should happen to an offender. If instead the legal conditional is 
phrased factually, asking for what will happen to an offender, then reasoners consider 
exceptions and one’s own sense of justices loses importance. It was also expected that the 
universality of a legal rule should affect legal reasoning. However, Experiment 8 showed that 
changing the legal conditional into a universal or existential rule did not affect inferences. 
Probably because changes which only alter the way the legal rule is phrased are not as 
notorious as those which also alter what the conclusion asks for.  
I am not the first to highlight the importance of linguistic factors in the psychology of 
reasoning. For example, Schmeltzer and Hilton (2014) showed that the pragmatic implications 
of the antecedent influence the conclusions participants draw. There are many different kinds 
of conditionals in the literature, e.g., causal conditionals, conditionals describing threats, tips, 
and promises (see Dieussaert et al., 2002) or consequential conditionals describing outcomes 
(Bonnefon & Hilton, 2004), making clear how important it is to track their different 
formulations when making predictions about how people reason with them. The distinction 
between deontic and factual conditionals is especially relevant. As I have shown for legal 
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reasoning, deontic and factual conditionals activate different systems of rules: while the 
former activates the moral system, the latter activates the knowledge about real world. Some 
might argue that our factual conditionals were still deontic in certain way because they still 
represented some kind of rule. I agree with that. However, instead of weakening my 
arguments, this criticism supports the hypothesis about the relevance of modals in reasoning: 
although the content was in both cases somewhat deontic, the different modals used in order 
to express the rule made participants draw different conclusions.   
One last point that needs further investigation are the results for the MT inferences. In 
all three experiments in this Chapter, factors that affected MP inferences did not affect MT 
inferences. For instance, while the preference of pq over p¬q (Experiments 6 & 7) or moral 
outrage (Experiment 8) affected MP inferences (e.g., by enhancing punishment conclusions), 
the endorsement of MT conclusion were not affected by people’s sense of justice. As argued 
in Experiment 8, one main reason is probably that the structure of MT inferences is less 
emotionally charged than the structure of MP inferences. While MP inference ask for what 
should happen (or will happen in Experiments 6 and 7), in MT inferences participants are 
only asked whether an offence was committed or not. They are therefore required to make a 
rather objective analysis of the matters of facts. However, another reason may be the one 
presented in Experiment 6. In Experiment 6 I argued that according to the principle of 
relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1995) the categorical of MT inferences (“The person 
should/will not be punished for offence X”) makes people aware of exceptions. If this 
conversational implicature (see Grice, 1975) of legal MT inferences is correct, then it is 
necessary to 1) re-interpret existing data on MT endorsement, and 2) conduct further studies 
to identify moderators of this effect. According to Experiment 7 a possible moderator could 
be for instance a person’s personal commitment to the conditional. The denial of the 
consequent enhances people’s thought of exceptions only if there are no personal pragmatic 
implications in conflict with it. When people do not want to believe that the antecedent is true 
(here: someone close doing something they dislike), then hearing that the consequent is not 
the case fulfills their expectations making them to conclude that the antecedent is not true. In 
other words, the motivation to conclude that the antecedent is not the case might bring people 
to ignore exceptions and thereby endorse the classically correct conclusion to MT. All in all, 
further studies are necessary to fully understand the role of conversational implicatures on 
reasoning and especially on MT.  
In sum, the results corroborate the complexity of reasoning. Contrary to the 
assumptions of classical logic, the way people interpret and reason with conditionals often 
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depends on its content, on the personal relevance the rule has, as well as on its linguistic 
phrasing. In some cases people may consider their own inner values when drawing 
conclusions, but in other cases factual information about exceptional situations take 
precedence.  
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Chapter 6: The Defeasibility of Negative Emotions in 
Everyday Scenarios  
 
In the experiments presented in the previous Chapters, participants had difficulties 
withdrawing from the conclusion of punishing an offender. Moral outrage theory explains this 
finding by arguing that people experience negative intuitive emotions of moral outrage and a 
desire for punishment when faced with offences. Accordingly, people’s difficulties in 
considering exculpatory circumstances in defeasible reasoning can be also interpreted as a 
difficulty of leaving aside the negative emotions (i.e., moral outrage) evoked by the offences. 
The aim of this Chapter is to investigate whether this difficulty in withdrawing negative 
emotions is something particular for the legal domain, or whether it also exists in everyday 
situations. In our daily life we often have to make inferences about the consequences of 
emotionally charged situations. For instance, we might know that “If I fail an exam, then I am 
sad”. In the case we actually fail an exam we can thus conclude that we will be sad. Similar to 
the punishment conclusions in legal reasoning, this conclusion of being sad is the result of a 
conditional framing a situation which one considers to be negative. Now, if withdrawing 
conclusions evoked by negative emotions is not particular to legal reasoning but also exists 
for everyday situations, then it should also be difficult to withdraw negatively-charged 
conclusions in everyday situations. In the example above this implicates that people should 
have difficulties in withdrawing the conclusion of being sad after having failed in an exam. 
This difficulty in defeating negatively-charged conclusions should bring participants to still 
conclude being sad even when defeaters (e.g., positively-charged information, such as going 
to the cinema with a friend) are available. 
In the following I present two experiments on the defeasibility of negative emotions in 
everyday scenarios. The first experiment investigates the withdrawal of conclusions from 
highly negative situations (analogous to the case of high moral outrage) and the second the 
withdrawal of conclusions from less negative situations (analogous to the case of low moral 
outrage).  
Chapter 6: The Defeasibility of Negative Emotions in Everyday 
Scenarios 
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6.1. Experiment 9: Defeating Strong Negative Emotions 
 
Experiment 9 explored the role of strong negative emotions in defeasible reasoning. It was 
investigated whether people’s reluctance to defeat conclusions from legal conditionals 
describing strongly negative-charged situations – such as high moral outrage offences – also 
has a correspondence in everyday scenarios. In the previous experiments, very severe 
offences such as manslaughter or maltreatment of wards were linked to negative emotions like 
moral outrage. However, strong negative emotions can also be evoked in everyday situations, 
as for example in the case of loss of a beloved person. Consider for instance the following 
inference problem: 
If my mother dies, then I am sad. 
My mother dies. 
I get my dream job.  
Am I sad? 
How would you answer? Just like legal conditionals described an offence in the antecedent 
and the corresponding punishment in the consequent, also this conditional describes a 
negatively-charged situation in the antecedent, and the corresponding emotion in the 
consequent. Further, just like the inference tasks on legal reasoning contained information 
about defeaters (i.e., exculpatory circumstances), this inference problem also contains a 
defeater: a positively-charged situation, which evokes emotions contrary to those triggered by 
the situation in the antecedent. Therefore, if the findings from legal reasoning have a 
correspondence in everyday situations, then reasoners should feel attracted to draw MP 
inferences and conclude that one is sad after a negative situation; even in light of defeaters. 
Evidence in this direction can be found in the psychological literature on attitudes and 
emotions. Several researchers have shown the existence of a so-called negativity bias (see 
Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). People “respond more 
strongly to very negative stimuli than to matched positive stimuli” (Norris, Larsen, Crawford, 
& Cacioppo, 2011, p. 100; see also Ito, Cacioppo, & Lang, 1998). As Vaish, Grossmann, and 
Woodward (2008) review, in comparison to positive information, negative information is 
observed longer (e.g., Fiske, 1980), weighted more heavily when making decisions and 
evaluations (e.g., Atthowe 1960; Kahneman & Tversky, 1983; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972), 
and considered more when making inferences about other people’s traits (e.g., Aloise, 1993; 
Skowronski & Carlston, 1989; Wyer & Hinckle, 1976; for reviews on the negativity bias see 
CHAPTER 6: THE DEFEASIBILITY OF NEGATIVE EMOTIONS IN EVERYDAY SCENARIOS 
 140 
Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Vaish et al., 2008). Negative information is therefore more 
informative than positive information (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Vaish et al., 2008). 
In Experiment 9 the amount of defeated conclusions drawn from conditionals 
describing negatively-charged situations is compared with the amount of conclusions drawn 
from conditionals describing positively-charged situations. For instance: 
If I get my dream job, then I am happy. 
I get my dream job. 
My mother dies.  
Am I happy? 
This comparison serves on the one hand as a control condition to show that negative emotions 
are indeed difficult to defeat. On the other hand it also provides a measure of how difficult it 
is to defeat negatively-charged conclusions compared to positively-charged ones.  
 
 
Hypothesis: People defeat conclusions drawn from strongly negatively-charged conditionals 
less often than conclusions drawn from strongly positively-charged conditionals 
 
 
6.1.1. Methods 
 
6.1.1.1. Participants  
 
30 participants (15 female) took part in the experiment. All but one participant were students. 
The mean age was M = 24.83 years (SD = 3.82). 
 
6.1.1.2. Material and Design  
 
36 conditional inference problems were constructed, 24 of them with additional information 
like the problems in the introduction of this experiment (i.e., experimental items), and the 
remaining 12 problems without any additional information (i.e., control items; for a similar 
design see Hilton et al., 1990). The problems therefore consisted of 1) an initial conditional 
rule, 2) the fact that the antecedent of this rule is given, 3) an additional information (omitted 
for control items), and 4) the question about the conclusion. I experimentally varied the 
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valence of the initial conditional rule and the valence of the additional information by using 
situations rated as positive or negative by N = 255 participants in an online preliminary study 
via SoSci Survey (Leiner, 2014). In this preliminary study participants had to rate how they 
feel about n = 31 positive and n = 31 negative situations on a 7-point-Likert scale (1= very 
sad, 7= very happy). For the experiment the six most positive (M = 6.40; SD = 0.16) and the 
six most negative (M = 1.50; SD = 0.26) situations were selected and brought into a 
conditional form (i.e., “If [the situation], then I am sad/happy.”). Each conditional rule was 
presented three times, once with additional information of the same valence, once with 
additional information of the opposite valance, and once without any additional information. 
As additional information I used the same six positive and six negative situations that were 
used to create the conditionals but without framing them into a conditional form. Hereby, I 
alternated which situation was presented as the conditional rule and which information was 
presented as the additional information. As illustrated in the two examples in the introduction 
of this experiment, in half of the cases a specific situation A was phrased as the conditional 
rule, together with situation B as the additional information. In the other half of the cases, 
however, it was the other way around: the situation B was now presented as the conditional 
rule, and situation A as the additional information. It was made sure that the pairs of positive 
and negative situations used in one inference problem were matched in strength, i.e., ratings 
for positive and negative situations were equally distant from the neutral scale midpoint. In a 
second step, in order to guarantee that the pairs of situations in each inference problem were 
not only matched in the strength of their emotions, but also in their associative strength, a 
second validation study was conducted. Via SoSci Survey (Leiner, 2014) I presented each of 
the 12 situations (and 12 filler situations) in a conditional form paired once with the positive 
and once with the negative consequent (e.g., "If your mother dies, are you then sad?"). 
Participants (N = 67) had to answer on a seven point Likert scale ranging from 1 = Definitely 
not to 7 = Definitely yes. Results corroborated that positive situations were as strongly 
associated to the "I am happy" consequents (M = 6.67; SD = 0.40) as were the negative 
situations to the "I am sad" consequents (M = 6.56; SD = 0.47), t(66) = 1.63, p = .109, d = 
0.23). 
The experiment followed a 2 (Valence of the conditional: positive vs. negative) x 3 
(Valence of the additional information: positive vs. negative vs. none) within subjects design.  
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6.1.1.3. Procedure  
 
The experiment was conducted with Cedrus SuperLab © 4.5 on a desktop computer. 
Participants were tested individually and instructed to answer spontaneously to the question 
about the conclusion in the end of each problem. They were told that there exists no right or 
wrong answer. Participants gave their answers by either pressing a “Y” (yes) or a “N” (no) 
key on the keyboard. The order of these keys was counterbalanced. The spacebar was used to 
switch from one premise to the next one. The question at the conclusion was written in red, 
the premises in black. After each problem participants had the possibility to take a break. 
Before starting the experiment participants completed two practice problems. 
 
 
6.1.2. Results 
 
I computed the amount of defeated conclusions in percent for each category of problems 
separately. One participant had to be excluded from the computations because he or she 
deviated over 4 SD from the mean in two of the four experimental conditions with additional 
information.  
 
6.1.2.1. Control Problems with no Additional Information  
 
An important prerequisite for the experiment was that when no additional information is 
presented, participants make the logically valid conclusion. Therefore, it was analyzed how 
often participants defeated the logically valid conclusion of control problems. Without any 
additional information participants almost never defeated the conclusion suggested by the 
conditional rule, neither for positively (M = 0.0%; SD = 0.0) nor for negatively (M = 3.45%, 
SD = 11.25) charged conditionals. In fact, a t-test for repeated measures shows that the 
participants’ acceptance of positively-charged and negatively-charged conclusions did not 
differ from each other, t(28) = 1.65, p = .110, d = 0.43. 
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6.1.2.2. Problems with Additional Positive or Negative Information  
 
To test people’s defeasible reasoning from emotionally-charged conditionals, I conducted a 2 
(Valence of the conditional: positive vs. negative) x 2 (Valence of the additional information: 
positive vs. negative) ANOVA on the percentages of defeated conclusions of the experimental 
problems. Descriptive results can be found in Figure 9. As expected, the ANOVA showed a 
main effect for the valence of the conditional, F(1, 28) = 20.64, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .424, a main 
effect for the valence of the additional information, F(1, 28) = 41.90, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .599, and 
an interaction between both factors, F(1, 28) = 204.79, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .880. This interaction 
was analyzed with post-hoc t-tests and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .025. As can be 
seen in Figure 9, conclusions from positively-charged conditionals were defeated by negative 
additional information (M = 74.71%; SD = 28.04) more often than were conclusions from 
negatively-charged conditionals by positive additional information (M = 33.33%; SD = 
27.46), t(28) = 5.64, p < .001, d = 1.49. When the conditional rule was paired with additional 
information of the same valence, participants did not differ in the percentage of defeated 
conclusions (Mneg-neg = 4.02%; SD = 11.49; Mpos-pos = 0.57%; SD = 3.09), t(28) = 1.54, p = 
.136, d = 0.42. 
 
 
Figure 9. Percentage of defeated conclusions as a function of the valence of the conditional 
rule and additional information in Experiment 9. Error bars show standard errors.   
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6.1.3. Discussion 
 
The results support my hypothesis and show that it is more difficult to withdraw conclusions 
drawn from negatively-charged conditionals than conclusions from positively-charged 
conditionals. This finding is in accordance with people’s reluctance to defeat conclusions in 
legal reasoning. However, people’s reluctance to defeat conclusions in legal reasoning was 
limited to highly morally outraging offences. When offences were only of low moral outrage, 
then people did defeat conclusions. In order to test whether the findings from legal reasoning 
indeed have a correspondence in everyday situations it is therefore necessary to test if 
people’s defeasible reasoning from negatively-charged conditionals is enhanced when these 
emotions are only mild in strength. This will be tested in Experiment 10.  
 
 
 
6.2. Experiment 10: Defeating Mild Negative Emotions 
 
In Experiment 9 conditionals were constructed that described strongly negative situations and 
their corresponding emotion. As for legal reasoning, reasoners had difficulties to defeat 
conclusions from such negatively-charged conditionals. Experiment 10 aims to test whether 
people’s reluctance to withdraw conclusions from negatively-charged conditionals persists 
when the situations described in the conditionals are only mildly negative. According to the 
findings in legal reasoning – where in cases of low moral outrage people did consider 
exculpatory evidence – conclusions from conditionals describing situations that evoke only 
mild negative emotions should be defeated to a higher extent than conclusions from strongly 
negative conditionals. As in Experiment 9, people’s defeasible reasoning from negative 
emotions is tested by comparing the amount of defeated conclusions drawn from negatively-
charged conditionals with the amount of defeated conclusions drawn from positively-charged 
conditionals.  
 
Hypothesis: People defeat conclusions from weakly negatively-charged conditionals more 
often than conclusions drawn from strongly negatively-charged conditionals 
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6.2.1. Methods 
 
6.2.1.1. Participants 
 
31 participants took part in the experiment. One participant did not understand the task and 
was removed from the analysis. The final sample consisted thus of 30 participants (15 
female). All but one participant were students. Their mean age was 23.90 years (SD = 2.98). 
 
6.2.1.2. Material, Design, and Procedure 
 
The problems used in Experiment 10 followed the same structure as the problems used in 
Experiment 9. Hence, they consisted of 1) a conditional rule, 2) a fact, 3) additional 
information (omitted for control problems), and 4) the question about the conclusion. The 
valence of the conditional and the additional information was varied exactly as in Experiment 
9. However, contrary to Experiment 9, this time I did not choose highly negative and positive 
situations, but selected only situations of mild positive (e.g., “I see something beautiful on 
offer”) and mild negative (e.g., “My favorite band splits”) strength. These mild positive and 
mild negative situations were gained with the help of two online preliminary studies on SoSci 
Survey (Leiner, 2014). In these online studies N = 259 and N = 245 participants had to rate 
how they feel about different positive and negative situations on a 7-point-Likert scale (1= 
very sad, 7= very happy). In total n = 115 positive and n = 113 negative situations were 
created, yet each participant was only confronted with a subset of them (28-31 positive and 
28-31 negative situations). For the experiment six positive and six negative situations with 
ratings around the scales mean of 4 were selected. The mean rating of the mild positive 
situations was M = 4.91 (SD = 0.15) and the mean rating for the mild negative situation was 
M = 3.04 (SD = 0.12). Again it was made sure that each pair of situations was matched in 
emotional strength. As in Experiment 9 a second validation study was conducted to test for 
associative strength (N = 43). The procedure was the same as in Experiment 9. Results 
corroborated that positive situations were as strongly associated to the "I am happy" (M = 
5.03; SD = 0.93) consequents as were the negative situations to the "I am sad" consequents (M 
= 4.87; SD = 0.84), t(42) = 1.47, p = .149, d = 0.18).  
The design and procedure was the same as in Experiment 9. 
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6.2.2. Results 
 
As in Experiment 9, I computed the amount of defeated conclusions in percent for each 
category of items separately.  
 
6.2.2.1. Control Problems with no Additional Information 
 
Participants only seldom defeated the conclusion from problems without additional 
information (Mpos = 7.22%, SDpos = 14.31, and Mneg = 18.33%, SDneg = 22.47). Nonetheless, 
participants’ acceptance of positively-charged and negatively-charged conclusions differed 
from each other, t(29) = 2.76, p = .01, d = 0.56 . This will be considered in further 
computations.  
 
6.2.2.2. Problems with Additional Positive or Negative Information  
 
People’s defeasible reasoning from conditionals describing situations only mild in emotional 
strength was investigated in two steps. First the percentages of defeated conclusions for 
positive and negatively-charged conditionals were analyzed. In the second step the results 
from this experiment were compared to the ones of Experiment 9, with the aim to discover 
whether people defeat more often conclusions from negatively-charged conditionals if the 
emotions are only mild of strength. Descriptive data can be found in Figure 10. 
A 2 (Valence of the conditional: positive vs. negative) x 2 (Valence of the additional 
information: positive vs. negative) ANOVA on the percentage of defeated conclusions of the 
experimental items revealed no main effect of valence of the conditional, F(1, 29) = 0.02, p = 
.882, ηp
2 
= .001, but a main effect of valence of the additional information, F(1, 29) = 12.43, p 
= .001, ηp
2 
= .300, which is explained by an interaction between both factors, F(1, 29) = 
161.69, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .848. Participants defeated positive conclusions more often when they 
were followed by negative compared to positive additional information (Mpos-neg = 60.56%, 
SDpos-neg = 21.66; Mpos-pos = 6.11%, SDpos-pos = 15.46; t(29) = 10.92, p <.001, d = 2.90), and 
they defeated negative conclusions more often when they were followed by positive 
compared to negative additional information (Mneg-pos = 48.89%, SDneg-pos = 30.30; Mneg-neg = 
16.11%, SDneg-neg = 21.66; t(29) = 7.82, p < .001, d = 1.18). Yet, as can be seen in Figure 10, 
the percentage of conclusions drawn from positively-charged conditionals defeated by 
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negative information did not differ significantly from the percentage of conclusions drawn 
from negatively-charged conditionals defeated by positive information, t(29) = 1.47, p = .153, 
d = 0.45. However, since negative and positive conditionals already differed significantly in 
the control problems (without additional information), this finding is difficult to interpret. To 
control for possible confounds I compared a second time the amount of withdrawn 
conclusions from conditionals with conflicting additional information, but this time with a 
corrected measure, eliminating all problems where participants disagreed with the initial 
conditional (i.e., the problems where they answered "no" in the control condition). Again, no 
differences were found (M = 45.83, SD = 31.70 for negative conditionals with positive 
additional information, M = 58.67, SD = 26.09 for positive conditionals with negative 
additional information, t(29) = 1.50, p = .145, d = 0.44).  
This first analysis thus shows that when the emotion described in the conditional is 
only mild in strength, then people do not differ in how often they defeat conclusions from 
positive and negatively charged conditionals. However, the statistics used do not allow the 
interpretation of null-effects. To test whether people’s higher reluctance to defeat conclusions 
drawn from negatively-charged conclusion is particular for conditionals of high emotional 
strength, the results from Experiment 10 were compared to the ones of Experiment 9. 
Compared to Experiment 9, participants in Experiment 10 (corrected measure) defeated more 
negative conclusions by positive additional information (33.33% vs 45.83%; respectively), 
and less positive conclusions by negative additional information (74.71% vs. 58.67%; 
respectively). Consequently, the difference between negatively-charged conclusions defeated 
by positive information and positively-charged conclusions defeated by negative information 
is significantly smaller in Experiment 10 than Experiment 9, t(57) = 2.52, p = .014, d = 0.66. 
In other words, people’s reluctance to defeat conclusions drawn from conditionals describing 
negative situations diminishes when the emotions are only of mild emotional strength.  
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Figure 10. Percentage of defeated conclusions as a function of the valence of the conditional 
rule and additional information in Experiment 10. Error bars show standard errors.  
 
 
6.2.3. Discussion 
 
The results show that when the situation described in the conditional is only mild in negative 
emotional strength, then people do defeat initially drawn conclusions. More precisely, the 
amount of defeated conclusions drawn from negatively-charged conditionals does not differ 
anymore from the amount of defeated conclusions from conditionals describing positive 
situations. Compared to Experiment 9, the current results show that when the situation 
described in the conditional is only of mild emotional strength, people’s problems in defeating 
negatively-charged conclusions diminishes. This pattern of results supports my hypothesis 
and resembles thus the pattern of results found when investigating people’s legal reasoning, 
because here, too, participants mostly had problems excusing highly morally outraging 
offences, but not offences of low moral outrage.  
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6.3. Summary and Implications of Chapter 6 
 
The results of Experiment 9 and 10 show similarities to the findings on legal defeasible 
reasoning. In legal reasoning people showed difficulties in withdrawing conclusions stating 
that offenders of severe offences should be punished. Similarly, in Experiment 9 people 
showed difficulties in withdrawing conclusions drawn from conditionals describing very 
negative situations. Moreover, as in legal reasoning where people’s reluctance to defeat 
punishment conclusions was restricted to high moral outrage offences, in Experiment 10 – 
where only situations of mild emotional strength were presented – people’s reluctance to 
defeasible reasoning diminished. In legal reasoning these findings were explained by arguing 
that people are influenced by their own sense of justice. Since people usually wish severe 
offences to be punished, they also endorsed such conclusions very often and refused to excuse 
such offences. When offences were not severe, this wish to punish offenders diminished and 
people engaged in defeasible reasoning. But how can the results from Experiment 9 and 10 be 
explained?  
Differences in associative strength cannot account for the results because in both 
experiments positive and negative information were as strongly associated to their respective 
conclusions of being sad or being happy (see De Neys et al., 2003b; Markovits et al., 1998; 
Quinn & Markovits, 1998). As already pointed out in the introduction of this Chapter, 
negative information seems to be more informative than positive information (i.e, the 
negativity bias). But why is negative information more informative than positive one? 
Possible reasons for its superiority is that negative information can be more diagnostic (e.g., 
Skowronski & Carlston, 1987; 1989; for an overview see Lewicka, Czapinski, & Peeters, 
1992), or less expected than positive information (Ikegami, 1993). Another explanation is 
provided by the Evaluative Space Model (ESM), which explains the negativity bias by 
assuming two separable underlying motivational systems functioning at different levels of 
evaluative input (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1999; Cacioppo et al., 1997; Cacioppo, Gardner, & 
Berntson, 1999; Ito & Cacioppo, 2005). It is argued that by weighing highly negative 
information stronger than positive information, one guarantees survival chances because 
strong negative events are often threat to life. ESM actually also explains why this superiority 
of negative information is only observable when the information is of high emotional 
strength. It is argued that when the emotional strength is only mild, not negative but positive 
information is more informative. This is called the positivity offset (Cacioppo et al., 1997; Ito 
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& Cacioppo, 2005). When the evaluative input is only of mild emotional strength, then 
positive information gains weight because ignoring mild negative events in favor of positive 
events enhances exploration behavior facilitating food finding and expansion (Cacioppo et al. 
1997; 1999; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Vaish et al., 2008). Accordingly, other researchers as 
well have observed how at low levels of evaluative input (i.e., information of little emotional 
strength) positive information is actually weighed stronger than negative one (e.g., Amster, 
1964; Anisfeld & Lambert, 1966, Boucher & Osgood, 1969; Ito et al., 1998). However, it is 
important to notice that in Experiment 10 positive information was not weighed stronger than 
negative information; no positivity offset was found. Further studies are therefore necessary to 
understand the cognitive mechanisms behind defeasible reasoning with emotional content 
outside of the domain of legal reasoning.  
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Chapter 7: General Discussion 
 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate how people reason with legal rules and which factors 
influence their defeasible reasoning. In a series of experiments legal rules were presented as 
legal conditionals and embedded in inference tasks. In addition to the legal conditional and 
the categorical premise these tasks also included information about potential exculpatory 
circumstances. Exculpatory circumstances served as defeaters and were either presented 
explicitly as a third premise (Experiments 1, 2, 4-5), captured implicitly via preliminary 
studies (Experiments 6-8), or generated by participants (Experiment 3, without embedding the 
offences into inferences). Participants’ task was to decide whether the offender described in 
the inference task should be punished (Experiments 1-8) or will be punished (Experiments 6-
7). That is, participants had to decide whether it is appropriate to defeat the conclusion of 
punishing the offender in light of exculpatory circumstances. The first three experiments were 
designed to show that contrary to lawyers, laypeople’s own sense of justice affects their 
willingness to withdraw conclusions from legal rules. The remaining experiments investigated 
what moderates the effect of one’s own sense of justice: Experiments 4 and 5 by testing 
differences in people’s attitudes towards offences and offenders, and Experiments 6 to 8 by 
varying the phrasing of the legal conditionals. Finally, this thesis also investigated whether the 
findings from Experiments 1-8 are specific to legal reasoning, or if they also have 
correspondence in everyday scenarios (Experiments 9 and 10). 
The results show that legal reasoning is often defeasible, not only for lawyers whose 
defeasible reasoning followed from the defeasibility of the penal code, but also for laypeople. 
However, laypeople’s defeasible reasoning differed from lawyers’. Laypeople’s punishment 
decisions depended on their own sense of justice: their acceptance of exculpatory 
circumstances as defeaters depended on how morally outraging the offence described in the 
antecedent was. If the offence was highly morally outraging, it was more difficult to decide 
not to punish the offender than if the offence only evoked low moral outrage. In cases of high 
moral outrage, laypeople even had difficulties in retrieving exculpatory evidence from 
memory. As a consequence, differences in people’s attitudes about offences and offenders 
were shown to also affect legal reasoning. For instance, Experiment 4 showed that highly 
religious persons confronted with an offence which is usually not considered morally 
outraging decided to punish the offender anyway. Also cultural differences affected the way 
people deal with their feelings of moral outrage. Experiment 5 linked moral outrage to the 
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acceptance of vigilantism: when offences were morally outraging, people from Peru defeated 
the conclusion of punishing the offender in light of vigilante circumstances more often than 
people from Germany. However, the effect of a person’s own sense of justice on legal 
reasoning also depended on the way in which the conditionals were phrased. Experiments 6 
and 7 showed that peoples own sense of justice affected inferences when they were asked 
whether the offender should be punished for a given offence. But when reasoners were asked 
whether an offender will be punished, the effect of one’s own sense of justice was diminished 
allowing for consideration of exceptions. However, not all variations in the phrasing of legal 
conditionals affected inferences. Variations which only affected the legal conditional but not 
the specific question about the conclusion did not affect inferences. In Experiment 8 it did not 
matter whether the rule stated that all or some offenders deserve punishment. Given that the 
conclusion always asked whether the offender should be punished, conclusions only depended 
on reasoners’ moral outrage; the original phrasing of the rule was ignored. Finally, 
Experiments 9 and 10 showed that people’s reluctance to defeat conclusions that are evoked 
by negative emotions – such as moral outrage – is not limited to the legal domain. Negatively-
charged conclusions were also difficult to defeat when conditionals described everyday 
situations: conclusions such as being sad when ones mother dies, were much harder to defeat 
than conclusions such as being happy when getting one’s dream job.  
The findings are novel in the psychological literature on reasoning. The idea of 
combining the fields of conditional reasoning and legal reasoning to investigate people’s 
defeasible reasoning with legal rules is promising and has implications for psychology, law 
and society. However, due to its novelty there are also aspects of this thesis that deserve 
further discussion and need further investigation. Hence, in the following sections I report the 
findings in more detail and discuss their consequences and implications for cognitive 
psychology, law, social psychology, and society. Finally, also the limitations and further 
perspectives of this work are discussed. 
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7.1. Consequences for Cognitive Psychology 
 
The current findings are relevant for cognitive psychology. First, they show the importance of 
domain knowledge for reasoning in general, and for defeasible reasoning in particular. 
Second, they also show that people often introduce their own preferences into reasoning tasks: 
factors people use in their everyday life to decide upon offenders and offences are also 
considered during legal reasoning. Relatedly, the current findings also show that the 
emotional attachment people have to the rule described in conditionals affects their 
inferences. In the following sections I discuss these three aspects in more detail. I start by 
discussing how, in legal reasoning, in absence of domain knowledge, people introduce their 
own preferences and attitudes to decide about the defeasibility of a given legal rule. 
Regarding these effects, I will also discuss how applying these preferences and attitudes when 
drawing conclusions can be seen as a kind of decision making, where reasoners consider the 
utility of punishing an offender for their society. Then I discuss how emotions affect legal 
reasoning and how the investigation of emotions and defeasibility can further our 
understanding of human cognition. Having discussed these three main aspects of legal 
reasoning (defeasibility, domain knowledge, and decision making), I evaluate which of the 
current reasoning theories best accounts for these factors and therefore best describes people’s 
legal reasoning. Afterwards, I explain why it is important to be cautious when relating the 
findings of this thesis to the usual literature on deontic reasoning, and finally I discuss how 
this work can be related to the question about human rationality. 
 
 
7.1.1. Defeasibility, Domain Knowledge, and Decision Making 
 
The experiments presented in this dissertation show the importance of domain knowledge on 
defeasible reasoning. People defeat previously drawn conclusions in light of additional 
information, but what counts as a defeater for some is not necessary a defeater for others. 
When reasoners are confronted with a conditional and a potential defeater, they must decide if 
this defeater is strong enough to withdraw a conclusion. In everyday life – and in most of the 
experiments found in the literature – such a decision is easy. People are usually confronted 
with conditionals describing everyday situations where they have background knowledge 
about which defeaters are plausible and which not. However, if a conditional is domain 
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specific – such as legal conditionals – then the picture changes: inferences made by people 
who do have background knowledge about this specific domain differ from the inferences 
drawn by people who do not. If domain knowledge is available, this knowledge can be used to 
decide about defeaters. But, if such knowledge is not available, then reasoners must use other 
cues in order to decide the role assigned to a potential defeater. Simply ignoring the potential 
defeater is not an option because people usually assume that information uttered to them is 
relevant (Grice, 1975). Consequently, they cannot simply ignore potential defeaters but have 
to decide in which respect it may be relevant for the inference. But how? In the beginning of 
this thesis it was assumed that reasoners compensate their lack of knowledge by other criteria 
which might differ from the ones used by experts, but which are related to the domain in 
question. Experiments 1 to 5 showed that in legal reasoning, when asked to conclude what 
should happen to an offender, those criteria are the reasoners’ own sense of justice, driven by 
feelings of moral outrage. 
Using one’s own sense of justice when reasoning with legal rules implies that people 
decide about defeaters according to their own preferences of what should happen to offenders. 
Given that legal conditionals describe in the antecedent an offence and in the consequent the 
corresponding punishment, people who perceive that an offence deserves punishment will 
endorse the corresponding conclusion to punish an offender more strongly than people who 
do not. Consequently, a defeater is rejected or not considered strong enough to defeat the 
conclusion to the extent that the reasoner considers the offence inexcusable. For instance, if 
people feel highly morally outraged by an offence and think that such an offence deserves 
punishment, then exculpatory circumstances that may be considered relevant in other 
situations are not considered strong enough to excuse this offence (Experiments 1-3). 
Similarly, if reasoners have a close relationship to the offender and do not wish this offender 
to be punished, then this attitude will affect the inferences they draw (Experiment 7). Or, if 
people are taught that offences deserve punishment irrespective of their severity, then this 
cultural norm will make reasoners to conclude that even harmless offences should be 
punished (Experiment 4). Finally, if people believe that vigilantism is an acceptable response 
for offences, then this attitude can bring people to consider vigilantism as a defeater 
(Experiment 5). All these results show that people who do not have objective measures for 
deciding about defeaters (i.e., domain knowledge) make inferences according to their 
preferences for the different outcomes a conditional can have (e.g. preferring pq over p¬q; see 
Manktelow et al., 2000).  
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People’s consideration of their own preferences for the different outcomes a 
conditional rule can have also highlights the importance of utilities in legal reasoning (see 
Section 1.1.2.5). Factors considered while making decisions or judging actions, for example 
when giving one’s opinion about an offender, also influence reasoning. Just like Bonnefon 
(2009) and Manktelow et al. (2000) showed that utilities often influence inferences, especially 
in the domain of legal reasoning it is difficult and perhaps unnecessary to separate reasoning 
from decision making. Already in law theory the idea of illustrating legal reasoning with the 
help of the judicial syllogism has the main function of justifying a decision (e.g., Alexy, 
1983). This is one of the reasons why in the Results sections of the reported experiments I 
sometimes talked about “punishment decisions”. In fact, according to law theorists, legal 
reasoning should be considered as kind of practical reasoning (MacCormick, 1998), whose 
function it is to decide which actions have to be taken when an offence has been committed. 
This could explain why in some cases the lawyers in Experiments 1 and 2 did not defeat 
conclusions in light of exculpatory circumstances. Perhaps they knew that the defeater was in 
principle exculpatory, but nonetheless started to think about the possible negative 
consequences of excusing that particular offence (e.g., recidivisms). Especially laypeople’s 
conclusions seem to follow some kind of utility maximizing strategy. Laypeople’s preference 
to punish offenders and their reluctance to excuse offences mirrors findings from social 
psychology showing that punishment is often perceived as more beneficial than not punishing. 
For instance, it is known that in order to feel secure, people have several mechanisms 
primarily concerned with detaching oneself of being a victim in the future. For example, 
people like to believe in a just world (Lerner, 1970; Lerner & Miller, 1978) where people get 
what they deserve and where bad things only happen to bad people. Similarly, terror 
management theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) proposes that when a 
person’s own mortality is made salient – which may have happened in the experiments 
through the presentation of severe offences – people feel motivated to reaffirm cultural values 
by for instance, endorsing higher punishment of offenders (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, 
Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). In that way, laypeople’s punishment conclusions are of high 
utility, since they restore the status quo and our feeling of security. In contrast, deciding not to 
punish offenders would not only go against our beliefs in a just world, but would also 
highlight the fact that everybody is a potential victim.  
However, Experiments 6 and 7 showed that people only use their own sense of justice 
and preferences when asked about what should happen to an offender. If reasoners are instead 
asked whether an offender will be punished, they also use their knowledge about how often 
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different offences are punished, that is, their factual knowledge. The results of Experiments 6 
and 7 thus show that the way people compensate their lack of knowledge in legal reasoning – 
and probably also when reasoning about other domains of which they have no elaborated 
knowledge – depends on what reasoners think they are asked for. Utilities are important when 
the task asks what should happen, that is, when the conditional is deontic and appeals to the 
reasoners’ attitudes and preferences. If instead the task asks about what is the case, that is, 
about what actually happens in the world, then reasoners compensate their lack of domain 
knowledge by their knowledge about what happens in the world. Yet, even in the case of 
factual conditionals people are probably not using objective measures as for example police 
statistics to estimate the frequencies of pq or p¬q cases. Instead, it makes more sense to 
assume that people use subjective frequencies of pq and p¬q cases, which might be biased by 
the media, social networks, or other experiences. In further studies one could thus compare 
reasoning performance for factual legal conditionals and test to what extent the conclusions 
drawn by people with and without knowledge of police statistics differ. 
One question which still needs to be discussed is whether reasoners are aware of the 
factors used to compensate their lack of domain knowledge when reasoning with legal 
conditionals. In other words, do reasoners apply consciously their own sense of justice or their 
subjective frequencies of exceptions when reasoning? The experiments reported here do not 
allow a clear answer. What we should acknowledge, however, is that some experimental 
manipulations might have encouraged participants to reason according to their sense of justice 
and personal experiences. The use of own preferences or exception estimations when 
reasoning was probably enhanced by the fact that participants were instructed to reason as a 
judge (Experiment 1 and 2) or even explicitly according to their own sense of justice 
(Experiment 4 and 5). Contrary to most of the literature on deductive reasoning, participants 
were not instructed to consider the premises as true and to indicate what necessarily follows 
from the premises. Instead they were instructed to reason spontaneously (Experiments 6 to 8). 
In some experiments they were even told that no right or wrong answer exists (Experiment 8 
to 10). This was done because I was interested in the natural understanding of legal 
conditionals. As others argued before (see Cummins, 1995; De Neys et al., 2003a; 2003b), 
when interested in everyday reasoning it is not necessary to instruct reasoners to assume the 
truth of the premises, or to respond with what follows with logical necessity from them. In 
everyday life people constantly draw inferences, but are never told to assume the information 
as true. On the contrary, people know that in real life hardly anything is necessarily true. 
Instead, things are true to a certain degree. Along the lines of the new psychology of 
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reasoning (Evans, 2012; see Section 1.1) my aim was to understand how people reason 
naturally with conditionals, and not to see if they reason as they should. How people should 
reason with legal rules is already regulated in the penal code. Instead, how people do reason is 
not regulated and is therefore an interesting topic of research. 
In sum, the findings of this thesis show that defeasibility, domain knowledge, and 
decision making are closely linked. People’s defeasible reasoning depends on their domain 
knowledge and on what reasoners think is relevant for the inference. If people think the 
inference task asks about what they prefer, then their own preferences are used in reasoning, 
and the conclusions are influenced by their attitudes about what is described in the 
conditional, for instance, one’s own sense of justice in legal reasoning. However, if reasoners 
think they are asked about matters of facts, then these preferences can be ignored and the 
answers are according to what they think is the case in the real world. This complex interplay 
between domain knowledge, preferences and interpretation raise attention to theoretical 
oversimplifications. Reasoning theories should aim to consider all factors used in drawing 
conclusions. That is to say, not only those factors explicitly provided in the tasks instructions 
should be considered, but also those that reasoners themselves bring along, for example own 
preferences and personal experiences. Just as Bonnefon (2009; 2010) argued, everything we 
usually use during reasoning in everyday life leaks into the experimental setting.  
 
 
7.1.2. Emotions in Defeasible Reasoning  
 
Most research focused on how emotions influence deductive reasoning followed the standards 
of classical logic. It was usually found that emotions hinder people from drawing logically 
valid conclusions, probably because emotions impair working memory and sometimes trigger 
heuristic strategies (Blanchette, 2014; Blanchette & Amato, 2014; Blanchette & Richards, 
2010; Quraishi & Oaksford, 2014). This thesis expands these findings by suggesting that 
emotions affect defeasible reasoning as well. The current findings suggest that when the 
antecedent and the consequent of conditionals describe something one emotionally approves, 
inferences are easily drawn and conclusions are difficult to defeat. This is the case not only 
when the content of the conditional is law-related (Experiments 1-8), but also when the 
antecedent describes emotional situations from everyday life and the consequent the 
corresponding emotion (Experiments 9-10). However, the possibility that emotions can 
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encourage people to draw conclusions by ignoring defeaters conflicts with the usual findings 
from the literature on emotions in deductive reasoning. As just mentioned, many studies 
showed that emotions hinder people from drawing logically valid conclusions. That is, people 
refuse to endorse the valid conclusions of MP or MT, and make more AC and DA fallacies. 
This thesis instead suggests that emotions inhibited people’s consideration of defeaters, 
thereby enhancing their willingness to draw MP conclusions. Is it possible that emotions 
affect deductive reasoning and defeasible reasoning in different ways? I do not think so. A 
more likely explanation for these conflicting results is the methodology used in the different 
experiments. As Blanchette and Richards (2010) argued, studies differ in how emotions are 
induced (see also Gangemi, Mancini, & Johnson-Laird, 2014). Some researchers induce 
emotions externally, by showing a sad or a happy movie before the experiment, by 
conditioning the content of the conditional to one emotion, or by giving participants negative 
feedback about their reasoning capacities (e.g., Blanchette, 2006; Blanchette & Leese, 2010; 
Jung, Wranke, Hamburger, & Knauff, 2014). Results from studies inducing emotions 
externally are the ones which usually show that emotions hinder deductive reasoning 
performance (e.g., Blanchette & Campbell, 2005; see Gangemi et al., 2014). In my 
experiments, however, emotions were induced internally by the content of the conditional. 
The antecedent described a situation which induced an emotion (e.g., moral outrage) and the 
consequent described an action enhanced by this emotion (e.g., punishment), therefore 
triggering MP conclusions. Other researchers have also induced emotions internally through 
the content of the conditional and showed that those can enhance reasoning. Blanchette, 
Richards, Melnyk, and Lavda (2007) for instance found that people living near the place 
where terrorists attacked London in 2005 made less logical errors when reasoning with 
syllogisms concerning terrorism than people living further away from London (e.g., Some 
terrorist attacks are murders. All terrorist attacks are heinous. Therefore, some murders are 
heinous.). Similar effects were found with veterans when reasoning with war related 
syllogisms (Blanchette & Campbell, 2005). Emotions can therefore influence reasoning in 
distinctive ways, both hindering and improving performance. Depending on how the emotion 
is induced, the endorsement of conclusions is sometimes enhanced or inhibited (see Gangemi 
et al., 2014).  
The fact that emotions affect reasoning differently depending on how an emotion is 
induced shows how complex the relationship between emotions and reasoning is. Further 
studies are therefore necessary to gain deeper insights into when emotions enhance reasoning 
performance and when not, especially in defeasible reasoning. In this thesis, emotions seem to 
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have enhanced valid MP inferences by inhibiting the effect of defeaters. The same could 
happen when, for example, people with dog phobia are asked to think about defeaters for the 
conditional “If a dog barks at you, then he will bite you” (cf., De Jong & Vroling, 2014). 
Another avenue for future research is to construct problems where emotions do not inhibit, 
but enhance the consideration of defeaters. One could formulate conditionals where the 
antecedent evokes an emotion which is not captured by the consequent. Imagine for instance 
you are a person with social anxiety and you are confronted with the conditional: “If I have to 
speak in front of a huge audience, then I can show how much I know.” People with social 
anxiety will certainly feel negative emotions when imagining speaking in front of big 
audiences. These negative emotions would therefore not trigger the conclusion of showing 
how much one knows, but would instead trigger the conclusion of getting red or embarrassing 
oneself. That is, the emotion evoked by the antecedent (i.e., fear of public speaking) conflicts 
with the emotion implied in the consequent (i.e., proudness of showing one’s skills). By 
triggering an opposite emotion to the one described in the conditional, defeaters can be made 
salient. For instance, in this last example social fears could make reasoners aware that when 
speaking in front of audiences one can make mistakes, have a black out, or receive negative 
feedback – all possible defeaters. As some researchers argue, being emotionally involved by 
the emotional content of conditionals can affect people’s motivation to think deeper about 
possible alternatives or disabling conditions (cf. Gangemi et al., 2014).  
Finally, another task for the future is to understand in greater detail how emotions 
influence defeasible reasoning. In other words, what are the mental processes that underlie the 
effect of emotions on reasoning? There are different explanations for the inhibiting effect of 
externally induced emotions (for a review see Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Some 
researchers explain people’s errors in reasoning by arguing that some emotions impede 
analytic thinking and enhance heuristic thinking (e.g., Blanchette & Amato, 2014; Quraishi & 
Oaksford, 2014). Others suggest that externally induced emotions are irrelevant for the task, 
thus being a burden for working memory (e.g., Blanchette, 2014; Richards, French, Keogh, & 
Carter, 2000). Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, and Williams (1996), for instance, showed that 
secondary working memory tasks inhibited reasoning performance similarly to mood 
inductions, suggesting that emotions trigger the spontaneous retrieval of mood congruent 
memories which in turn burden working memory. Yet others say emotions hinder reasoning 
by moving attention away from task-relevant information (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; see 
also Schimmack, 2005). However, how internally induced emotions enhance people’s 
drawing of MP and MT conclusions still requires further research. In legal reasoning 
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emotions could guide inferences by enhancing or reducing the perceived sufficiency of the 
antecedent for its consequent. Even though necessity and sufficiency relations were not 
measured in this thesis, the results suggest that an antecedent is considered highly sufficient to 
its consequent when the relationship described in the antecedent and the consequent 
corresponds to the emotions evoked by the conditional. This happens in cases of highly 
morally outraging offences. When the antecedent describes a highly morally outraging 
offence, people’s feelings of moral outrage evoke a desire to punish the offender, which is 
described precisely in the consequent. Instead, an antecedent loses sufficiency when its 
consequent is not in accordance with the experienced emotions. This happens in cases of low 
morally outraging offences. Given that low moral outrage is only linked to a little desire to 
punish the offender, the corresponding consequent is not perceived as necessary. Sufficiency 
and necessity relations can also be used to explain the effect of emotions on reasoning with 
conditionals describing everyday scenarios. The antecedent of the conditional “If I fail an 
exam, then I am sad” is probably perceived more sufficient for its consequent than the 
antecedent in “If a write a bad grade, then I am sad”. However, the explanation based on 
emotions affecting the sufficiency and necessity relations of conditionals cannot fully explain 
the findings from Experiments 9 and 10. In Experiments 9 and 10 negative emotions were 
weighed stronger than positive ones, even though the associative strength between antecedent 
and consequent did not differ between the two kinds of emotions. Further, sufficiency and 
necessity relations are also unable to explain why negative emotions are weighed stronger 
when emotions are strong, but not when they are mild. Alternative explanations are therefore 
necessary. In Chapter 6 it was argued that emotions can influence reasoning through the 
negativity bias: people weigh strong negative emotions more heavily than strong positive 
emotions. Yet, it is not clear why this negativity bias exists. The evolutionary explanation 
provided by ESM is tempting but probably not supported by all researchers because 
evolutionary explanations are often considered circular, untestable, or “just so” stories (see 
Siegert & Ward, 2002). Instead, the explanation of negative emotions being more diagnostic 
than positive ones can seem more plausible. However, diagnosticity cannot explain why the 
negativity bias only exists for strong emotions and not weak ones. Alternative explanations 
are necessary. I can imagine that with the help of physiological measures one can gain 
insights into why negative emotions are sometimes perceived as more important than others. 
Along these lines it could be interesting to analyze the role of utilities in emotional reasoning. 
As Blanchette (2014) argues, emotions can influence the calculation of utilities. Perhaps 
strong negative emotions (such as sadness or high moral outrage) affect people’s utilities 
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calculation in such a way that endorsing MP inferences (e.g., drawing punishment 
conclusions) is perceived as more beneficial than withdrawing such conclusions. 
 
 
7.1.3. Mental rules, Mental Models, Probabilities, or Utilities?  
 
So far I have discussed how domain knowledge, preferences, and emotions influence the 
conclusions people draw or withdraw in legal reasoning. But which are the reasoning 
processes behind these effects? The experiments in this study were not specifically designed 
to test between the different competing reasoning theories in the field. It is therefore difficult 
to test the single assumptions of each theory with my data. What can be done instead is to 
weigh the pros and cons of each theory when trying to understand the different effects found 
in this study. This is the aim of this section.  
Mental rules theories argue that people apply abstract general reasoning rules to draw 
inferences, and are thus often labeled syntactic theories (Knauff, 2006). In this thesis, 
however, laypeople’s conclusions depended highly on the content of conditionals. Inferences 
with identical syntactic structure were rated differently depending on the content of 
conditionals, that is, whether it contained a highly morally outraging offence (Experiments 1-
5) or whether it contained an offence with a high frequency of exceptions (Experiments 6 and 
7). Mental rules theories could account for these content effects by arguing that content only 
affects the comprehension component and that the inference schemas act on the output of 
those comprehension processes (Braine & O’Brien, 1991). For instance, Braine and O’Brien 
(1991) argue that due to pragmatic principles certain contents can affect the semantic 
representation of conditionals. However, it is not clear how exactly pragmatic principles can 
account for people’s introduction of their own preferences and attitudes on legal reasoning, or 
how they consider the frequencies of exceptions in their conclusions. When explaining how 
exceptions may affect comprehension, Braine and O’Brien (1991) refer to Byrne’s (1989) 
study and argue that defeaters are integrated into the antecedent. But as explained in Section 
1.2.1 this is not plausible due to the limitations of working memory and the impossibility of 
exhaustively enumerating defeaters. Consequently, mental rules theories have problems in 
accounting for laypeople’s reasoning performance. Mental rules theories could be nonetheless 
used to explain lawyers’ legal reasoning. Contrary to laypeople, lawyers have background 
knowledge about the penal code and about which circumstances count as defeaters and which 
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not. Their main task is therefore that of external justification (Alexy, 1983; see Section 1.2.1). 
That is, lawyers have to decide whether the circumstance information provided is regulated as 
exculpatory circumstance in the penal code. After having decided whether a fact is 
exculpatory or not, lawyers’ actual inference process (the internal justification) requires no 
additional weighing, but can be described as following some clearly prescribed rules: if the 
circumstance information is not considered exculpatory according to penal code, they 
conclude that the offender should be punished. But if the circumstance information is 
considered exculpatory, they withdraw the conclusion of punishing the offender. This way 
one could conclude that lawyers apply something like mental rules. Perhaps not the mental 
rules proposed by Braine (1978; Braine & O’Brien, 1991) or Rips (1994) since those do not 
allow defeasible reasoning, but still some kind of abstract rules which can be applied once the 
structure of the inference has been extracted.  
To explain laypeople’s reasoning performance we need a theory which considers the 
semantic content of conditionals. One such candidate is mental models theory (Johnson-Laird 
& Byrne, 1991; 2002), which proposes that people construct mental models of the premises to 
derive conclusions. According to the principle of pragmatic modulation (Byrne et al., 1999; 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) when the task requires, people can also include their general 
knowledge about the content of the task in mental models. This principle of pragmatic 
modulation could be used to illustrate how people reason with legal conditionals. When 
reasoners are confronted with a legal conditional, they could first construct the following 
models from the premises:  
offence   punishment 
            … 
The additional information of exculpatory circumstances can be integrated in these models: 
offence   exculpatory circumstance   punishment 
If this exculpatory circumstance is stored in memory as a defeater, then reasoners should be 
able to construct the following explicit mental models based on their general knowledge: 
   exculpatory circumstance   ¬punishment 
¬exculpatory circumstance    ¬ punishment 
¬exculpatory circumstance     punishment 
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When reasoners are confronted with exculpatory evidence as part of the inference task, the 
first possibility is integrated into the model of the conditional rule: 
offence   exculpatory circumstance   ¬punishment   punishment 
According to the principle of pragmatic modulation general knowledge has priority over the 
information given in the premises, yielding the following mental model (Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 2002): 
offence   exculpatory circumstance   ¬punishment 
As a consequence, reasoners should conclude that, when an offence has been committed in 
exculpatory circumstances, no punishment should follow.  
Mental models theory can also be used to explain why laypeople differed from 
lawyers in the first two experiments. The different inference patterns of laypeople and lawyers 
can be a result of different mental models: depending on reasoners’ prior knowledge, different 
mental models from general knowledge are built, and different circumstances are recognized 
correctly as exculpatory, and used as defeaters in further inferences. This idea is strengthened 
by the findings of Experiment 3, which suggested that laypeople’s and lawyers’ different 
acceptance rates of exculpatory circumstances relies – at least in part – on different amounts 
of exculpatory circumstances stored in memory. Is it also possible to explain lawyers’ legal 
reasoning by mental models? In my opinion mental models theory is only suitable to explain 
lawyers’ external justification, i.e., the decision of whether specific circumstance information 
is a defeater or not, by comparing the given premises with their knowledge about what counts 
as a defeater. The internal justification – the actual reasoning process by which a punishment 
conclusion is reached (see Section 1.2.1) – is in my opinion better described by mental rules 
theories. Given that lawyers know from the penal code what to infer from a given set of law-
related premises, they do not need to construct mental models to read off from them what 
follows. Instead, they can simply apply the rules they know: either punishing or not 
punishing, depending on whether defeaters are available or not. Notwithstanding this 
argumentation, mental models might still be applied to predict lawyers’ legal reasoning in 
more complex and less defined legal cases. One such example are cases for which the penal 
code does not prescribe how precisely to decide, but different premises would have to be 
evaluated and weighed (e.g., in higher instances such as in the Supreme Court). 
In sum, mental models theory can be used to illustrate how laypeople arrive at 
conclusions and how lawyers decide whether a potential exculpatory circumstance counts as a 
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defeater. However, there are some problems. First, mental models theory has difficulties in 
explaining defeasible reasoning from deontic legal conditionals. The principle of pragmatic 
modulation was introduced to explain defeasible reasoning from factual conditionals, and not 
from deontic ones. That is, pragmatic modulation is indicated to describe how single defeaters 
are integrated in mental models, but it is difficult to explain how laypeople’s preferences and 
attitudes about offences and offender are represented in these models. Arguing that reasoners’ 
own sense of justice is reflected in the amount of defeaters available in memory is not enough. 
The results of this thesis show that although reasoners are able to at least generate some 
exculpatory circumstances (Experiment 3), they nonetheless conclude that offenders should 
be punished, indicating that they have problems in considering these as defeaters in reasoning 
(see Experiment 2, 4 to 8). A second problem of mental models theory is that pragmatic 
modulation only describes how single possible defeaters are considered during reasoning, but 
not how the frequencies of exceptions are considered, i.e., the mental models built from 
general knowledge do not represent how often different defeaters occur or how often 
exceptions occur in general. This is problematic, because Experiment 6 showed that the 
frequency of exceptions and not the amount of defeaters best predicted inferences. It is not 
clear how the frequency of exceptions is computed within pragmatic modulation. It is 
imaginable to introduce frequencies to the mental models built from general knowledge by 
representing the proportion of models in which each possibility holds (cf. Johnson-Laird et 
al., 1999; Stevenson & Over, 1995). However, first empirical studies question the suitability 
of such adapted mental models (see Fernbach & Erb, 2013). 
To understand how people reason with factual legal conditionals a theory is necessary 
which describes how frequencies of exceptions are considered. Probabilistic theories can do 
this through the computation of conditional probabilities. According to most probabilistic 
accounts, people calculate the conditional probability by assuming that p holds and then 
computing the ratio between the instances were q happens and those in which q does not 
happen. The higher the perceived probability of P(pq) is compared to P(p¬q), the higher the 
conditional probability is and the more likely MP conclusions are endorsed (Evans & Over, 
2004; Geiger & Oberauer, 2010; see also Oaksford & Chater, 2003b; Oaksford et al., 2000). 
People’s consideration of frequencies of exceptions in legal reasoning is thus directly 
captured by the conditional probability, which – as just explained – contains the frequency of 
p¬q cases (here: offence but no punishment). Of course further studies are necessary to 
compute the concrete conditional probabilities for legal conditionals. For example, neither in 
Experiment 6 nor 7 the frequency of pq cases was measured which is actually necessary to 
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compute conditional probabilities. Nonetheless, in my opinion, probabilistic accounts are still 
the most appropriate ones to predict reasoning with factual legal conditionals, because 
contrary to the other theories described in this thesis, they can best predict the effect of 
frequency of exceptions in legal reasoning.  
Nevertheless, probabilistic theories have problems accounting for the conclusions 
drawn from deontic legal conditionals as well. On the on hand, it is difficult to explain 
lawyers’ legal reasoning because in law a legal rule can be either applied or not applied but 
not more or less applied (Dworkin, 1977). In fact, in one experiment conducted by my 
colleagues and me, advanced law students and graduate lawyers had to indicate on a Likert-
scale the degree to which an offender should be punished (similar to Experiment 6 and 7). 
Many lawyers reported after the experiment to have felt confused by this response scale, and 
mentioned that “yes” or “no” responses would be legally more appropriate. On the other hand, 
also laypeople’s reasoning from deontic legal conditionals is difficult to explain by 
probabilistic approaches. As Over et al. (2004) noticed, conditional probabilities are not 
predictive for reasoning with deontic conditionals (see Section 1.1.1.2.2). Instead, decision 
theoretic calculations of people’s preference of pq over p¬q are better predictors of their 
conclusions (Over et al., 2004). This was indeed corroborated by Experiments 6 and 7, where 
frequencies of exceptions only predicted conclusions for factual but not deontic legal 
conditionals. Inferences from deontic legal conditionals depended on the reasoners’ sense of 
justice, measured by their preference of pq over p¬q.  
People’s introduction of their own preferences and attitudes when reasoning with 
deontic legal conditionals is directly related to utilities and hence also to decision making. The 
importance of utilities for legal reasoning was already discussed in the beginning of this 
Chapter. In short, the idea that conclusions reflect people’s preference of pq over p¬q may 
well be the result of utility calculations resulting from feelings of moral outrage. Accordingly, 
in Experiment 6 the preference of pq over p¬q correlated highly significantly with moral 
outrage. This utility based explanation is also appropriate for the finding that laypeople 
decided to rely on the legal conditional rule (Experiments 1 and 2) even if they could actually 
think of at least one defeater (Experiment 3). In fact, this thesis’ main hypothesis that people’s 
own sense of justice influences inferences implies some kind of utility computation: when 
people decide to punish offenders due to moral outrage, they are probably weighing the 
benefits of punishing an offender more heavily than the ones of acquitting the offender. 
However, besides Bonnefon’s folk axioms (2009), there is no concrete description of how 
utilities are concretely used in reasoning, and even less in defeasible reasoning. There may be 
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some decision theoretic explanations for the cards turned in the Wason’s selection task (but 
see Section 7.1.4), but further studies are needed for conditional inference tasks. One solution 
could be to expand Bonnefon’s et al. (2013) justice template to describe how utilities affect 
laypeople’s defeasible legal reasoning. Although the justice template suggests that bad things 
should happen to bad people, people may refuse to conclude that something bad should 
happen to a person who committed an offence, if circumstance information questions the 
utility of this action. Imagine for instance a case of manslaughter. The legal conditional says 
“If a person kills another person, then the person should be punished for manslaughter”. 
According to the justice template people should endorse the MP conclusion. However, if 
additional information questions the utility of punishing the offender, then people should 
withdraw this conclusion, for instance when it is known that the family of the offender will 
take revenge.  
In sum, this analysis suggests that there is no single reasoning theory which can 
account for all the findings in this thesis. Lawyers’ legal reasoning could be explained by 
theories based on mental rules (internal justification) or mental models (external justification), 
but laypeople’s calls for a theory which captures the introduction of one’s own preferences 
and utilities, as well as the consideration of the frequency of exceptions. Especially the 
differences found between lawyers and laypeople suggest that dual process theories may 
account for people’s legal reasoning (Evans, 2003; 2006; Klauer et al., 2010; Verschueren et 
al., 2005). Given that exculpatory circumstances are regulated in the penal code, it is possible 
that lawyers decide about what counts as defeaters in an analytic, deductive way, whereas 
laypeople decide in a more heuristic way, based on their preferences for certain outcomes or 
utilities. This is in accordance with the automatic, intuitive nature of feelings of moral outrage 
(Darley, 2009). However, although the proposal that there are two different processes 
underlying laypeople’s and lawyers’ decisions is tempting, this thesis is only the tip of the 
iceberg unraveling these processes. For instance, it is not clear if behind these two different 
responses are really different cognitive processes, or perhaps the same but one of them simply 
being biased by emotions. It is necessary to conduct more research to fully understand how 
people reason with legal conditionals.  
One potential avenue for further research is using non-monotonic logics for well-
structured and formally clear, yet flexible psychological theories of defeasible reasoning. 
There are many logics that could be implemented in cognitive psychology. For instance, 
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2005) showed how logic constructs, e.g., the closed-world 
assumption, can be integrated to psychological theories to explain people’s performance in 
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defeasible reasoning. Also Pfeifer combined insights from philosophy and psychology to 
derive his mental probability logic (Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2005; 2010). Pfeifer (2013) argues that 
the inferences people draw should be probabilistically coherent and that the uncertainty of the 
premises is transmitted to the conclusion in a deductive way. Another candidate could be 
System P by Kraus et al. (1990). System P was developed in Artificial Intelligence and 
provides rules that a non-monotonic consequence relationship should satisfy (Da Silva Neves 
et al., 2002). Another System is the Rational Closure, which includes System P together with 
a rational monotony postulate (Da Silva Neves et al., 2002; Kraus et al., 1990). Already Da 
Silva Neves and colleagues (2002) showed that System P plus Rational Monotony are 
appropriate to predict human non-monotonic reasoning. They nonetheless acknowledged that 
these postulates should be not understood as rules people apply during reasoning, but as 
emerging proprieties “from a spreading activation process operating directly on knowledge 
structures” (p. 117).  
 
 
7.1.4. Legal Reasoning and Deontic Reasoning 
 
The majority of the legal conditionals used in this study were deontic, the consequents 
describing what should happen to an offender. This deontic formulation was selected 
following the law theoretic literature on the judicial syllogism. However, until now I have 
purposefully not talked much about the psychological literature on deontic reasoning, nor 
have I tried to relate my findings to these studies. In the following I present the main tenets 
with respect to deontic reasoning, and explain why it may be problematic to relate the 
literature on deontic reasoning to the defeasibility of legal rules investigated in this thesis.  
In deontic reasoning people are usually asked to make inferences about which actions 
are forbidden or allowed, obligatory or not obligatory given a deontic rule (Beller, 2010). 
Reasoners have to decide about the deontic adequacy of actions (e.g., If a person has a ticket, 
then the person may enter. A person has no ticket. What follows? See Beller, 2010). Which 
actions are permissible or not given a deontic rule are depicted in the deontic square (Figure 
11; e.g, Beller, 2008b; 2010; McNamara, 2014):  
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Figure 11. Deontic square. Figure based on Beller (2010). 
 
 
For instance, if a deontic rule states that A obligates B (“If a person has no ticket, then 
the person must stay outside”), and A is the case (i.e., a person has no ticket), then B is 
permissible (i.e., it is permissible to stay outside without a ticket), but it is a violation of the 
rule not to do B (i.e, not to stay outside, that is to enter without a ticket; see Beller, 2010).  
Deontic reasoning has been investigated either directly, by asking participants which 
actions are allowed, permissible or prohibited from given deontic conditional rule (e.g., 
Beller, 2008a; Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 2005), or with the help of the deontic version of 
Wason’s (1968) selection task. In the deontic selection task participants are confronted with a 
rule (e.g., “If a person is drinking beer, then that person must be over 18 years of age”; Cox & 
Griggs, 1982) and have to decide when this rule is violated. For this they must choose 
between four cards representing p (here: drinking beer), ¬p (here: not drinking beer), q (here: 
over 18 years), or ¬q (here: not over 18 years). The task is to indicate which cards have to be 
turned in order to test whether the rule was violated. The correct answer is to turn the p and 
¬q cards, because a person under 18 years drinking beer is a case that violates the rule. 
Participants are usually quite good in selecting those cards; much better than when the rule is 
not deontic but abstract (e.g., “If there is a vowel on one side, then there is an even number on 
the other side”). In the abstract selection task (the one used in Wason’s seminal experiment 
from 1968) people have to turn cards to falsify the rule. The correct cards to turn are also the 
p and ¬q cards, because both are necessary to falsify the two valid inferences according to 
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material implication: MP and MT. However, performance in the abstract selection task is very 
poor: reasoners turn the correct cards in only 4% of the cases (Johnson-Laird & Wason, 1970; 
see also Oaksford & Chater, 1995b). Several theories have been proposed to explain superior 
performance in the deontic compared to the abstract selection task. According to Cheng and 
Holyoak’s (1985) pragmatic reasoning schema theory, people apply domain specific inference 
schemas in reasoning. Among these schemas people are though to possess permission and 
obligations schemas (see Holyoak & Cheng, 1995a; 1995b), which facilitate reasoners’ 
correct resolution of the deontic selection task. Cosmides (1989) goes one step further arguing 
that people have some kind of cheater detection system, which originated through evolution 
and helps people in the selection task to pick the right cards. Also decision theoretic 
approaches have been developed to explain people’s performance in the deontic selection 
task. Oaksford and Chater (1995b; 2007; 2009) argue that people decide which cards to turn 
according to their expected utility for violation detection. Finally, an explanation from mental 
models theory for the high level of performance in the deontic selection task comes from 
Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (2005). They argue that people construct mental models of the 
permissible situations according to the evaluated rule, and that these models help to infer 
which actions are forbidden. 
Although tempting, linking the selection task to the experiments in this study is 
problematic. First, the selection task and the conditional inference tasks measure different 
things with different task requirements. In the selection task participants are not asked which 
conclusion should follow given some rule and fact. Instead, the selection task requires 
reasoners to either search for violations or to engage in hypothesis testing, applying Popper’s 
falsification theory (Popper, 1959; see e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 1995a). Second, and perhaps 
related to these different task requirements, different factors influence performance in the two 
tasks. Thompson (2000) showed in a multivariate principal component analysis that 
performance on conditional inference tasks depends on necessity and sufficiency relations, 
but performance on the Wason task not. Which cards are turned in the selection task depends 
instead on whether the conditional is deontic or factual. Conditional inference tasks and the 
Wason task evoke different representations of the conditional relationship (Thompson, 2000). 
As a consequence, Thompson (2000) concludes that the interpretation of conditionals in not 
only content specific, but also task dependent. 
These methodological issues are, however, not the only problems when trying to relate 
the findings from the literature on deontic reasoning to the findings in this thesis. The main 
problem is the underlying assumption of what a deontic rule represents: the deontic square 
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used to decide what correct deontic reasoning is, is not applicable to legal reasoning. Why so? 
According to the deontic square legal rules can be classified as obligation rules
6
, for instance: 
“If a person kills another human, then the person must be punished”. Now imagine the 
following inference: 
 
If a person kills another human, then the person must be punished. 
A person kills another human 
The person needs not to be punished.  
 
According to the deontic square, this conclusion is contradictory. However, in law it is not 
necessarily so: people need not to be punished after killing another human if exculpatory 
evidence exists. Now consider this inference: 
 
If a person kills another human, then the person must be punished. 
A person kills another human 
The person is not punished. 
 
According to the permission and obligation relations captured by the deontic square, this 
conclusion violates the deontic rule: If an action (here: punishing) is not taken although it is 
obligatory, then the rule is violated. However, in law this is not necessarily a violation. The 
rule of manslaughter is only violated if somebody kills another human and is not punished due 
to malpractice (e.g., errors in the police investigation, police corruption). But if instead a 
person is not punished because of exculpatory circumstances, then it is not a violation. The 
penal code includes several instances which actually permit cases of p and ¬q. Therefore, if 
somebody is not punished for manslaughter because of, e.g., self-defense, it is only an 
exception to the manslaughter rule. Legal rules are defeasible, and even though they state that 
some action deserves punishment, in light of exculpatory evidence it is permissible to not 
apply this rule anymore. Hence, defeasibility is not captured by the deontic square. Beller 
(e.g., Beller, 2008a; 2010) tried to find a solution to this problem by arguing that all relevant 
preconditions necessary for the deontic regulation should be included in the deontic rule 
                                                 
6
 On a first sight one could think that laws are prohibition laws, e.g., “It is prohibited to kill another human”. 
However, the way legal rules are exposed in the penal code corresponds to obligation rules: they describe what 
law practitioners are obligated to do when an offence was committed.  
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exhaustively, or that they are exhaustively represented in the mental representation of the rule. 
Applied to legal reasoning this would mean that all exculpatory evidence should be captured 
by the antecedent of the legal conditional. However, already in Section 1.2.1 it was explained 
why this is impossible in legal reasoning (and in reasoning in general). Another solution could 
be to say that legal rules are not obligation rules but only permission rules, to be read as “If a 
person kills another human, then the person may be punished”. Yet, this is also legally 
inadequate, this time because of being too weak for a legal rule. To say that a person may be 
punished would permit a judge not to punish offenders even when no exculpatory 
circumstances exist. This leaves too much room to subjectivity and thereby does not capture 
the spirit of legal rules. Legal rules are obligation rules, but defeasible obligation rules: they 
state which actions must be taken after an offence, but also allow defeating these decisions in 
light of exculpatory evidence. P¬q instances do not invalidate or violate the rule, but only 
defeat the conclusion. 
In sum, the legal conditionals used in this thesis describe deontic rules, but it is 
difficult to relate legal reasoning to the psychological literature on deontic reasoning. First, in 
this thesis participants were not asked to indicate when a conditional rule was violated. 
Second, deontic and legal reasoning have different understandings of “correct inference”, 
which have to do with defeasibility: the common literature on deontic reasoning does not 
consider the defeasibility of rules, which is crucial in law. Relating legal reasoning to the 
literature on deontic reasoning is thus in my opinion confusing. Maybe in future studies one 
could try to develop deontic logics for legal reasoning, for instance recently non-monotonic 
versions of deontic logic have been developed (e.g., Beirlaen & Straßer, 2013; Nute, 1997; 
Ryu, 1995). Future studies could also try to adapt the experimental paradigm and see how 
allowances and prohibitions are weighted in legal reasoning, for instance by trying to 
implement Oaksford and Chater’s (2007) decision theoretic approach on deontic reasoning.  
 
 
7.1.5. What does it mean to be rational?  
 
One question that arises from the current investigation is whether the conclusions reached by 
participants were rational or not. Until now, I have abstained from using the term “error” 
when discussing the experiments’ results. Nevertheless, what is a rational and what is an 
irrational conclusion in legal reasoning? From a legal point of view laypeople are clearly 
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doing wrong when ignoring exculpatory circumstances as reasons to void punishment. If the 
penal code states that a given circumstance is exculpatory and should therefore lead to the 
exoneration of the offender, then people who do not exonerate offenders are making “errors”. 
However, laypeople who do ignore potential defeaters and do not withdraw the MP valid 
conclusions are actually reasoning deductively correct because they preserve the monotonicity 
of inferences; such behavior has been considered in many psychological papers rational (e.g., 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Markovits, 1986; Markovits & Vachon, 1990; Rumain et al., 
1983; Taplin, 1971; see Evans, 2002 for an overview). That means: had I conducted the very 
same experiments in a deductive monotonic framework, then laypeople’s conclusions that 
ignore defeaters would have been labeled correct and rational. In fact, lawyers’ conclusions of 
not punishing offenders in light of exculpatory circumstances would have been wrong. So, 
who is right and who is wrong? 
My suggested answer is that neither lawyers nor laypeople are wrong, they are simply 
using distinct criteria for reasoning: those prescribed by the penal code, and those imposed by 
their own sense of justice, respectively. The ambiguity of reasoning “correctly” shows how 
important it is to clarify beforehand what is being tested – and even more importantly – what 
the reasoners think they should do. As Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004; 2005; 2008) 
argue, before evaluating responses in light of a rational norm (e.g., be that classical logic, 
probabilities, or some non-monotonic logic), and declaring those right or wrong, it is essential 
to understand how reasoners interpreted the task (see also Thompson, 2000). Researchers 
ought to consider what different interpretations a task allows. As Experiments 6 and 7 
showed, when reasoners interpret an inference task as asking about their deontic preferences, 
they reach different conclusions than when they think they have to answer according to their 
factual knowledge about the world. Along the same lines, researchers should also consider 
that people with different background knowledge might interpret problems differently. Just as 
laypeople and lawyers interpreted potential exculpatory circumstances differently, also other 
individual differences can affect interpretation. For instance, a person with training in 
classical logic would probably ignore content and answer according to the logical structure of 
a problem. I am not saying that researchers should wait until after the experiment to decide 
post-hoc which interpretation participants took. Instead, similar to Anderson’s rational 
analysis (1991), researchers should carefully examine their experimental paradigm and 
consider the reasoners’ goals, preferences, and background knowledge to predict which 
interpretation is most probable. Only if we can predict how a problem is being interpreted by 
those called to resolve it, we can say which conclusions rightly follow, and attempt to specify 
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how they might have been reached. Therefore, depending on how a problem has been 
interpreted, how consistently, in what context, and for what purpose, different conclusions 
may end up being right or wrong.  
Due to the complexity of understanding how reasoners interpret a problem it is also 
difficult to equal rationality to only one logical norm. I have just described how conclusions 
considered rational under the assumptions of classical logic can be considered wrong from the 
perspective of defeasible legal reasoning, and vice versa. Moreover, even within one 
monotonic framework the very same inferences can be sometimes considered errors and 
sometimes not, depending on their context. For instance, as contained in Grice’s (1975) 
conversational implicatures, sometimes AC and DA inferences – which are fallacies 
according to material implication – can be well justified, for example in conversational 
situations. Consider the following conditional: “If you pay me, I give you the product”. Even 
though there may be alternatives for someone handling the product without paying (e.g., an 
assault), in normal conversations, it is appropriate to conclude that if somebody does not pay, 
they do not get the product. In fact, in law AC and DA inferences are actually valid. The legal 
conditional “If somebody kills another person, then the person should be punished for 
manslaughter” has no alternative antecedents resulting in the same consequent. If somebody 
does not kill another human, then the person should not be punished for manslaughter, and if 
somebody should be punished for manslaughter, it is because the person killed another 
human. Legal conditionals thus bare a biconditional interpretation. 
The difficulty of classifying responses as correct or wrong, challenges the necessity of 
using norms in cognitive psychology. If everything depends on interpretation, then which 
norm can be used to describe human rationality? Some researchers have argued that it is not 
the task of psychologists to decide which norm should be applied to describe human 
reasoning (see Evans, 2012; Elqayam & Evans, 2011). Instead, psychologists should 
concentrate on how people actually reason. How people should reason is a concern for 
philosophers (Evans, 2012). This is of course a very simple solution for the problem in 
defining what rationality is, but I think it is not the only one. Instead of psychology giving up 
completely normative research, it could be more fruitful to allocate more resources to 
investigate how reasoners interpret problems, and which different norms may be appropriate 
for different interpretations. Many psychologists equal “logic” with classic propositional 
logic, probably for historical reasons. However, there are very different logics, especially for 
non-monotonic reasoning (e.g., default logic or epistemic logic). Therefore, in order to find a 
solution to the problem of the right norm for human reasoning, it is necessary that 
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psychologist collaborate with philosophers and logicians. Philosophers and logicians can 
suggest to psychologists various formal frameworks, whose assumptions can be tested 
experimentally, and psychologists can provide philosophers and logicians with empirical data 
about how people interpret reasoning tasks so that philosophers and logicians can suggest 
which logics may be the suitable norm for a given task or interpretation.  
 
 
 
7.2. Consequences for Law  
 
The differences between laypeople and lawyers found in this study are probably not surprising 
for law theorists. It is quite obvious that someone who has no elaborated knowledge about the 
penal code reasons differently with legal rules that somebody who does. Not for nothing 
lawyers have to study several years at university before obtaining the credential to apply law 
correctly. However, at a second sight, the results of this thesis have implications for the law 
theoretic debate about the moral correctness of law. In law there have been several 
discussions regarding the relationship between law and morals. Most law practitioners and 
law theorist agree that law and morals are not always the same (Hilgendorf, 2001; see also 
Alexy, 2008). In fact, law theorists following the school of legal positivism argue that it is 
necessary to distinguish and separate law from morals. They argue that law does not need a 
moral justification (e.g., Raz, 2009). However, this idea of justifying law by itself is often 
related to the injustices happening in the Third Reich. According to Radbruch (1946) the 
separation of law and morals allows people to carry out actions which might be legal, yet 
unjust according to one’s morality. In other words, it allows legalizing actions which should 
not be carried out by moral standards. Radbruch argues that law cannot be law if it does not 
guaranty justice. Accordingly, he appeals to judges to refuse applying laws which are 
extremely unjust (i.e., morally wrong; see Alexy, 2008), because unjust laws are simply not 
laws. This in turn allows sanctioning persons who acted according to some clearly unmoral 
law, as for example the leaders of concentration camps or border guards in the German 
Democratic Republic (Hilgendorf, 2001). The appeal to decide against immoral laws is also 
defended by other law philosophers such as Hart (1949). However, Hart still recognized 
immoral laws as laws, but ones which need to be refused by law practitioners. To sum up, the 
debate about moral correctness in law shows that although law theorists recognize that law 
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and moral are not equivalent, it may be necessary to think about which laws are morally 
acceptable and which not. But what is a morally acceptable rule? Hilgendorf (2001) argues 
that in the past religion defined what was morally right or wrong. But since nowadays religion 
has lost importance, he argues that new measures of morality are necessary. In this way, 
empirical studies – such as this thesis – can help to answer the question about how a morally 
acceptable rule should be. For instance, similarly to this study (but in a more ecologically 
valid context) one could create scenarios where agents carry out actions which are then rated 
as just or unjust, or as justified or unjustified. In addition, such studies could help to uncover 
further discrepancies between law and morality and to discuss their societal consequences 
(see Section 7.4).  
Another way in which this thesis is relevant for law is that it shows that psychological 
investigations can help to test theoretical assumptions from law theory. I showed here that the 
judicial syllogism, which was developed as a theoretical construct, can be tested empirically. 
Such experiments can thus help to test to what extent other theoretical constructs are suitable 
for practice as well. In this regard, Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that lawyers have no 
problems in applying the judicial syllogism when reasoning with legal rules. After the 
experiments no lawyer complained about the format of the task. On the contrary, they seemed 
to be familiar with reasoning about legal rules in a syllogistic way. Further, they also did not 
complain about the exculpatory circumstances that were presented to them, showing that 
defeating conclusions in light of exculpatory circumstances is something natural to them. 
There are plenty other law theoretical constructs besides the judicial syllogism that can be 
tested with psychological methods, for example the weighing of fundamental rights, 
something known in legal theory as balancing. The problems presented in this thesis were 
actually quite simple from a legal point of view. In order to defeat a conclusion, lawyers had 
only to decide whether a given circumstance information is exculpatory according to the penal 
code. However, when deciding between two or more fundamental rights, there are no written 
rules on how to decide. In principle, all fundamental rights have to be guaranteed. There is 
nothing like a penal code prescribing what to do when two fundamental rights are in conflict. 
Judges have to decide case by case which fundamental right deserves in this particular dispute 
more importance. For instance, imagine a case where a celebrity is photographed by a 
journalist during a candle light dinner. On the one hand the celebrity has the right to privacy, 
so he or she could prohibit the journalist to publish the picture. On the other hand the 
journalist has the right to freedom of the press, which allows a journalist to publish 
information and opinions considered relevant. How would you decide? Because there are no 
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concrete rules on how to decide, some legal theorists argue that such decisions cannot be 
made rationally (e.g., Habermas, 1992). However, Alexy (2003) argues that this is possible by 
proposing the Weight Formula (= Gewichtsformel):  
 
𝑮𝒊,𝒋 =
𝑰𝒊 × 𝑮𝒊 × 𝑺𝒊
𝑰𝒋 × 𝑮𝒋 × 𝑺𝒋
 
 
The Weight formula considers the degree of detriment of the first fundamental right i and 
compares it to the importance of satisfying the competing fundamental right j (Alexy, 2003). 
This is done by considering the case specific (Ii and Ij) and abstract weights (Gi and Gj) of the 
rights in conflict, and how certain the effects of favoring or disfavoring the one or the other 
fundamental right are (Si and Sj). Depending on this quotient, the first or the second right is 
preferred over the other. This rather abstract formula can be tested empirically in 
psychological investigations. For instance, one could construct cases of conflicting 
fundamental rights where all variables of the formula get a specific value. One could then 
compare participants’ preferences of fundamental rights to the predictions of the Weight 
formula. Such an empirical investigation of the Weight Formula might play a role in the 
debate about the rationality of balancing. 
 
 
 
7.3. Consequences for Social Psychology 
 
This study is important for social psychology in several ways. On a practical level it helps to 
understand people’s perception of justice. The literature on social justice and sentencing 
philosophies usually shows that people react negatively to offences, with a desire to punish 
offenders (e.g., Darley, 2009; Darley & Pittman, 2003; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Tetlock et 
al., 2000). People perceive that offences deserve punishment proportional to their severity 
(e.g., Alter et al., 2007; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley, 2009; Darley et al., 2000; Gromet & 
Darley, 2009). This thesis corroborates these findings by emphasizing the conditions under 
which people indeed have problems in excusing offences. In accordance with retributive 
sentencing philosophies, this difficulty was shown to depend on the perceived wrongfulness 
of the offence, even when asked to reason like real a judge (Experiment 2). Along these lines 
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– as already suggested in Section 7.1.1 – the reluctance to excuse offences can be also linked 
to the vast social psychological literature on people’s attempts to have control over a stable 
world. For example, the literature on “Belief in a Just World” (Lerner, 1970; Lerner & Miller, 
1978) shows that people are motivated to believe that everybody gets what they deserve. 
People therefore show a tendency to punish offenders or to derogate victims more harshly 
depending on how severe the offence was (see e.g., Walster, 1966). This can be linked with 
the findings reported in this thesis: the increased reluctance to accept exculpatory 
circumstances for severe offences can also be a result of the attempt to restore status quo. In 
sum, this thesis shows how deeply engrained people’s wish to punish offenders is. This has 
consequences when deliberating about the adequacy of sentencing reforms in legal systems. 
For instance, in recent times it has been argued that retributive punishment is not always 
necessary: punishing because of retribution does not necessarily help offenders to regenerate 
and to reincorporate later to society (e.g., Bazemore, 1998). Instead, law should pursue 
rehabilitation and especially restauration, which helps both – the victim and the offender – to 
understand their respective perspectives and necessities (Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & 
Platow, 2008). However, as long as people experience the wish to punish offenders – at least 
for severe offences – it remains open whether the population will accept such innovative 
sentencing methods (for further details see Robinson & Darley, 2007). If rehabilitation and 
restauration are not perceived as a proper punishment, people may feel dissatisfied with their 
legal system. The potential consequences of such dissatisfaction are described in Section 7.4.  
On a theoretical level this study helps to further understand the theory of moral 
outrage. For instance, Darley and Pittman (2003) proposed that mitigating circumstances, 
such as negligence, should lower feelings of moral outrage. They argue that mitigating 
circumstances usually show that offenders did not want to behave wrongfully, so that the 
perceived intentionality of the offence is lessened and consequently the moral wrongfulness 
of offences should be lowered. In this thesis, however, people had problems in considering 
exculpatory circumstances for severe offences. Although severity ratings were lowered by 
exculpatory evidence, participants still decided to punish the offender. This suggests that 
feelings of moral outrage impeded the consideration of exculpatory evidence as defeaters. 
How can this finding be integrated to the theory of moral outrage? One reason could be the 
way the offences and exculpatory circumstances were presented. In this thesis participants 
were first presented with the fact that an offence was committed and only afterwards they got 
the information about exculpatory circumstances. Both kinds of information were presented in 
separated screens, one after the other. It could thus be that the initial presentation of the 
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offence already evoked such strong feelings of moral outrage, that the subsequent presentation 
of exculpatory circumstances could not have high impact. This could be tested in further 
experiments where the order of the premises is reversed. If first exculpatory circumstances are 
presented (e.g., Bob is a person with a psychological disorder) and then the offence (Bob kills 
another human), then people might be more open to excuse this offence. Such primacy effects 
are long known in psychology (e.g., Anderson, 1965; Page & Norris, 1998) and can also be 
relevant in law, for instance when planning the order in which to present case relevant 
information during a trial (cf. Spiecker & Worthington, 2003). Moral outrage theory should 
therefore specify more clearly what is exactly meant when arguing that mitigating 
circumstances should lower feelings of moral outrage. It is not clear whether low feelings of 
moral outrage should actually exonerate offences or only mitigate them. Such as in this thesis, 
Robinson and Kurzban (2007) already suggested that even for low morally outraging offences 
people might expect at least some kind of mild punishment.  
Another implication for social psychology, in fact also for psychology in general, is 
methodological. This study shows that the conditional inference task – originally designed to 
measure reasoning performance – can also be used in other disciplines. Here it was put to use 
in testing theoretical constructs from law theory (see Section 7.2), but also in measuring 
people’s attitudes and preferences. In all experiments people’s conclusions mirrored their 
attitudes about offenders. Moreover, Experiments 4 and 5 showed how the conditional 
inference task can even be used to measure cultural differences in legal reasoning. Further 
still, the conditional inference task could be also used to infer which knowledge structures 
participants have, for example by analyzing how people weigh potential defeaters. I propose 
to continue using the conditional inference task in other domains at the interface between 
psychology and the social sciences. The paradigm has many advantages over other more 
typical methods in social psychological research. For instance, with the conditional inference 
task one can systematically manipulate the conditional rule and circumstance information 
without the need to add unnecessary filler information, which may confound the results and 
make comparisons between experimental conditions difficult. One can focus on the relevant 
factors without adding unnecessary noise to the task. Also, if the rule, fact, circumstance, and 
conclusion are presented on separate screens, the conditional inference task allows the 
measurement of decision times, which is more cumbersome with other methodologies such as 
vignettes. In this thesis measuring decision times provided insights into the cognitive 
processes of legal reasoning. They showed that deciding contrary to feelings of moral outrage 
is difficult, irrespective of whether this implies to exonerate severe offences or to punish low 
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morally outraging offences (Experiment 2). In Experiment 4, decision times even allowed 
showing differences between highly and less-religious participants that were not visible in the 
mere responses. This may actually explain why many studies on the effect of religiosity on 
punishment decisions that do not measure decision times sometimes have difficulties in 
finding such effects (see McCullough & Worthington, 1999). The bottom line proposal is not 
that traditional social psychological measures should be abolished. Instead I propose that the 
conditional inference task could be an interesting supplement to traditional social 
psychological measures, especially when generating hypotheses about the factors that 
influence particular decisions.  
 
 
 
7.4. Consequences for Society 
 
The discrepancies found between law and feelings of justice discussed in the previous 
sections also bear on our society. The reported experiments show that investigating reasoning 
with legal conditionals is of interest beyond the rather abstract investigation of defeasible 
reasoning. This thesis’ results help to understand why people often are annoyed when they 
hear about offenders released on parole or when they hear that offenders “only” get a hospital 
treatment order: when offences are of high moral outrage, laypeople have difficulties in 
accepting exculpatory circumstances. This difficulty does not necessarily mean that laypeople 
do not know that specific circumstance information may be exculpatory. Instead, this 
difficulty shows that people have problems in withdrawing the punishment of offenders when 
this withdrawal conflicts with their own sense of justice. Accordingly, in Experiment 2 
laypeople accepted exculpatory circumstances as reasons for voiding punishment, but only 
when the offence was of low moral outrage.  
The implications of laypeople rejecting situations that the penal code labels as 
exculpatory are problematic. The problems used in these experiments show that sometimes 
laypeople perceive offences differently than the legal system does, although they were 
fictitious and had limited external validity (see Section 7.5.5). Darley (2001; 2009) previously 
discussed the negative consequences these discrepancies can have for society. Besides 
dissatisfaction, such a mismatch between the law and people’s own sense of justice can have 
other consequences: people might lose respect for the legal system and refuse to follow rules 
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they consider inappropriate (Darley, 2001). In other words, people might be willing to follow 
and respect a legal rule only if they perceive it as just and right. Darley (2009), for instance, 
describes how the prohibition laws in the beginning of the 20
th
 century in the United States – 
which prohibited selling, producing, and transporting alcohol – were not followed by the 
people, primarily because alcohol consumption was considered as morally permissible. A 
similar behavior is observed when people illegally download music or stream TV shows. 
Downloading music illegally was used as a legal conditional in Experiments 6 and 7 and was 
the offence with the lowest moral outrage ratings and the lowest rule agreement ratings. This 
suggests that illegal download of music is not perceived as morally wrong, and could thus at 
least partly explain why so many people engage in such practices (Swash, 2009). Along these 
lines, also corruption and underground practices can result from people’s perception of having 
to obey rules they do not consider morally necessary (Robinson & Darley, 2007). Police 
officers or other authorities are probably more willing to act against the law if they have not 
internalized as a moral duty following such rules.  
Another serious consequence of people feeling unsatisfied with their legal system is 
vigilantism, which has been already treated in Experiment 5. Vigilantism is often linked to 
low trust in the legal system. The literature talks in this respect about people feeling that the 
police and courts are corrupt, that they do not do their jobs well and leave offenders free. This 
perception is not only linked to malpractice of police and courts. People can also feel low trust 
in police and courts if they consider that the rules of their justice system are not appropriate, 
e.g., too lenient (Robinson & Darley, 2007). In other words, people can also feel low trust in 
the legal system if they do not agree with the rules of the penal code. This implies that if the 
mismatches between legal system and people’s sense of justice can be replicated outside the 
lab, then people’s disagreement with exonerating offenders for severe offences can increase 
their sympathy for vigilantes. Interestingly, only two years after conducting the study on 
vigilantism (Experiment 5) a movement denominated “chapa tu choro” arose in Peru. “Chapa 
tu choro” is a colloquial way to say “catch your thief”. This movement started as an online 
campaign in social networks, in response to the increasing criminality experienced in Peru in 
2015. The campaign was adopted very fast by the Peruvian population (Doyle, Torres, & 
Judah, 2015). Within few weeks a lot of thieves were caught by their own victims or by 
witnesses of assaults. People even organized plans to capture thieves in flagrante. Captured 
thieves were insulted, humiliated, or beaten (Collyns, 2015; Roper, 2015), and in some cases 
delivered to the police (“Atrapan a sujeto robando,” 2015). However, even though at first 
sight this movement was effective with respect to capturing offenders, one should not forget 
CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 181 
that it is grounded on the idea of vigilantism, which is a crime. Even though most offenders 
caught by “chapa tu choro” were indeed guilty, one should not forget that everybody has a 
right to defend themselves and to get a just trial: everybody is innocent until the opposite is 
proven, but proving is not something that vigilantes invest much effort in.  
In sum, it is important to continue investigating legal reasoning not only for basic 
research reasons, but also because it helps to gain insights in people’s perception of law and 
their attitudes towards the legal system. We can only help improve our society if we 
understand how people perceive what is just, and what modulates their ways of dealing with 
injustices. Understanding these concepts is essential for constructing a desirable society where 
people do not follow its rules because of obedience, but because they perceive them to be just. 
 
 
 
7.5. Limitations and Further Perspectives 
 
The findings of the experiments presented in this thesis have helped to understand how people 
reason about legal rules, and on what their defeasible reasoning depends. In addition, they 
highlighted the importance of considering people’s background knowledge during defeasible 
reasoning as well as the reasoners’ attitudes and preferences about the conditional content. It 
is noteworthy as one of the first studies to investigate experimentally defeasible reasoning in 
law. As a consequence, there are still many open questions that require further work. Along 
these lines, the experiments presented in this thesis also have some methodological 
shortcomings to be considered in further research. In the following I will discuss these 
shortcomings and argue how these could be solved in future experiments.  
 
 
7.5.1. Measuring Moral Outrage 
 
In all experiments moral outrage was measured indirectly by preliminary studies. In online 
studies large samples of participants rated how morally outraged they felt by offences (N= 
448 for Experiment 2 and 4, N = 568 for Experiment 5). The same was done for Experiments 
9 and 10 when measuring the emotional valence of everyday conditionals. The main reason 
for measuring moral outrage indirectly was to avoid demand characteristics. If reasoners had 
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been asked in the beginning of the experiment to rate how morally outraged they feel by the 
different offences, then they might have become aware that the experiment was meant to 
measure some relation between moral outrage and reasoning. Asking participants after the 
experiment to rate their moral outrage was also not a good option because the problems in the 
experiment might have made participants aware that offences can be mitigated, which in turn 
could have affected moral outrage ratings.  
One way to have a more direct measure of moral outrage in future experiments could 
be through the use of physiological measures, like electrogalvanic skin response or pupil 
dilatation (e.g., Blanchette & Leese, 2010; Prehn & van der Meer, 2014). Participants’ 
electrogalvanic skin response, for instance, could be measured in preceding experimental 
blocks. Before resolving the inference tasks, participants could be confronted with the 
different offences (e.g., “A person kills another human”) while measuring their electrodermal 
activity (EDA). One important benefit is that feelings of moral outrage would be measurable 
even without giving any explicit rating instruction. This way, measuring EDA has no demand 
characteristics because it allows recording participants’ natural response to offences, without 
letting them note what is aimed to measure and thereby potentially leading to artifacts. A 
similar approach has been used by Blanchette and Leese (2010), who were interested in the in 
relation between skin conductance responses (SCR) and reasoning performance in a deductive 
inference task. The content of their conditionals was originally emotionally neutral, but after a 
classic conditioning trial these neutral conditionals were associated with certain emotions. 
Blanchette and Leese found that higher arousal to negative stimuli during the conditioning 
task was related to more logical errors in reasoning.  
Another advantage of measuring moral outrage with EDA is that it allows testing for 
individual differences. People with high electrodermal responses (and therefore higher 
feelings of moral outrage) should be more prone to punish offenders and ignore potential 
defeaters. Physiological measures could therefore be an interesting addition to the literature 
on moral outrage, but also on the role of emotions in reasoning, especially because in most 
experiments emotions are only measured by self-reports, even though arousal is considered to 
be an important component of emotions (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). However, EDA also 
poses some methodological difficulties. SCR are very slow and time-lagged, making long 
stimulus intervals of 6 to 12 seconds necessary (Figner & Murphy, 2011). Measuring the 
arousal evoked by single offences would thus require long lasting pause slides between 
offences. This could make the experiment very tedious and participants might lose motivation 
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and attention. One solution would be to use block designs to measure EDA. This requires 
grouping offences of similar severity, but allows a more reliable measurement of SCR.  
Semantic priming (e.g., Neely, 1977) is yet another reliable – though indirect – 
measure of moral outrage. When offences do evoke feelings of moral outrage, offences should 
enhance the classification of outrage related words compared to neutral words. For instance, 
in lexical decision tasks participants could be confronted with offences as primes, and then 
presented with either non-words or words which are unrelated or related to moral outrage, 
e.g., anger, injustice, outrage, immoral, disgust, etc. (see Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 
1999). Depending on how fast participants classify moral outrage related words one could 
infer how highly morally outraged they were by the offence. Alternatively, upon presenting 
offences as primes, participants could be asked to classify ambiguous situations – perhaps 
pictures of social interactions – along different dimensions such as right/wrong, just/unjust, or 
even outraging/not outraging. Ratings as well as decision times could indicate how morally 
outraging participants were by the offence. Similar experiments have already been carried out 
to measure the effect of emotions on the interpretation of ambiguous stimuli, for example by 
the use of homophones, homographs, or ambiguous sentences (Richards & French, 1992; see 
also Calvo & Castillo, 1997; 2001; for a review see Blanchette & Richards, 2010).  
There are many benefits of measuring moral outrage more objectively, besides the 
possibility of testing individual differences. For instance, one could also investigate in how far 
lawyers are morally outraged by offences. In this study lawyers’ punishment decisions did not 
depend on the level of moral outrage of the offences. However, this does not mean that 
lawyers did not experience any emotions at all. It is not clear whether lawyers do not react 
emotionally to offences at all, or if they are simply able to control their emotions and inhibit 
their effect. For instance, Schleim, Spranger, Erk, and Walter (2011) found that even when 
lawyers report not to be emotionally involved when judging offences, brain regions involved 
in emotional processing did not differ in their activity from laypeople. Further studies 
including the measurement of arousal could thus help to understand what it actually means “to 
think like lawyers” (Goodenough, 2001, p. 41). 
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7.5.2. Improving the Experimental Paradigm  
 
In this thesis defeasible reasoning was assessed in different ways. In some experiments it was 
measured by comparing inferences drawn from conditionals with and without exculpatory 
circumstances (Experiment 5, 9, and 10), or with irrelevant circumstances (Experiment 1 and 
4). In other experiments defeasible reasoning was measured by comparing the amount of 
defeated conclusions drawn from conditionals containing differently morally outraging 
offences (Experiment 2 and 8) or different quantifiers (Experiment 8). Yet in others, measures 
of defeasible reasoning were derived from testing in how far the frequency of exceptions or 
people’s preference of pq over p¬q predicted inferences (Experiment 6 and 7). All these 
methods were rather static. Only through comparisons between different conditions it was 
possible to test whether one manipulation encouraged people to defeat conclusions or not. In 
further studies it would be recommendable to try to measure defeasible reasoning more 
dynamically. For instance, one could ask participants to select a conclusion twice, first after 
presenting only rule and fact, and second, after introducing a potential defeater. This has 
several advantages. On the one hand it is a direct measure of defeasible reasoning since it 
shows how people actually defeat a previously drawn conclusion in light of additional 
information. On the other hand it helps to understand how defeaters are weighed, for instance 
by comparing the impact of different defeaters on the same legal conditional. This allows the 
calculation of the defeasible power of each defeater. The procedure is also advantageous 
because it allows introducing several defeaters to one problem. For instance, one could 
present a case of manslaughter and first present coercion as a defeater, and then – after a 
punishment has been conclusion – a second defeater, such as psychological disorders. This 
would indicate not only how high the impact of additional defeaters is, but also whether there 
are any order effects.  
A similar method has been used by Dieussaert, Schaeken, Schroyen, and d’Ydewalle 
(2000). Dieussaert and colleagues constructed problems where participants first drew a 
conclusion on the basis of the initial conditional and a fact. Only in a second step they 
presented another conditional implying a defeater (cf. Byrne, 1989) and asked participants if 
they would change their previous conclusion in light of this new information. Dieussart’s et 
al. (2000) results show that at least some people consider defeaters in two stages: first they 
draw a putative conclusion without the consideration of the disabling condition, which they 
then amend in light of defeaters. Manktelow et al. (2000) also used a similar procedure in 
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their experiments on road traffic violations (see Section 1.2.3). In one condition Manktelow 
and colleagues presented the information about offence category (speeding vs. drink-driving), 
degree of the offence (minor vs. major), and circumstance information (aggravating vs. 
mitigating) in serial mode. Participants indicated after each information which fine the 
offender deserves. Results corroborated the findings from their static version of the task.  
Another interesting manipulation to the experimental paradigm would be to introduce 
time constraints. The literature on dual process accounts of reasoning shows that under time 
constraints people rely more on System 1 than on System 2 (Markovits et al., 2013). 
Therefore, it may be that time constraints enhance the effect of moral outrage. For instance, 
highly morally outraging offences could be punished to an even higher degree, whereas low 
morally outraging offences even less. In other words, time constraints could enhance people’s 
usage of their own sense of justice during reasoning. Especially interesting would also be to 
test lawyers under time constraints. In the current thesis lawyers answered according to the 
penal code, but when given less time they could rely more on their own moral values. In fact, 
before the experiments of Chapter 3 some lawyers asked me whether they should answer as 
lawyers or as ordinary people. So time constraints could help to better understand the 
relationship between the theoretical knowledge of law and the moral understandings of 
lawyers.  
 
 
7.5.3. Different Legal Conditionals 
 
In the present study all legal conditionals had the same structure: the antecedent described an 
offence mainly from penal code, while the consequent indicated whether the offender should 
or will be punished. Keeping constant this structure allowed comparisons across studies. 
Further studies could nonetheless vary the kind of offence described in the legal conditional, 
as well as specify the kind of punishment an offence deserves.  
 
7.5.3.1. Specifying the Punishment 
 
In all experiments legal conditionals stated that the offender of a crime should (or will) be 
“punished”. This was done following the judicial syllogism tradition from law theory (see 
Alexy, 1983; Bäcker, 2009; Koch & Rüßmann, 1982). However, the word “punishment” can 
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have different meanings: from a fine, to life imprisonment, or even to death penalty in some 
countries. One aim for the future could thus be to create legal conditionals where the 
consequent is more precise. For instance, one could pair offences with punishments which are 
in accordance to people’s sense of justice, or which are not. If a deontic legal conditional is 
paired with a too lenient consequent (e.g., “If a person kills another human, then the person 
should be punished with a fine”), or with a too harsh one (e.g., “If a person steals, then the 
person should be punished with life imprisonment”) people might refuse to draw MP 
conclusions although they are against the committed offence. The same could happen with 
factual legal conditionals: if the consequent does not describe what is believed to be the usual 
punishment for a given offence, then people might also refuse to endorse MP. For example, 
the factual legal conditional “If a person illegally downloads music, then the person will be 
punished with life sentence” is probably endorsed even less than the non-specified version “If 
a person illegally downloads music, then the person will be punished”.  
The punishment could also be specified by keeping the consequent constant, but by 
providing a Likert-scale which reflects the different degrees of punishment that exist. Such a 
Likert-scale could range from no-punishment to life imprisonment. One problem with such a 
Likert-scale is that it might hinder the measurement of defeasible reasoning. By having only 
one option for no-punishment (e.g., the left most extreme of the scale) but several options for 
different degrees of punishment, participants might feel artificially tempted to avoid this one 
extreme. It would thus be more appropriate to include such a question about how strong a 
punishment should follow after participants already made the choice whether punishment 
should/ will follow or not.  
 
7.5.3.2. Varying the Offences 
 
Besides specifying the kind of punishment, one could also vary the specific offences in 
the legal conditionals. For instance, further studies could investigate people’s defeasible 
reasoning with rules from civil law. Contrary to the penal code, offences in civil code do not 
describe core offences against life and physical or mental integrity, but are thought to regulate 
private law, such as transactions between entities or companies, property, or family law. 
Accordingly, Robinson and Kurzban (2007) argue that only core offences evoke high desires 
to punish offences. Hence, it might be possible that people’s consideration of defeaters with 
respect to the civil code is higher than for the penal code. For instance, people could be 
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confronted with the rule “If there was an offer and acceptance, then a valid contract was 
created” and the defeater “One of the parties was insane when accepting the offer” and asked 
whether under these circumstances a valid contract was created (example taken from the 
Dutch contract law, see Prakken, 2001). Also cross-cultural studies with offences from the 
civil code could be interesting. Given that civil law varies between cultures, one could test 
how intuitive their regulations are: depending on whether defeaters from civil code are 
considered justified in cultures where they do not exist, one could tell something about the 
suitability of such rules and defeaters.  
One could also investigate what happens if participants have to decide about actions 
that are considered offences under some personal or societal norms, but not under penal or 
civil law. Consider abortion for example. Under German law, there are several exculpatory 
circumstances for abortion. But abortion is prohibited by several religions. When considering 
exculpatory circumstances in cases of abortion, highly religious participants should be highly 
reluctant to accept these exculpatory circumstances as valid exceptions from punishment. The 
same may be true for offences which only exist in law, but are permitted by certain religions. 
For example law prohibits circumcision due to religious doctrines whenever minors are not 
explicitly told what circumcision means (Zacharakis, 2013). In some religions, however, such 
practices are supported. Comparing people’s reasoning about rules which only exist according 
to law or another norm (e.g., religion) can help to understand how the source of a rule affects 
defeasible reasoning. Along these lines future studies could also investigate people’s legal 
reasoning with offences whose perceived severity differs from the amount of penalty assigned 
to them in the penal code. For instance, according to the penal code manslaughter is 
considered much more severe (not less than 5 years, up to life imprisonment) than sexual 
assault (not less than 2 years). However, when these offences are dramatized in movies or TV 
series, people’s reactions are in conflict with the severity order proposed in penal code. While 
killing people is part of many movies, showing how somebody is raped is considered not 
appropriate. Consequently, both laypeople’s and lawyers’ reasoning about such offences 
should differ in predictable directions: laypeople may consider raping as more severe than 
manslaughter and consider thus more defeaters for the latter than for the former, whereas 
lawyers’ severity perception and consideration of defeaters may be the other way around. 
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7.5.4. Expertise and Longitudinal Studies  
 
In the first three experiments laypeople’s legal reasoning was compared with lawyers’. 
However, these “lawyers” were in their majority advanced law students, and not graduates or 
highly experienced lawyers. Although this might appear at a first sight problematic, I do not 
think that this has severe consequences for the interpretations. The problems used in the 
experiments were quite simple from a legal point of view. The only challenge was to 
recognize a certain exculpatory circumstance correctly. Law students in Germany learn to do 
this in the middle of their studies, in such a way that the advanced law students tested should 
be familiar with the relevant details of the penal code. In fact, an initial comparison of the 
advanced law students and the graduate students in Experiments 1 and 2 did not show relevant 
significant differences. Furthermore, more experienced lawyers normally specialize in a 
particular legal domain (e.g., civil law), and may not remember all the details of the penal 
code. One exception would be for sure criminal court judges, but convincing them to come to 
the lab and participate in some psychological experiment would be too difficult anyway. One 
solution could be nonetheless to construct online studies on legal reasoning. By giving 
lawyers the possibility to participate in the experiment from their homes, it would be possible 
to test more people with expert knowledge, perhaps even people working in higher instances 
of the legal system. However, online studies allow for less experimental control, for example 
continuous concentration cannot be guaranteed. In addition, lawyers may ease their reasoning 
by looking up the relevant parts of the penal code.  
Another way in which the effect of theoretical knowledge on legal reasoning could be 
tested is through longitudinal studies. It is imaginable that the effect of moral outrage on 
punishment decisions decreases especially in the first years of law studies. Such findings 
would not only corroborate my interpretations, but also help to gain more insight into the 
relationship between moral outrage and reasoning. For instance, it is possible that the effect of 
moral outrage is stronger the more uncertain participants are. By testing participants with 
different degrees of knowledge we can find out under which circumstances moral outrage 
mostly affects inferences. This can actually also be tested with laypeople as participants. In 
this study only participants that reported to have no elaborated knowledge of the penal code 
were tested. However, it is also possible to test laypeople with different degrees of 
knowledge, for example knowledge from the media or TV. Irrespective of whether this 
knowledge is correct according to the penal code, such knowledge could still enhance 
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reasoners’ subjective feeling of certainty and thereby lower the impact of their own sense of 
justice on reasoning. 
 
 
7.5.5. External Validity 
 
One last limitation of this study is its external validity. By being one of the first studies 
combining the fields of legal reasoning and conditional reasoning it was necessary to start 
with a rather abstract and simple experimental paradigm. People’s legal reasoning was 
investigated with an adapted version of the deductive paradigm from cognitive psychology. 
Consequently, the problems only contained sparse information: a legal conditional rule, a fact, 
potential exculpatory evidence, and the question about the conclusion. Even though the 
judicial syllogism itself contains just as little information, in real legal cases certainly more 
information is available. For instance, real cases contain more information about offenders 
and victims, such as age, criminal record, or intentions. Moreover, in actual legal cases more 
than one rule may be applicable, and much more circumstance information is available. It is a 
task for further studies to operationalize such variables experimentally in order to get better 
insight into people’s defeasible reasoning with legal rules. One way in which this could be 
done is by providing participants with short background stories about the offence, offender, 
and victim just before presenting the legal inference task. Such a methodology has been 
already applied by e.g., Demeure, Bonnefon, and Raufaste (2009). An even more externally 
valid alternative would be to embed legal conditionals and defeaters in case reports or 
newspaper articles. Participants could be asked to reason about a real case, thus enhancing 
their motivation, allowing more case relevant information, and thereby encouraging more 
realistic reasoning. 
 
 
 
7.6. Conclusion 
 
This thesis investigated how people withdraw conclusions from legal rules. While lawyers 
decided about exculpatory evidence as prescribed in the penal code, laypeople’s withdrawal 
of conclusions drawn from legal rules depended on their own sense of justice. When 
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laypeople were asked whether an offender should be punished, their consideration of 
exculpatory circumstances varied according to how morally outraging the offence was. 
Conclusions drawn from highly morally outraging offences were difficult to defeat, probably 
because of conflicts with people’s desire to punish offenders. Only when laypeople were 
asked whether an offender will be punished, they were more willing to consider exceptions 
also for highly morally outraging offences. Along these lines also societal rules of behavior 
affected inferences. Depending on people’s attitudes towards offences and offenders, 
sometimes legally irrelevant defeaters or legally impermissible situations (i.e., vigilantism) 
were considered as reasons to void punishment. Finally, people’s reluctance to defeat 
conclusions one emotionally approves can also be observed outside the domain of legal 
reasoning, such as when reasoning about emotional situations from everyday life.  
This study corroborates the complexity of human reasoning. For a long time now 
psychologists have focused on investigating people’s competence to reason deductively from 
a given set of premises. Very insightful theories on human reasoning have emerged from 
those studies. However, conclusions are hardly ever irrefutable. In most domains of our daily 
lives we draw conclusions which we defeat in light of additional information. Just like in law, 
also when deliberating about what to conclude from the arguments of politicians, colleagues, 
or friends it is quite often necessary to engage in defeasible reasoning. In this process of 
defeasible reasoning, people make use of different kinds of information. Besides potential 
defeaters, this study showed that people may also take into account their preferences, attitudes 
and experiences during reasoning. All these factors must be considered when trying to 
understand and to predict human cognition. Not considering them could lead researchers to 
unjustifiably classify some conclusions as “errors”. I use “unjustifiably” because the 
integration of defeaters, preferences, and experiences, that is, of both objective and subjective 
factors, may be so complex and coherent that, far from being an “error”, it might appear more 
like a sign of rationality. It is certainly a task for future studies to continue investigating how 
people reason in context rich situations. Only this way it will be possible to develop complex 
enough reasoning theories to fit the complexities of human cognition. 
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